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Investors face numerous challenges when making investment decisions. Which kind
of retail financial product suits their needs best? How to select between several similar
products from different financial institutions? When to divest from a product or to invest
in a new one? Answering these questions requires the weighting of many different factors
with sound information and solid financial knowledge. However, investors—particularly
retail investors—are often confronted with limited expertise and bounded capabilities
to process new information. Accordingly, it is not surprising that retail investors tend
to make investment decisions that, from a normative view, might not be in their best
interest, given the complexity and the often confusing financial products offered to them
(Campbell, 2006; Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini, 2007; Tufano, 2009). Hence, since sellers
of those financial products usually have superior information than their buyers (Carlin,
2009; Carlin and Manso, 2011), retail investors often rely on the provided and presented
information.
In this dissertation, entitled “Information Disclosure, Competition, and Sustainability
in Retail Financial Markets”, I examine different retail financial products. Motivated to
understand investment decisions in more detail and contribute to a more sustainable world
in general, I investigate the relation between financial products for retail investors, the
provided salient information, and the corresponding value of the information for investors.
This dissertation addresses questions like what kind of information is salient to investors?
Which news about their products do financial institutions provide and highlight? Which
information should be taken into account for the investment decision, and is the provided
information accurate? In three empirical papers, employing a wide range of different
research methods, e.g., laboratory experiments, textual analysis, cluster analysis, I derive
several answers to these questions.
The first essay of my dissertation investigates the market for structured products in
Switzerland. These products are often fairly complex, and most retail investors have
limited experience investing in them (Henderson and Pearson, 2011; Célérier and Vallée,
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2017). Choosing one of those products is often associated with a lot of uncertainty, and
therefore, the provided and salient information is crucial for investors. In this essay, my
co-authors and I investigate both the demand and the supply side of yield enhancement
products. We document that these products’ inherent complexity, combined with salient
information, i.e., the coupon of these products, is a driver of high margins. This fact is
further reinforced by a high degree of competition among issuers.
The second and third essay focuses on a different retail financial product as well as
another region by analyzing the market for mutual funds in the United States. The U.S.
mutual funds market is quite large, complicating investors’ decision process for the mutual
funds to invest in (Sirri and Tufano, 1998; Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). The second essay
analyzes the value and accuracy of the information provided in mutual fund prospectuses.
Since every mutual fund in the U.S. is mandated to provide key information to (potential)
investors, we examine whether the provided qualitative information is accurate and should
be considered by investors when making an investment decision.
Finally, the last essay takes a closer look at another specific information piece provided
by mutual funds: the mutual fund names. This essay investigates the accuracy of the
information embedded in mutual fund names and documents that funds often deviate
from the stated style in them.
However, before providing the details of the research papers, I would like to establish
the foundations of my work in this chapter. In general, all essays contribute to the field of
household finance. Hence, what is household (consumer) finance? According to the two
presidential addresses of Campbell (2006), and Tufano (2009), household finance asks how
investors make financial decisions and how regulatory interventions affect the provision of
financial services. It is the normative and positive study of how institutions can provide
financial goods and services to satisfy households’ objectives (Guiso and Sodini, 2013).
In a perfect world, investors would, without difficulty, achieve their objectives by
making suitable investment decisions as long as they have all relevant information. Si-
multaneously, competition among financial institutions would ensure the accuracy of the
provided information. Since otherwise, the company would be forced out of the market.1
Thus, based on these assumptions, all decisions would be beneficial for the investors in the
long-term, and we would live in a sustainable and stable financial system. Obviously, this
is a normative and not a positive description of our world. In reality, it is well documented
that households experience notable welfare costs due to investing mistakes (Calvet et al.,
1Classic microeconomics predicts price convergence to marginal cost in the presence of high competi-
tion.
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2007). While investors have to make a wide array of financial decisions, many retail in-
vestors have only limited ability to make decisions that are always in their best interest.
Hence, what are the constraints keeping retail investors from achieving their objectives
by deviating from the prescriptions of normative finance?
On the one hand, it might be their behavior and the corresponding biases that in-
vestors exhibit. This view is covered in the behavioral finance literature. Especially, the
first essay of this dissertation contributes to this literature. This research field focuses
on investors’ behavior and provides some answers to potential behavioral constraints (bi-
ases). It primarily deals with the psychology and sociology of investors as well as the
mechanisms that influence individuals’ financial decisions.2 On the other hand, we can
examine the setting in more detail in which retail investors have to make financial de-
cisions. Contributing mainly to this view, I investigate in this dissertation in particular
what kind of information is provided, which information is salient, and how investors react
to it.
To elaborate more on potential constraints, let’s think about a world of full shared
information between financial institutions and investors. In this world, as soon as “ra-
tional” investors have all information at hand, they are able to make decisions that are
always in their long-term interest. Since rational investors exhibit no biases, they decide
based on the information available to them and accordingly manage to meet their prefer-
ences. Regulators only have to ensure that disclosures are complete and that the content
provided to (retail) investors is accurate. Indeed, several government policies attempt to
improve decision-making by setting disclosure requirements so that retail investors can
make informed decisions. Hence, information disclosure is an essential component of reg-
ulation in financial markets (Goldstein and Yang, 2017) and improves market quality in
an economy with exogenous information. While disclosure rules are certainly one way to
influence retail investors’ decisions, they have the advantage of not restricting the invest-
ment decision space. Thus, from a regulatory perspective, disclosure plays a significant
role in protecting investors without being prohibitive.3
However, we also know that even in theory, full shared information does not converge to
an equilibrium (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980). In reality, there are at least two limitations
that restrict convergence towards such an equilibrium. First, there are limitations in
2See, for instance, Shleifer (2000) for an introduction to behavioral finance, and Kahneman (2003) for
an overview on bounded rationality.
3Note, that I focus on ex-ante disclosures. I do not analyze strategic ex-post disclosures, which depend
on the received signal of the party and is part of the asymmetric information literature (see, e.g., Akerlof,
1970; Grossman, 1981; Milgrom, 1981; Dye, 1985; Acharya, DeMarzo, and Kremer, 2011).
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retail investors’ search and analysis of information. As outlined above, retail investors
exhibit bounded rationality. Second, theoretical and empirical literature discusses the
exploitation of information asymmetries between financial institutions and retail investors
(Bolton, Freixas, and Shapiro, 2007; Bergstresser, Chalmers, and Tufano, 2008; Carlin,
2009; Stoughton, Wu, and Zechner, 2011; Carlin and Manso, 2011; Mullainathan, Noeth,
and Schoar, 2012; Zingales, 2015; Egan, 2019). Due to the informational advantages
for the sell-side (Carlin, 2009; Carlin and Manso, 2011), and depending on the market
structure, this results in potential conflicts of interest between financial institutions and
retail investors.
Hence questions about the relation of the shared information between the supply and
the demand side often relate to industry competitiveness. The role of competition in this
context, however, is complex. On the one hand, competition among financial institutes
can be a mechanism to increase credible information disclosures (Bolton et al., 2007).
Hence, market forces might be a way to protect investors and to decrease this conflict of
interest. The standard economic theory claims that all information is directly consolidated
into market prices in competitive markets, and suppliers of financial products have to pass
on all profits to their customers. However, this relation only holds if there are no frictions
in the markets. Rent-seeking activities, which are common in finance (Shiller, 2003), are
a clear indication that markets are not fully efficient.4
On the other hand, competition might even amplify this conflict of interest. For in-
stance, an increase in competition leads to more pressure among the financial advisors
(Mehran and Stulz, 2007). Accordingly, financial institutions might be attempted to
shroud specific product attributes by increasing the obfuscation and complexity of finan-
cial products (Gabaix and Laibson, 2006; Carlin, 2009) or even to disclose misleading
information (Reurink, 2018). In this case, the provided information might not facilitate
investors’ decisions making. In other words, potential incentive conflicts exist in the
provision of almost all financial products, resulting in various types of externalities and
potential information failure.
Hence, authorities and the regulation of retail financial products play an essential role
(Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, and Tufano, 2011). Regulatory frameworks aim to protect
households from making mistakes and being exploited by financial intermediaries aware
of their limitations. In particular, in the second and third essay, my co-authors and I
elaborate on the importance of the regulatory authorities, namely the U.S. Securities
4For a survey of the costs that investors bear searching for positive performance, see also French
(2008).
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and Exchange Commission (SEC). Its mission is to ensure the quality of the information
provided by financial institutions and companies to their investors.
Finally, the papers in this dissertation are also related to sustainability. While in our
days, the term sustainability in the context of finance is closely linked to the environmental
and social performance of a financial asset, sustainability encompasses many more aspects
related to the durability and stability of the financial system. Indeed, it is challenging
to agree on a unique definition of the term sustainability, particularly in the context
of finance. However, how can an investment decision be sustainable if it is not in the
long-term interest of the investors? Therefore, I refer to a very comprehensive definition
of the term sustainability. The Cambridge Dictionary (2020) defines sustainability as
“the quality of causing little or no damage [...] and therefore able to continue for a
long time.” Accordingly, finance can only serve society if the investment decisions are in
the investors’ long-term interest. Accurate and valuable information is a prerequisite to
obtaining a sustainable equilibrium. Hence, I relate in this thesis sustainability to welfare-
maximizing behavior. Friedman (1970) argues that firms profit-maximizing behavior and
the private donation of the firm owners would directly maximize welfare, and we should
not expect costly pro-social behavior from financial institutes, firms, and their investors.
However, the more recent literature emphasizes that a pro-social behavior can be the
welfare-maximizing behavior if investors experience frictions or if firms can use it as a
comparative advantage (see, e.g., Bénabou and Tirole, 2010; Magill, Quinzii, and Rochet,
2015; Hart and Zingales, 2017). Thus, there are still unanswered research questions that
demand to evaluate financial institutions’ current practices and whether these are in the
interest of investors and society in general. Accordingly, the details of my essays are the
following.
In the first essay, Low Interest Rates, Bounded Rationality, and Product Complex-
ity: Demand and Supply Effects for Retail Financial Markets, we study the market for
yield enhancement products in Switzerland. It is written together with Marc Chesney
and Felix Fattinger. In this essay, we investigate the post-global Financial crisis mar-
ket for retail structured products. Our study focuses on a prototypical and particularly
interesting retail financial market: the market for so-called yield enhancement products
(YEPs). Generally, the difficulty in studying the role of specific bounds to rationality in
the context of financial innovation lies in the isolation of behavioral channels within the
endogenous determination of competitive equilibrium outcomes. To overcome this poten-
tial endogeneity problem, we combine the power of laboratory control with the external
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validity of representative field data.
In the first part of the essay, we experimentally study the demand for “complex prod-
ucts” controlling for different investment environments. First, we find that product mar-
gins go hand in hand with participants’ misestimation of Multis’ inherent correlation risk,
which directly translates into higher margins relative to Singles. Second, our results indi-
cate a negative relation between interest rate levels and participants’ willingness to bear
the risk. In line with Lian, Ma, and Wang (2019), we provide evidence for an increased
appetite for risk in an environment of low-interest rates. Lower interest rates significantly
increase the demand for both Singles and Multis, while we do not observe any impact on
participants’ relative willingness-to-pay (WTP). Third, we find participants’ WTP to be
decreasing in their relative risk aversion but increasing in their level of overconfidence.
The second main contribution of the essay is the provision of evidence for the external
validity of the experimental findings by analyzing a unique data set spanning 4,460 Barrier
Reverse Convertibles (BRC) on U.S. equities issued in Switzerland between 2008 and
2017. For each BRC, we estimate expected issuer margins implied by standard pricing
techniques and calculate realized issuer returns based on actual cash flows at maturity.
We find banks’ average issuance margin to be consistently higher for Multis (at least 4.0%,
depending on correlation estimations) relative to Singles (2.0%). Thus, the misestimation
of correlation effects documented in our experiment provides a precise mechanism that
can explain the margin differences observed in the field.
Looking closer at the issuer of those products, we then document that the number of
different issuers remains high throughout. Based on this fact, we conclude that there is
considerable competition among BRC issuers for retail investors. Therefore, the third key
insight from this essay is the positive relationship between competition and an increase
in complexity. More precisely, we document that by increasing the issued products’ com-
plexity, financial institutions can partly shield their margins from competition pressure.
Mutual Fund and Qualitative Disclosure is the second essay in this dissertation, written
jointly with Timo Schäfer. This essay studies the informational value of U.S. mutual funds’
qualitative disclosures. In the United States (as well as in Europe), mutual funds are
mandated not only to inform about yearly measures on performance but also to provide
up-to-date qualitative information on their investment strategies, investment objectives,
and principal risks (SEC, 2009). Accordingly, we ask a straightforward question: What
is the informational value of these qualitative disclosures or to put it into an investors’
perspective: How carefully should investors read the text in a prospectus of a mutual
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fund?
In this essay, we show evidence that the provided information is indeed valuable. For
this, we analyze the summary sections of active U.S. open-end equity funds between 2011
and 2018. This is—to the best of our knowledge—the first study that analyzes in detail the
qualitative disclosure in fund prospectuses. The detailed contributions of this essay can be
summarized as follows. First, we document a positive relation between the amount of text
on disclosed risk and the actual risk a fund is exposed to. The riskier a fund invests, the
more a fund writes about it in its risk statement. This finding is confirmed for the general
risk, the systematic risk, and the idiosyncratic risk of a fund. However, we find that this
positive relation only holds if we control for characteristics at the investment company
level. Accordingly, we argue that for measuring the informativeness of the disclosures, we
have to take into account the variation attributable to investment company fixed effects.
In the second part of the essay, we then introduce two more advanced textual measures
to examine in more detail the actual written content of funds disclosures. For this, we use
our laboratory setting in a more fine-tuned analysis to determine how similar the textual
content of funds’ disclosures is. Again we confirm that a substantial part is determined
at the investment company level. Nevertheless, around one-third of the variation in the
content of funds’ risk disclosures is fund-specific. To investigate the textual information
in funds’ summary sections in more detail, we therefore decompose the content into an
informative part and into a standard part (see also Hanley and Hoberg, 2010). This allows
us to analyze the implications of fund-specific informativeness regarding funds’ risk-taking
behavior, funds’ performance, and funds’ flows. Our results indicate that (i) funds with
a higher risk exposure inform more accurately about their risks, (ii) the more informative
the qualitative disclosure of a fund, the higher the fund’s contemporaneous alphas (see
also (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2020)), and (iii) funds with more informative disclosures
attract higher fund flows. Moreover, in line with Li (2010); Cohen, Malloy, and Nguyen
(2020), we show that regular content-based updates of the relevant information predict
future fund performance. Overall, this essay provides evidence for informative qualitative
disclosures of fund prospectuses while still highlighting the considerable heterogeneity
across funds, mainly attributed to investment company characteristics.
The third essay, Mutual Fund Names and Style (Mis-)Information, analyzes the ac-
curacy of mutual fund names. This essay is joint work with Anne-Florence Allard and
Kristien Smedts. Like the second essay, the research question focuses on the U.S. mutual
fund industry; however, in this essay, we examine the information provided to investors
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in the mutual fund names.
As already outlined at the beginning of this chapter, investors often look for simplified
information for their investment decision. Therefore, salient information is often crucial.
In the mutual fund industry, it is common practice that mutual funds inform via their
name about the investment style that they pursue. Hence, recognizing the importance
and potential influence of such names in investors’ investment decisions (SEC, 2001), the
SEC introduced in 2001 Rule 35d-1. This rule regulates mutual fund names, requiring,
for instance, that at least 80% of a mutual fund’s portfolio is invested in the asset class
mentioned in the name, e.g., equity. However, this rule leaves two loopholes. First,
there is no strict regulation of the use of terms referring to the size factor, e.g., small or
large-cap. Second, terms indicating an investment strategy, such as growth or value, are
not regulated. Focusing on these loopholes, we document that a significant proportion of
mutual fund names provides inaccurate information. More precisely, the funds’ investment
styles do often not align with the given names.
Hence, complementary to the two studies of Cooper, Gulen, and Rau (2005) and
Espenlaub, ul Haq, and Khurshed (2017) who both study the motivation for and conse-
quences of fund name changes, we also investigate the cases where funds keep their names
but change their investment strategies. First, to classify the fund investment strategies,
we estimate for all active U.S. equity funds that refer in their names to an investment
strategy the four-factor model of Carhart (1997). Next, we take the factor loadings and
sort funds into investment style clusters according to their similarity. Based on this clas-
sification, we then assign an accuracy measure to each fund. We find that fund name
inaccuracy is a widespread phenomenon. A large proportion of mutual funds has an in-
accurate name at least once in their lifetime – mostly triggered by strategy changes and
less by fund name changes. Regarding the motivation of fund managers to deviate from
the investment styles stated in a fund name, this essay also highlights the role of com-
petition, i.e., pointing to the tournament hypothesis (Brown, Harlow, and Starks, 1996;
Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). The fund industry can be seen as a tournament in which
funds in the same investment category compete for assets under management. Since the
managers’ compensation is often linked to the size of assets under management, managers
have an incentive to be ranked among the top-performing funds by the end of the year.
Consequently, when their performance over the course of the year is not good, they might
be willing to deviate from the investment style stated in their names. In line with the
predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), managers of mutual funds
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are willing to take more risk when they are in the (relative) loss area. The results of
the analysis carried out in the third essay provide evidence supporting this tournament
hypothesis. Finally, investigating the consequence of the deviating behavior of the fund,
we document that investors experience difficulties in responding—expressed by abnormal
fund flows—to the misleading information in mutual fund names while, at the same time,
they do not benefit, on average, from such deviations.
In summary, this dissertation sheds light on the relation between product information
for some financial products and the corresponding value of this information for retail in-
vestors. The results and the underlying methods in this dissertation are useful to answer
a wide range of economic questions. In all three essays, I find evidence that the pro-
vided financial information, particularly salient information, and the obligatory disclosure
rules mandated by the authorities can significantly affect the interest of retail investors.
Specifically, competition and the motivation to shield profits are essential drivers of finan-
cial institutions’ actions. Accordingly, only when there is a setting that guarantees the
provision of valuable and accurate information, investors have the opportunity to take
investment decisions that are in the long-term in their best interest. Valuable and precise
information disclosure is a precondition for financial stability and the sustainability of
financial markets.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Part II comprises the
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2.1 Introduction
During the unprecedented period of low interest rates following the Great Recession, the
search for low risk investments with positive yields has become increasingly difficult. This
new environment has been linked to important demand and supply effects in retail finan-
cial markets. On the one hand, recent evidence suggests that low risk-free rates induce
yield-seeking behavior among retail investors (Lian et al., 2019). On the other hand,
decreasing interest rates have been paralleled by an increase in the supply of structured
investment products catered to households (Célérier and Vallée, 2017). Importantly, how
exactly interest rates affect the empirically observed product characteristics remains un-
clear.
Contrary to most financial markets, the market for retail investment products is com-
monly characterized by a distinct attribution of potential bounded rationality (Kahneman,
2003) among buy-side investors (Gennaioli, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2012) and informational
advantages for sell-side investors (Carlin, 2009; Carlin and Manso, 2011; Egan, 2019).
Consequently, the literature has emphasized the importance of regulatory policies for
distributional outcomes (see, e.g., Tufano, 2009, and Campbell et al., 2011). To assist on-
going regulation, a better understanding of both demand and supply driven mechanisms
is crucial for shedding light on the impact of unconventional monetary policies on house-
holds’ investment decisions and, ultimately, on allocative efficiency and financial stability
(Shiller, 2009; Gennaioli et al., 2012).
In this paper, we investigate the post-Great Recession market for retail structured
products. We first show that low interest rates increase investors’ overall risk tolerance
when reaching for predefined yield in return for down-side exposure. Second, our findings
suggest that the subsequent rise in product complexity is driven by a sell-side response to
investors’ risk misestimation, which manifests itself in higher margins for more complex
products. Third, while fueled by low interest rates, this increase in complexity appears to
mainly result from competition among product issuers. Finally, building on recent insights
from cognitive neuroscience, we provide evidence that suppliers’ structuring of popular
investment products caters to a distinctive bias in humans’ perception of dependencies
among financial assets.
Our study focuses on a prototypical and particularly interesting retail financial market:
the market for so-called yield enhancement products (YEPs) in Switzerland. Foremost,
YEPs represent a class of structured products that has enjoyed increasing popularity
among retail investors. Combining a fixed rate bond with a short option position, YEPs
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promise high coupons (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2016), while often exposing in-
vestors to the risk of unlimited losses. Effectively, the short (put) option converts the
product principal into a predefined amount of the underlying asset whenever its price
falls below a certain threshold (see Section 2.2.1 for a detailed example). In Switzerland
alone, bank deposits contained YEPs worth more than CHF 71bn in 2019, correspond-
ing to approximately 15% of Swiss equity funds’ assets under management.5 Across EU
households, YEPs amounted to EUR 500bn in 2017.6 Strikingly, the rising popularity
of YEPs is not solely a European phenomenon. In the US, YEPs are the largest and
fastest growing class of retail structured notes with more than USD 100bn sold since 2008
(Vokata, forthcoming).
Furthermore, the Swiss market for YEPs exhibits two features of particular relevance
for our study. (i) Originating in the 1990s, it is a mature and – as we will show – highly
competitive market. (ii) Due to the central bank’s devaluation measures for the Swiss
Frank relative to the Euro, investors in Switzerland have faced a decade of remarkably
low interest rates (see Figure 2.1).
The emergence of a sharply diverging issuance pattern among the most popular YEPs,
so-called barrier reverse convertibles (BRCs), constitutes the starting point of our analy-
sis.7 While the overall increase in issued BRCs appears associated with decreasing interest
rates, there is a subsequent tendency towards the issuance of BRCs with multiple (“Mul-
tis”) instead of BRCs with only one underlying asset (“Singles”) – see Figure 2.1. A very
similar pattern obtains from issuance volumes (see Figure 2.9 in the Appendix).
In line with the literature, Multis’ larger number of contingencies makes them con-
siderably more complex relative to Singles (Célérier and Vallée, 2017), without offering
any liquidity or tax advantages. Moreover, contrary to standard intuition about diversi-
fication benefits, BRCs’ inherent worst-of payoff structure implies that the risk borne by
5See market data provided by Swiss Fund Data available via https://www.swissfunddata.ch/
sfdpub/investment-funds.
6See the European Structured Investment Products Association (EUSIPA) market reports available via
https://eusipa.org/category/market-reports/ and the European Securities and Markets Authority
(ESMA) report on “Trends, Risks and Vulnerabilities,” No. 2, 2018, available via https://www.esma.
europa.eu/press-news/esma-news, respectively.
7Reverse convertibles are commonly considered synonymous with structured products (Egan, 2019).
Already in 2011, the SEC referred to reverse convertibles as “perhaps the riskiest [structured product]
available to retail investors” (see p. 4 of the SEC report “Staff Summary Report on Issues Identified in
Examinations of Certain Structured Securities Products Sold to Retail Investors,” July 27, 2011, available
via https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/ssp-study.pdf). In contrast to standard reverse con-
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Figure 2.1: BRCs issuance and interest rates over time
Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of all BRCs issued in Switzerland between Jan-
uary 2008 and December 2017 (left y-axis) and the corresponding development of the
average monthly risk-free coupon component (“risk-free CC,” right y-axis). For tax-
ation purposes, the coupon (headline rate) of each product is split into an interest
component and a premium component, only the former is subject to income tax. We
classify BRCs as “Singles” (one underlying asset) or “Multis” (more than one underly-
ing asset), respectively. In total, 47,080 BRCs were issued: 18,583 Singles and 28,497
Multis.
investors is an increasing function in the number of underlying assets. Considering that
humans often exhibit difficulties in correctly adjusting for correlation effects (see, e.g.,
Enke and Zimmermann, 2019), the application of a worst-of payoff structure to multiple
underlyings is of particular interest here.
What drives this increase in complexity? Are there distinct demand and supply effects?
What role does the prevailing interest rate play, and does there exist any evidence of
bounded rationality on the part of retail investors? The difficulty in studying the role
of specific bounds to rationality for financial innovation lies in the isolation of behavioral
channels within the endogenous determination of equilibrium outcomes. We address this
challenge by combining the power of laboratory control with the external validity of
representative field data. While our experimental approach allows for counterfactual
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analysis under measurable beliefs, contrasting experimentally identified mechanisms with
real-world data is crucial for quantifying their economic implications.
Specifically, to answer the above questions, we proceed in three steps. Aiming for a
clean micro-foundation of potential demand effects, we first conduct a laboratory exper-
iment to quantify participants’ relative willingness-to-pay (WTP) for BRCs of varying
complexity (number of underlying assets). Importantly, the means of laboratory control
enable us to study the effects of specific changes to the investment environment in iso-
lation. In particular, we focus on changes in the interest rate of the risk-free investment
alternative, as well as the volatility of the underlying asset(s) as the main risk drivers.
Our experimental findings are threefold. First, we find that product margins go hand in
hand with participants’ misestimation of Multis’ inherent correlation risk, which directly
translates into higher markups relative to Singles (3.5 percentage points on average).
This effect is amplified in an environment of high volatility. Second, our results indicate
a negative relation between interest rate levels and participants’ willingness to bear risk.
Lower interest rates significantly increase the demand for both Singles and Multis, while
we do not observe a significant impact on participants’ relative WTP. Third, we find
participants’ WTP to be decreasing in their relative risk aversion but increasing in their
level of overconfidence. Besides a clear bias in estimating Multis’ embedded correlation
risk, our experiment demonstrates that, while low interest rates amplify participants’
reach for yield, they do not increase the relative popularity of Multis over Singles. This
is intuitive, as Singles’ headline rates are generally well above historical interest rates.
Their relatively lower coupons, compared to Multis, still offer a sufficient substitute for
risk-averse, yield-seeking investors (Lian et al., 2019).
In a second step, guided by our experimental evidence, we analyze a data set spanning
4,460 BRCs on US equities issued in Switzerland between 2008 and 2017. For all BRCs,
we estimate expected issuer margins implied by standard pricing techniques and calculate
realized issuer returns based on actual cash flows at maturity. We find banks’ average
issuance margin to be consistently higher for Multis (4.0% and higher, depending on
correlation estimates) relative to Singles (2.0%). When controlling for issuer and time
fixed effects, issuer margins for Multis are, on average, 2.9 percentage points (pp.) higher
than for Singles. Accordingly, for investors, the average realized return from investing in
Multis is indeed negative (-1.6% p.a. over the risk-free rate). The differences in estimated
(2.9 pp.) vs. realized margins (2.6 pp.) are strikingly similar.8 Overall, these magnitudes
8Note, the deviations in levels stem from our conservative discount rate, i.e., the risk-free rate. Given
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corroborate our experimental results. The misestimation of correlation risk documented
in our experiment provides a clean mechanism that can explain the margin differences
observed in the field.
In a final step, we study the dynamics of retail markets in response to low interest
rates in more detail. In line with our experimental findings, the outstanding volume of
YEPs, including both Singles and Multis, essentially doubled from CHF 36.9bn in 2009
to CHF 73.6bn in early 2019. At the same time, the volume invested in other types of
structured products fell sharply until 2011 and stayed fairly stable thereafter. Looking
closer at our sample of BRCs, we find the number of different issuers to remain high
throughout (average of 23.4), allowing for a substantial time variations in revenue shares.
In combination with an average Herfindahl index of 0.14, we conjecture that there is con-
siderable competition among BRC issuers for retail investors. This market perspective is
supported by a negative time trend in issuer margins, which is more significant for the
easier to compare Singles than for the more complex Multis. Motivated by the intro-
duction of a fast-growing issuer platform in 2014, we provide evidence of aggressive price
competition at the product level.
In light of the involved competitive forces, it is natural to further investigate how retail
financial markets respond to such an influx of retail capital. Consistent with shielding
rents borne by incompletely informed investors (Carlin, 2009), the issuance ratio of Mul-
tis to Singles steadily increases over our sample period. However, a closer investigation
reveals that this rise in product complexity follows a distinct pattern: instead of propor-
tionally expanding the universe of underlying assets, issuers appear to cater to investors’
time-variant preferences for certain blue chip or potential growth stocks, often from the
consumer goods sector. According to the Standard Industrial Classification, 44.8% of all
underlyings belong to the “Manufacturing” and 23.7% to the “Services” division.
Consistent with evidence from cognitive neuroscience (d’Acremont and Bossaerts,
2016), Ungeheuer and Weber (2020) document that both laboratory participants and
stock market investors require compensation for the frequency of price comovement rather
than actual price correlation, and are thereby effectively neglecting potential tail risk. In
line with Ungeheuer and Weber (2020), we find that popular underlying combinations
of Multis exhibit a relatively higher frequency of price comovement than price correla-
the objective of our study, and to remain as close as possible to our experimental setup, we do not
focus on risk-adjusted BRC returns. However, our estimates of issuer margins and realized returns
square reasonably well with carefully estimated beta-adjusted returns of YEPs (Singles) issued in the US
(Vokata, forthcoming).
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tion. Due to BRCs’ worst-of payoff structure, a lower correlation among underlying assets
actually increases the corresponding investment risk.9 Correlation overestimation, thus,
makes such Multis appear less risky to investors. Indeed, we show that the higher the
relative discrepancy between comovement frequency and correlation, the higher the esti-
mated product margin in the cross section. Hence, our findings suggest that the increase
in complexity appears – at least partially – driven by issuers who cater to retail investors’
bias in perceiving dependencies among financial assets.
2.1.1 Literature contribution
Our paper builds on several strands of literature. First, we add to the literature on
price and quality dispersion introduced by financial innovation. Traditionally, financial
innovation has been considered to arise in response to and for the benefit of previously
unmet investor needs (Allen and Gale, 1994; Duffie and Rahi, 1995). However, there is an
ongoing debate (Zingales, 2015) and accumulating evidence (see, e.g., Célérier and Vallée,
2017) about financial institutions’ strategic exploitation of information asymmetries when
catering financial services to retail investors.10 For instance, Ellison (2005) and Gabaix
and Laibson (2006) show theoretically how financial institutions may issue complex prod-
ucts to shroud specific product attributes, which increases search costs and protects rents.
Carlin (2009) and Carlin and Manso (2011) illustrate how the rents to issuers of complex
products decline with investor sophistication.
Second, our paper relates to the literature on the (mis)pricing of structured products.
Henderson and Pearson (2011) analyze the pricing and historical performance of 64 pop-
ular retail structured equity products and find that investors receive negative abnormal
returns of at least 8% per year relative to dynamically adjusted portfolios with compara-
ble risk. Margins of similar magnitude are found in two large studies of the US market
(Egan, 2019; Vokata, forthcoming). For the European market, margins of issuers are
slightly lower but still substantial (Wallmeier and Diethelm, 2009; Célérier and Vallée,
2017; Ammann, Arnold, and Straumann, 2018). Moreover, Célérier and Vallée (2017)
show that sellers’ margins are positively associated with product complexity. Similar to
our study, they define an increase in complexity as an increase in payoff scenarios. Hens
9The intuition is straight-forward, the lower the correlation, the higher the chance that at least one
underlying asset performs poorly.
10See, e.g., Zingales’ presidential address for a reflection on the distribution of benefits from current
trends in finance (Zingales, 2015). Chesney, Krakow, Maranghino-Singer, and Münstermann (2018) and
Chesney (2018) provide a critical discussion about the general role of finance for society as a whole.
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and Rieger (2014) theoretically demonstrate that the popularity of structured products
cannot be rationalized by expected utility theory. Egan (2019) and Henderson, Pearson,
and Wang (2020) respectively show how brokers use their informational advantage and
institutional power to distort households’ investment decisions or to manipulate market
prices. Ghent, Torous, and Valkanov (2019) document an uncompensated increase in
complex risk for mortgage-backed securities.
Third, we contribute to the literature that studies behavioral effects in (retail) financial
markets. Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer (2012, 2013) and Bordalo et al. (2016) show
how salience-driven probability weighting and product attribute attention can explain
both seminal stock market puzzles and retail investors’ reaching for yield under low in-
terest rates. Li, Subrahmanyam, and Yang (2018) illustrate that behavioral proclivity for
skewness increases the demand for retail investment products. However, unlike the con-
tracts analyzed by Li et al. (2018), the higher ex-ante likelihood of BRCs’ positive payoff
scenarios does not appeal to prospect theory preferences. Interestingly, Calvet, Célérier,
Sodini, and Vallée (2019) document how narrow framing (Barberis, Huang, and Thaler,
2006) can create space for financial innovation to alleviate retail investors’ reluctance to
bear financial risk.
Fourth, this paper relates to the experimental literature on complex financial assets.
For instance, Rieger (2012) and Kunz, Messner, and Wallmeier (2017) find that probabil-
ity misestimation increases the subjective attractiveness of complex products. However,
both studies do not investigate how such misperception translates into an incentivized
willingness-to-pay measure of potentially risk-averse investors and how this is affected by
varying interest rates. Carlin, Kogan, and Lowery (2013) show that, in a bilateral trading
environment, higher complexity results in increased volatility, lower liquidity, and less
trade efficiency.
Finally, our focus on the role of low interest rates on households’ investment decisions
in the context of retail structured products most directly relates to the important work by
Célérier and Vallée (2017). While their sample period accounts for the beginning of the
post-crisis decrease in interest rates, our field data fully captures the subsequent prolonged
period of (sub)zero risk-free rates. In line with the non-linearity of low interest rates’
yield-seeking effect documented in Lian et al. (2019), our experimental results indicate
that the complexity increase observed in the field is largely driven by competition rather
than interest rate levels per se.11 Note, while Lian et al. (2019) analyze investment
11The already high coupon (headline) rates of Singles are more than sufficient to cover the domain of
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decisions for a basic risky asset, the nature of structured products requires verification
of their result for more complex assets such as BRCs, which, besides pinning down the
mechanism behind mispricing, is the aim of our experiment.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview
and stylized facts of the Swiss market for retail structured products in general, and for
YEPs (BRCs) in particular. Section 2.3 introduces the design of the laboratory experi-
ment and discusses its findings. Section 2.4 describes our product data set in detail and
motivates the procedure of our empirical analysis. Section 2.5 presents our empirical
results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Market for Yield Enhancement Products
As their name suggests, structured products are tailored combinations of different financial
securities offering payoff profiles that are otherwise difficult (or costly) to attain for retail
investors. Their payoff generally depends on the performance of one or multiple underlying
assets, most commonly equities, but also fixed-income instruments or commodities. This
payoff dependency is achieved via an embedded derivative component, such as options.
Issuers – typically banks – offer structured products to potential buyers on a primary
market. Post issuance, these products can be traded on a secondary market, which,
however, exhibits relatively low liquidity (see, e.g., Ammann et al., 2018) due to the buy-
and-hold strategy of most investors. Given our interest in the structuring and issuance
process, our focus lies on the primary market.
In Switzerland, the typical notional (denomination), i.e., minimum investment amount,
ranges from CHF 1,000 to CHF 20,000 on issuer platforms.12 The recent popularity of
US underlyings in the Swiss structured product market has been attributed to the rising
share of younger investors (younger than 45 years).13 Studying Swedish household data,
Calvet et al. (2019) find the mean investor to be 55 years old with an interdecile range of
35 years. Overall, this suggests a fairly heterogeneous investor base.
There exist different types of structured products whose synthetic payoff profiles cater
to specific beliefs about future market performance. However, during the low interest
active yield-seeking documented in Lian et al. (2019).





rate environment following the Great Recession, so-called yield enhancement products
(YEPs) have emerged as the most popular product type (see Section 2.2.2). To illustrate
the workings of YEPs, we first provide a prototypical example before describing the
respective market in more detail.
2.2.1 An Example
YEPs are designed to allow investors to benefit from sideways-moving or slightly rising
markets. They consist of two main components: (i) a fixed rate bond, and (ii) a short
put option. From an investor’s perspective, YEPs’ upside potential is limited to their
fixed coupon (headline rate), which, financed by the put premium, is, however, much
higher than the prevailing risk-free rate. YEPs’ non-participating upside is contrasted
by their unlimited downside risk: in case the embedded put option expires in-the-money,
investors forfeit the pre-paid principal and receive the low performing underlying instead.
YEPs’ final cash-flows thereby either depend on one single underlying or on a basket
of underlyings. Crucially, in the latter case, only the worst performing underlying is
payoff-relevant. This is commonly referred to as “worst-of” payoff profile.
The structural differences between distinct types of YEPs stem from the kind of
shorted put option, i.e., plain vanilla vs. exotic puts. A particularly prominent type of
YEPs are barrier reverse convertibles (BRCs), whose embedded option position consists
of a short “down-and-in” European put. Specifically, such barrier options get activated
when at least one underlying hits a predefined lower barrier, typically expressed in per-
centage of the option’s strike price. Figure 2.2 illustrates the payoff diagram of a “Single”
BRC based on one single underlying and a “Multi” BRC based on multiple underlyings,
respectively. In the absence of a barrier event until maturity, BRC investors are repaid
the coupon plus principal. In contrast, upon activation of the barrier put, the principal
is converted into holdings of the worst performing asset (at a predefined ratio). In this
case, investors’ payoff equals the coupon plus the minimum of (i) the payoff-relevant un-
derlying value at maturity and (ii) the principal. Given Multis’ higher down-side risk,
they generally offer investors higher coupons, ceteris paribus.
Table 2.1 provides the corresponding specifications of two exemplary BRCs issued by
the same Swiss bank on May 26, 2011. Both BRCs presented in Table 2.1 exhibit typical
attributes, i.e., equities as underlying assets and a short-term duration of approximately
one year. The Multi’s higher risk due to multiple underlyings is contrasted with a higher
fixed coupon and a lower barrier. For the Single, investors start to participate in the losses
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Figure 2.2: Payoff profiles of Barrier Reverse Convertibles
Figure 2.2 displays the payoff profiles of barrier reverse convertibles (BRCs) with one
underlying asset (blue) and multiple underlying assets (red), respectively. The solid
45-degree line denotes the value of the payoff-relevant underlying at maturity. Vertical
dashed lines indicate the respective barrier levels. The distance between the x-axis and
the colored horizontal lines indicates the respective coupon payments, which do not
depend on the performance of the underlying(s). If the price of at least one underlying
hits the barrier before maturity, the product’s principal is converted into holdings of
the worst performing underlying (at a predefined ratio). In this case, the final payoff
is capped at par (initial value) plus coupon.
if the underlying Microsoft shares fall by at least 20% following the initial fixing date. For
the Multi, investors are protected as long as the worst performing stock falls by less than
35%. However, the ultimate question is, whether these more attractive features sufficiently
compensate for the Multi’s higher inherent risk. The respective margin estimates provided
in Table 2.1 indicate the opposite. We systematically investigate this in Section 2.5.
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Table 2.1: Two exemplary barrier reverse convertibles
Table 2.1 shows the product specifications of two BRCs issued on May 26, 2011.
The second column provides the specifications for a BRC with one underlying (“Sin-
gle”). The third column provides the specifications for a BRC with three underlyings
(“Multi”). Product specifications include: product ISIN, underlying stocks and tick-
ers, coupon per annum, barrier in percentage of underlying values at fixing, and time
to maturity in calendar days. The final row provides the estimated margin at issuance
(see Section 4 for details).
Single Multi
ISIN CH0127927132 CH0125720794
Underlying(s) Microsoft (MSFT) Microsoft (MSFT)
General Electric (GE)
Newmont Mining (NEM)
Coupon (p.a.) 7.5740% 10.8791%
Barrier 80% 65%
Time to maturity 386 days 358 days
Estimated issuer margin 1.448% 4.966%
2.2.2 Market Overview
The Swiss market for retail structured products is one of the largest worldwide, with
a total turnover amounting to CHF 331bn in 2018. According to the Swiss Structured
Product Association (SSPA), YEPs accounted for 46% of sales volume during the same
year, most of which were BRCs.14
Strikingly, the popularity of YEPs is not limited to Switzerland. Across all major
European markets, YEPs represented more than 59% of all exchange-listed investment
products by the end of 2018.15 Similarly, in the US, with more than 40% of issuance
volume, YEPs constitute the largest and fastest growing class among all retail structured
products (Vokata, forthcoming).
Not surprisingly, this substantial market growth has also drawn the attention of var-
14See the Swiss Structured Products Association (SSPA) Q4 2018 market report available via https:
//www.svsp-verband.ch/en/market-report/2019/.
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Figure 2.3: Outstanding volume of structured products in Switzerland
Figure 2.3 illustrates the evolution of outstanding volume (in bn CHF) of structured
products in Switzerland between the third quarter of 2009 and the fourth quarter of
2017. Sources: Market reports provided by the Swiss Structured Product Association
(SSPA) and the European Structured Investment Products Association (EUSIPA).
ious national regulators. For instance, already in 2007, the Swiss regulator outlined the
minimum product information that issuers are required to provide to investors (Swiss
Bankers Association, 2007). Moreover, several regulatory reports have pointed out the
potential exploitation of information asymmetries between issuing banks and relatively
inexperienced retail investors.16
Contrary to recent years, YEPs have not always been this popular among retail in-
vestors. For the Swiss market, Figure 2.3 displays the evolution of outstanding volumes
across the four categories of investment structured products between 2009 and 2017. Be-
sides YEPs, the two main categories are “Capital Protection” and “Participation” prod-
16See, for instance, the speech by SEC Commissioner Luis A. Aguilar in April 2015, available via https:
//www.sec.gov/news/speech/regulators-working-together-to-serve-investors.html. Similarly,
the report on structured products by the British regulator, the Financial Conduct Authority, concludes
that retail investors do not sufficiently understand payoff profiles that depend on the performance of
underlying assets (Financial Conduct Authority, 2015).
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ucts.17 Importantly, in sharp contrast to YEPs, neither of the alternative categories offer
a performance-independent fixed coupon. Figure 2.3 clearly shows how YEPs’ outstand-
ing volume steadily increased, while the volume of capital protection and participation
products sharply declined after the Great Recession.
Lastly, we take a closer look at the issuer composition in the Swiss market for YEPs.
The majority of products are issued by large and medium Swiss banks, but also by
multinational investment banks and boutique providers of investment solutions.18 Panel
A in Figure 2.10 in the Appendix displays the YEP market share, measured by turnover,
of all issuers that are among the top five in at least one year within our sample period.
The total number of issuers is sizeable, with a yearly average of 23.4. Clearly, substantial
changes in revenue shares occur over time, e.g., only three banks (Vontobel, Julius Baer,
and the Zurich Cantonal Bank (ZKB)) managed to maintain a turnover share of at least
5% in each year. Panel B in Figure 2.10 depicts the evolution of the corresponding
Herfindahl index, which, on average, equals 0.14, i.e., indicating an unconcentrated and
competitive industry. The index also shows a slightly decreasing trend, i.e., hinting at a
further increase in competition.
We interpret these market statistics as suggestive evidence for considerable competitive
pressure among YEP issuers when it comes to attracting retail capital. This interpretation
is further underpinned by the introduction of a multi-issuer platform in 2014.19 In essence,
for a given product, the platform allows investors to easily compare price quotes of up
to eight issuers (including Vontobel, ZKB, and UBS). Since adoption, the platform has
grown continuously, raising up to CHF 8.2bn in 2019.
2.3 Experiment
Initially, the rise in BRC issuance following the 2009 drop in interest rates was equally
distributed between Singles and Multis (see Figure 2.3). However, starting from 2014,
both the number and the volume of newly issued Multis have increased substantially, while
17Capital protection products allow investors to partially participate in rising underlying prices, while
protecting them against capital losses. As the name suggests, participation products generally offer full or
even progressive participation, while exposing investors to unlimited losses. For a concise overview, see,
e.g., the SSPA Swiss Derivative Map 2019, available via https://www.svsp-verband.ch/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/SVSP_Faltblatt_205x297_2019_EN.pdf.
18See Table 2.19 in the Internet Appendix for a detailed overview of all issuers in our final sample.
19For details, see https://www.deritrade.com/en. A short introductory video (in German), using
the case of a Single BRC, is available via https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HO024UgdsDw.
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the respective statistics of Singles started to decline. To investigate potential demand-
side drivers behind this pattern, we first conduct a laboratory experiment that isolates
(i) the effect of interest rate levels on participants willingness to invest in BRCs, (ii) the
accuracy of their risk-return assessments for both Singles and Multis, and (iii) potential
biases affecting participants’ respective fair value estimations. We furthermore control
for the effect of overall investment risk (volatility), risk preferences, and personality traits
such as overconfidence (Barber and Odean, 2001; Biais, Hilton, Mazurier, and Pouget,
2005).
2.3.1 Design
The experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For the main
task, we created two synthetic product types mimicking the payoff structure of typical
BRCs. In particular, participants were presented with synthetic “Singles” whose payoffs
depended on the evolution of one underlying stock as well as synthetic “Multis” whose
payoffs depended on the evolution of the worst performing of two underlying stocks.20 To
examine both interest rate and general investment uncertainty effects, we use a 2× 3 (2)
design (two volatility treatments and three (two) risk-free rate treatments).21 Table 2.11
in the Appendix summarizes the different treatments.22 In each experimental session,
participants went through all treatments, with each treatment corresponding to one of
six (four) independent rounds. The ordering of treatments was fully randomized between
sessions. In each of the six (four) rounds, participants were given the chance to either
invest in a Single or in a Multi, or, alternatively, safely store their money at the risk-free
interest rate. Table 2.12 in the Appendix provides an overview of all parameters used
across rounds. Importantly, our design allows for both a between and within-subject
analysis. The latter enables us to control for idiosyncratic attributes in participants’
behavior.
At the beginning of each round, participants were endowed with initial wealth amount-
20Designing synthetic products instead of using real BRCs has two advantages. First, it allows us to
control each parameter separately and thereby greatly simplifies effect identification. Second, we avoid
potential confounding effects due to participants’ different levels of expertise about real stock markets.
21Early sessions only consisted of two (positive vs. negative) risk-free rate treatments.
22In a second part of the experiment, we also introduced a treatment with risk-adjusted coupons.
Specifically, in this part, coupons were chosen such that both Singles and Multis had identical fair
values assuming risk neutrality. While the general underestimation of Multis’ correlation risk (see below)
prevails, there is no significant difference between the willingness-to-pay for Singles vs. Multis. This result
is in line with a higher subjective discount applied to Multis relative to Singles.
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ing to 130 Experimental Currency Units (ECU), which they could invest freely.23 More-
over, all participants received identical information about the products available for in-
vestment and the general investment environment, i.e., the prevailing risk-free rate and
volatility level. To limit the complexity of the task, Multis’ underlying asset prices always
evolved independently of each other, which was also emphasized in the up-front provided
information. To further facilitate participants’ evaluation of the available products, the
software calculated expected final payoffs based on participants’ estimates of (i) the prob-
ability of a barrier event and (ii) the expected value of the payoff-relevant underlying
conditional on such a barrier event.
At the first stage of each round, participants had to separately indicate their willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for both Single and Multi. To elicit individuals’ WTP, we employed the
seminal, incentive-compatible mechanism proposed by Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak
(1964). Specifically, for an extensive list of possible prices,24 participants had to indi-
cate whether or not they are willing to buy the product at hand. The actual price for
each product was then randomly drawn from this predetermined price list (with uniform
probabilities). Whenever the randomly drawn price was lower or equal to participants’
maximum WTP, they were allocated the product in return for the randomly determined
price. Any remaining wealth was automatically invested at the risk-free rate. In con-
trast, whenever the random price was higher than participants’ WTP, their entire wealth
was invested at the risk-free rate by default. To ensure that participants evaluated both
product types independently, the price draw was only executed for one randomly chosen
product in any round. Finally, participants always had the option to opt out of investing
in BRCs altogether and, independent of the random price, invest all their wealth at the
prevailing risk-free rate.
At the second stage of each round, after each participant’s investment decision had
been implemented, actual payoffs were determined and participants’ final wealth was
calculated. In addition, the price path realizations of the underlying assets were displayed
and the corresponding scenario (occurrence vs. absence of barrier event) was indicated.
All rounds were entirely independent of each other, i.e., at the beginning of every round,
participants’ initial wealth was reset to ECU 130.
Finally, after concluding the main task, we elicited participants’ risk aversion, following
Holt and Laury (2002), as well as their degree of overconfidence in judgment, following
23In a subsample, participants were endowed with ECU 140 instead. However, we find no significant
effects associated with this slight increase in initial endowments.
24The price list ranged from a minimum price of ECU 60 to the highest achievable payoff of ECU 117.
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Alpert and Raiffa (1982).
2.3.1.1 Procedural Details
The experiment was conducted in March and October 2018 at the computer laboratory
of the Department of Banking and Finance at the University of Zurich. We ran the
experiment with seven different cohorts, resulting in a sample of 125 undergraduate and
postgraduate finance students. All participants had some basic training in derivative
securities.25 Table 2.17 in the Internet Appendix provides the summary statistics across
all participating individuals. On average, our participants are 23 years old, with a slight
majority of females (68) over males (57). Around one third consider themselves familiar
with structured products (self-reported).
To alleviate low-stake incentive concerns and to induce sufficient risk aversion, fol-
lowing, e.g., Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994), Selten, Mitzkewitz, and Uhlich (1997),
Biais et al. (2005), and Williams (2008), participants’ final wealth from one randomly
selected round was converted into points that counted towards their final grade. The
written instructions (see Internet Appendix) contained various comprehension questions
that controlled participants’ understanding of the task. Participants were only allowed to
proceed to the practice round after they had answered those questions correctly. If nec-
essary, further explanations were provided by the experimenter. On average, one session
lasted about 90 minutes.
2.3.2 Experimental Results
We first describe the results at an aggregate level before turning to a detailed discussion of
the different treatment effects and the influence of participants’ personal traits on product
margins.
2.3.2.1 Implied Margins
Table 2.13 in the Appendix presents summary statistics of the main experimental variables
across treatments. On average, participants exhibit a higher WTP for Multis relative to
Singles.26 Table 2.13 also shows that participants correctly assign a higher likelihood
25Therefore, ex ante, we consider it plausible that actual retail investors are as likely to suffer from
potential behavioral biases.
26Conservatively, whenever participants’ maximum WTP is not uniquely defined (due to multiple
switching points in the elicitation task), we set it equal to the lowest value. Note, throughout our
31
of a barrier event to the case of multiple underlyings. To assess the accuracy of their
risk assessment, we measure the difference between true probabilities and participants’
respective estimates. On average, participants slightly overestimate Singles’ inherent risk
of a barrier event by 2.25%, whereas they substantially underestimate the corresponding
risk for Multis by 6.18%.
To compare revealed WTP levels across products and participants, we compute each





where FVp denotes product p’s fair value under risk neutrality. Hence, a product’s implicit
margin is defined as the percentage difference between participants’ product-specific WTP
and the product’s expected cash flow discounted at the prevailing risk-free rate. Recalling
Multis’ higher inherent down-side risk, this approach represents a conservative fair value
comparison of Multis relative to Singles.
We find participants to overvalue Multis relative to Singles. Panel A in Figure 2.4
shows the average difference in margins between Multis and Singles. Overall, the implicit
margin for Multis is 3.49% higher than for Singles. A two-sided t-test strongly rejects the
null hypothesis of identical margins (p-value < 0.01).
Next, to control for confounding effects, we regress product margins on a Multi-Dummy
(equal to one for Multis) while controlling for participants’ investment decisions, volatility
levels, and the risk-free interest rate. Table 2.2 shows the results of different regression
specifications. In the first model, we include participant fixed effects, whereas, in the sec-
ond model, we control for participant characteristics such as gender, age, risk preferences,
and overconfidence.
For both specifications, we find that Multis are associated with significantly higher
margins (p-value < 0.01). Moreover, while, in the first model, interest rates have no
significant effect on margins, interest rates are positively correlated with margins in the
second model. The latter result, however, may be caused by certain participants’ failure
to coherently discount their fair value estimates (WTP) across interest rate treatments.
When controlling for participant fixed effects, contrary to Célérier and Vallée (2017), we
find no evidence that interest rates affect margin levels.
Intuitively, we find margins to be decreasing in participants’ risk aversion and increas-








































































































































(d) Panel D: Investment rate
Figure 2.4: Main experimental results
Panel A shows the average margin difference between Multis and Singles, i.e., Multi
minus Single, across all rounds. Panel B shows the average probability misestimation
for both product types across all rounds. We measure probability misestimation as
the difference between the true probability minus participants’ estimated probability
of a barrier event. Panel C shows the difference in margins under moderate (13.7% per
unit of time) and under high volatility (27.4%) of the underlying asset(s), respectively.
Panel D shows the investment rate, i.e., the conditional willingness to invest in either
product, for different interest rate environments. Error bars represent standard errors.
ing in their level of overconfidence. Figure 2.11 and Figure 2.12 in the Appendix provide
scatter plots with the corresponding best linear fits. Interestingly, Figure 2.12 suggests
that participants’ degree of overconfidence substantially drives the margins of Multis but
does not significantly affect the margins of Singles.
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Table 2.2: Margins of Singles and Multis in the experiment
Table 2.2 displays the coefficients of OLS regressions with product margins as the
dependent variable. In the first specification, we regress margins on a Multi-Dummy
(equal to one for Multis) and control for participants’ investment decision, high volatil-
ity level, positive interest rates, as well as participant and round fixed effect. In the
second specification, we add participant characteristics, including risk preferences and
overconfidence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the


























2.3.2.2 Interest Rates and Willingness to Invest
Next, we isolate the impact of different interest rates on participants’ willingness to invest
in BRCs. Via our interest rate treatment, we introduce different spreads between prod-
ucts’ coupons and the prevailing risk-free interest rate (see Table 2.11 in the Appendix).
Expanding Lian et al. (2019), who focus on a simple risky asset, we are particularly inter-
ested in how varying risk-free rates affect the proportion of participants who are willing
to invest in either Singles or Multis as opposed to the risk-free alternative.
For each participant, we compute the conditional investment rate as the proportion of
rounds during which she decided to opt into the investment (bidding) process. Panel D in
Figure 2.4 shows average investment rates for the positive (3% per time unit) and negative
(-2%) interest environment, respectively. A Wilcoxon signed-rank test rejects the null hy-
pothesis of identical investment rates (p-value < 0.01). While the same holds true for the
difference between positive and zero interest rates (p-value < 0.01), we find, however, no
significant difference between zero and negative interests. Hence, our results indicate that
very low but non-negative risk-free rates are sufficient to induce yield-reaching behavior
(Bordalo et al., 2016).
Table 2.3 presents the results from corresponding logistic regressions. The estimated
coefficients are of economic significance: under positive interest rates, the proportion of
participants who are willing to invest in either Singles or Multis declines, on average,
by 11.7% relative to zero or negative interest rates. Note, none of the other variables
significantly impact participants’ investment propensity.
2.3.2.3 Probability Misestimation and Volatility Levels
Panel B in Figure 2.4 shows that participants are relatively accurate in assessing the
probability of a barrier event for Singles. However, they significantly underestimate the
corresponding risk for Multis. On average, participants slightly overestimate Singles’
probability of a barrier event by 2.25%, while, in the case of Multis, they significantly
underestimate the corresponding probability by 6.18%. Importantly, the only explanation
for this discrepancy lies in the inability to correctly account for the combination of multiple
underlyings with a worst-of payoff structure. While participants sufficiently account for
the risk induced by one single underlying, they clearly fail to do so in the presence of two
underlying assets.
To investigate this finding further, we examine the correlation between participants’
probability misestimation and the corresponding product margins. As expected, margins
35
Table 2.3: Investment rate
Table 2.3 displays coefficients of logistic regressions where the dependent variable is
participants’ conditional willingness to invest in either Singles or Multis (as opposed
to the risk-free alternative). Interest-Dummy indicates rounds with positive interest
rates. In specification (1), the raw effect of a positive risk-free rate is estimated, while
specification (2) includes controls for a high volatility level and participant character-
istics. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the participant
level. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2)

















strongly correlate with participants’ misestimation. Specifically, when participants accu-
rately estimate the probability of a barrier event, margins are close to zero, whereas, in
the case of imprecise probability estimates, margins are significantly different from zero
(correlation coefficient of 0.63, p-value < 0.01).
In line with this result, we find a higher volatility of the underlying asset(s) to in-
crease the discrepancy in margins between product types. Naturally, a rise in volatility
increases the likelihood of a barrier event and, hence, the risk of low payoffs. There-
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fore, ceteris paribus, the value of both Singles and Multis is a decreasing function in the
underlying volatility level.27 Strikingly, participants estimate both the probability of a
barrier event and the conditional payoff quite accurately under moderate volatility (13.7%
per time unit), whereas they experience substantial difficulties doing so under relatively
high volatility (27.4%). Panel C in Figure 2.4 documents this finding. A two-sided t-test
strongly rejects the hypothesis of no difference in margins between Singles and Multis in
the high volatility environment (p-value < 0.01).
In sum, the magnitude of this documented risk misestimation more than suffices to
explain the experimentally documented margin discrepancy between Singles and Multis.
However, as indicated above, participants are, on average, risk-averse and, accordingly,
bid somewhat prudently given their subjective probability estimates. For instance, while,
under high volatility, average estimates would justify risk-neutral Multi margins of 20.3%,
actual margins are “only” half as large (10.4% on average). This indicates that partic-
ipants indeed demonstrate awareness of the investment task’s difficulty but fail to fully
correct for the bias in their risk estimates.
2.4 Field Data and Pricing Methodology
To contrast our experimental findings with evidence from the field, we investigate, in a
second step, the term sheets of all barrier reverse convertibles publicly issued in Switzer-
land between January 2008 and December 2017.28 The initial data set contains 47,080
BRCs. However, contrary to our experiment, a pricing model is required to estimate
products’ fair values. To ensure the highest possible quality of input variables, we focus
on US equities with traded put options. Importantly, this allows us to rely on forward-
looking market estimates of the underlying assets’ volatility. Our final sample includes
4,460 BRCs on US stocks.29 Table 2.19 in the Internet Appendix lists the top ten issuers
of BRCs in our final sample as well as the number and type of products issued over time.
To obtain all input data for the pricing model, we rely on various databases. In
addition to our BRC data set, which provides product information regarding the issuer,
issue date, expiry date (maturity), coupon rate, barrier level, conversion rate, and the
underlying assets, we get valuation inputs from the Center for Research in Security Prices
27More precisely, the value of the embedded (short) put option is an increasing function in the under-
lying volatility level.
28We thank Derivative Partners for providing us with the data.
29Table 2.18 in the Internet Appendix provides summary statistics of all BRCs in the initial data set.
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(CRSP) and the Option Metrics’ IvyDB US database. Finally, we obtain our proxy for the
risk-free rate from Bloomberg (see below), which also provides data on issuance volumes.
To merge data across sources, we use the name of the underlying assets and then their
CUSIP numbers as identifiers. For all underlying assets, we find the closest name in
OptionMetrics measured by the Levenshtein distance. We then validate each match and
manually allocate name pairs that do not match perfectly.
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.4 presents an overview of our final sample. In Panel A, we provide summary
statistics of product characteristics. The average BRC in our sample offers an annual
coupon of 9.29% on an accumulated notional of CHF 18.3 million. The average maturity
is slightly below one calendar year, and the average barrier level is around 67% of the
underlying stocks’ value at fixing.30
The pricing model requires several input variables. To estimate the dividend yield
of underlying stocks, we use data from CRSP. We assume that dividend yields remain
constant over a product’s lifetime and calculate the annual yield as the sum of dividend
payments over the last twelve months (prior to issuance) divided by the stock’s closing
price (at issuance). Using Option Metrics data, we extract implied volatilities of under-
lying stocks (at issuance) from traded put options in two steps.31 First, we search for the
“closest” four options for each underlying asset, i.e., the put option with the closest lower
(higher) strike price and the put option with the closest shorter (longer) maturity relative
to the product’s expiry date. Second, we bi-linearly interpolate the implied volatilities
from the corresponding four options in the two-dimensional space of strike prices and
maturities. If one or more of these four options are unavailable, we follow Henderson and
Pearson (2011) and extract the implied volatility from the put option with the nearest
expiry date and the closest strike price. Finally, to approximate the risk-free interest
rate, we rely on the overnight index swap (OIS) rate provided by Bloomberg and match
maturities via linear interpolation.
Panel B of Table 2.4 provides summary statistics of annualized input variables across
all underlying assets in our final sample. The average dividend yield is 2.45%, and the
30Since we receive volume at issuance data from Bloomberg, we have volume data for 2,541 products,
which we winsorize at the 5% level.
31As the put-call parity often does not hold in practice (see, e.g., Figlewski and Webb, 1993, Amin,
Coval, and Seyhun, 2004, and Ofek, Richardson, and Whitelaw, 2004), we restrict ourselves from using
call options to infer implied volatilities.
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of final sample
Table 2.4 reports summary statistics of product characteristics (Panel A) and pricing model
inputs (Panel B) for all barrier reverse convertibles in our final sample. Coupon p.a. (%) is
the product’s annual coupon rate (extracted from its payoff description). Barrier level (%)
is the barrier level of the product’s embedded put option in percentage of underlying values
at fixing. Maturity (days) is the product’s time to maturity at issuance. # of underlyings
indicates the number of payoff-relevant underlying asset(s). Volume (mil. CHF) is the issued
volume. Valuation inputs are reported as annualized averages over all underlying assets (see text
for details). Panel C presents summary statistics of the various linear correlation estimates (i.e.,
simple estimation (CorrelationHist), the Ledoit and Wolf (2004) approach (CorrelationLW ), and
the Chen, Wiesel, Eldar, and Hero (2010) approach (CorrelationOAS)) and the frequency of
return comovement (see text for details). The sample consists of 4,460 products issued between
January 2008 and December 2017.
Panel A: Product characteristics
Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Coupon p.a. (%) 9.29 3.53 0.00 6.94 8.65 10.88 57.34
Barrier level (%) 66.65 9.59 39.00 59.00 69.00 75.00 90.00
Maturity (days) 355 104 60 357 358 386 1,093
# of underlyings 1.83 0.98 1 1 1 3 4
Volume (mil. CHF) 18.31 10.17 3.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00
Observations 4,460
Panel B: Valuation inputs
Dividend yield (%) 2.45 4.53 0.00 0.51 1.71 2.71 18.12
Implied vola. (%) 33.42 11.72 13.53 25.15 31.34 38.97 123.37
Risk-free rate (%) 0.51 0.49 0.06 0.14 0.32 0.60 3.09
Observations 4,460
Panel C: Correlation and comovement estimates
CorrelationHist 0.449 0.214 -0.021 0.290 0.442 0.575 0.912
CorrelationLW 0.383 0.245 0.000 0.207 0.389 0.531 0.884
CorrelationOAS 0.431 0.216 -0.014 0.271 0.424 0.558 0.895
Comovement (%) 67.02 7.69 51.88 61.94 65.59 70.16 87.85
Observations 1,932
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average implied volatility is 33.42%. The latter is relatively high compared to long-term
average volatility levels. The average risk-free rate over our sample period is 0.51%.
2.4.1.1 Measuring Correlations between Underlying Assets
To evaluate the fair values of issued Multis, we additionally require an estimate of the
correlations between underlying assets. Since there exists no traded instrument to reliably
infer markets’ correlations expectation, we have to independently estimate the underlying
correlation structure. As noted above, the correlation among underlying assets crucially
affects Multis’ fair value: the lower the correlation, the higher the probability of a barrier
event. Hence, to account for possible measurement errors, we complement our simple
correlation estimation based on one year of daily log returns with two additional esti-
mation approaches: (i) the shrinkage estimator of Ledoit and Wolf (2004) and (ii) the
oracle approximating shrinkage (OAS) method proposed by Chen et al. (2010). Results
of all three approaches are reported in Panel C of Table 2.4 (denoted by CorrelationHist,
CorrelationLW , and CorrelationOAS, respectively). As a robustness check, we also apply
these estimation approaches to six and 24 months of pre-issuance daily returns, respec-
tively, with no substantial effect on the distribution of estimated correlations in either
case.32
2.4.2 Singles versus Multis
Before examining the relation between product types and issuer margins, we separately
investigate the product characteristics of Singles and Multis, respectively. Given that,
by design, Multis carry a higher risk than Singles due to their embedded worst-of payoff
profile, we expect Singles and Multis to differ in their product specifications to compensate
for the latter’s higher downside risk. The summary statistics of the respective product
specifications are reported in Table 2.5.
Our final sample consists of 2,528 Singles and 1,932 Multis. Note, compared to the
total number of BRCs in our data set, we lose somewhat more observations for Multis
than for Singles. This is due to the higher restrictions on pricing data availability for
BRCs with multiple underlyings. In our final sample, Multis are, on average, based on
2.92 underlying stocks. The average maturity of both product types is slightly shorter
than one year. Multis offer, on average, a 1.76 pp. higher annual coupon, while their
32Detailed summary statistics are available from the authors.
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Table 2.5: Comparison between Singles and Multis
Table 2.5 reports summary statistics of product characteristics and pricing model inputs for
Singles and Multis, respectively. Coupon p.a. (%) is the product’s annual coupon rate (extracted
from its payoff description). Barrier level (%) is the barrier level of the product’s embedded
put option in percentage of underlying values at fixing. Maturity (days) is the product’s time
to maturity at issuance. # of underlyings indicates the number of payoff-relevant underlying
asset(s). Estimated valuation inputs are reported as annualized averages over all underlying
assets (see text for details). The subsample of Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products.
The total sample consists of 4,460 products issued between January 2008 and December 2017.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
Single Multi
Mean Median Std Mean Median Std ∆ Mean t-stat
Coupon p.a. (%) 8.53 7.86 3.45 10.29 10.00 3.38 -1.76*** (-17.04)
Barrier level (%) 70.01 70.00 9.56 62.25 62.00 7.66 7.76*** (30.08)
Maturity (days) 353.56 360 77.54 355.73 358 131.59 -2.17 (-0.64)
Divid. yield (%) 2.19 1.54 8.22 2.79 1.82 6.51 -0.60** (-2.71)
Implied vola. (%) 33.42 30.93 12.78 33.43 31.84 10.17 -0.01 (-0.02)
# of underlyings 1 1 0 2.92 3 0.34
Observations 2,528 1,932
barrier level is 7.76 pp. lower. Both differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Thus, in both dimensions, Multis’ specifications are unconditionally more attractive than
those of Singles. Notably, however, both product types are based on underlying assets
with equally high implied volatility levels (around 33% per annum) as well as comparable
levels of dividend yields. In total, our final sample covers 172 underlying stocks. Table
2.15 in the Appendix provides an overview of the 30 most frequently used equities for
Singles and Multis, respectively.
Figure 2.5 plots the time trend of the two deviating product characteristics for both
product types. Panel A shows that the difference between average coupons (headline
rates) remains fairly stable over time. Panel B illustrates that the same holds for the
respective average barrier levels. Interestingly, we observe that annual coupons decrease
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(b) Panel B: Barrier level
Figure 2.5: Main product specifications of Singles and Multis over time
Figure 2.5 shows the average annual coupon (headline rate in %, Panel A) and the
average barrier level in percent of the underlying values at fixing (Panel B) for Sin-
gles (Multis) in blue (red), between January 2008 and December 2017. Shaded areas
indicate one standard-error confidence intervals. The subsample of Singles (Multis)
consists of 2,528 (1,932) products.
interest rates over our sample period.
2.4.3 Pricing Model
Following the literature (see, e.g., Henderson and Pearson, 2011, and Célérier and Vallée,
2017), our pricing approach builds on the closed-form solution for down-and-in European
put options on a single underlying under the assumptions of Black and Scholes (1973).
In this model, Singles can, therefore, be priced in closed form. Multis, however, cannot.
Hence, to derive an accurate pricing model for Multis, we proceed as follows: first, we
price Singles following the above closed-form solution (the pricing formula is provided in
the Appendix). Second, we repeat the pricing of Singles, but now rely on a standard
Monte Carlo method instead. We then verify the accuracy of this numerical method
by comparing the respective prices.33 Finally, after ensuring that neither sampling nor
discretization errors systematically distort the values of numerically priced Singles, we
apply the same Monte Carlo method for the pricing of Multis.
33See Table 2.20 in the Internet Appendix for a comparison of both pricing approaches. The results
of the Monte Carlo procedure are based on 365 yearly time steps and 50,000 price path simulations for
each underlying asset.
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Our pricing approach, although straightforward, demands some elaboration. It is well
known that the assumptions of constant volatility and continuous price paths (i.e., absence
of jumps) in Black and Scholes (1973) do not hold in reality. However, both these features
generate leptokurtic distributions of the underlying asset returns. Thus, given that BRCs
are composed of deep out-of-the-money put options, both stochastic volatility and price
jumps increase the (absolute) value of the embedded short option position and thereby
decrease the value of the BRC as a whole. Therefore, our pricing methodology provides
conservative fair value estimates for both Singles and, in particular, Multis.
2.5 Field Evidence
In the following, we present the empirical results from our field data analysis. First, we
report estimated BRC margins at issuance and investigate their determinants for both
Singles and Multis, respectively. Second, we compare issuance margins to the realized
ex-post performance of each product type. Third, we analyze the time dynamics of both
issuer margins and product specifications in the context of supply competition. Finally,
we investigate the potential role of investors’ perceptional biases in the cross section of
Multi margins and with respect to frequent underlying combinations.
2.5.1 Issuer Margins
To estimate issuer margins as of the issuance date, we calculate the fair value of each
product according to the pricing procedure described in Section 2.4.3. To control for cor-
relation measurement errors, we compute the margins of Multis using all three correlation
estimation approaches introduced in Section 2.4.1. Following the literature (see, e.g., Hen-
derson and Pearson, 2011, Ammann et al., 2018, Egan, 2019, and Vokata, forthcoming),





where Marginpt is the issuer margin for product p at issuance date t, IPpt denotes the
corresponding issue price (including fees and commissions),34 and FVpt its fair value as
34Most BRC issuers in Switzerland do not charge explicit fees or commissions.
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implied by our pricing model.35
Table 2.6, Panel A, reports summary statistics of estimated issuer margins for both
Singles and Multis. We find an average margin for Singles of 2.0% and an average margin
for Multis between 4.1% and 4.4%, depending on the correlation estimation approach.
Moreover, Figure 2.6 illustrates the evolution of average margins (based on simple cor-
relation estimations) for both product types over our sample period. Generally, issuer
margins exhibit a decreasing time trend (see Subsection 2.5.3 for regression analysis). In
comparison with the literature, our estimates are similar but slightly lower than those doc-
umented for the US market (see Henderson and Pearson, 2011, Egan, 2019, and Vokata,
forthcoming).
To analyze this discrepancy in issuer margins between Singles and Multis, we run
several regressions. In Panel B of Table 2.6, we regress margins on a Multi-Dummy (equal
to one for Multis), including issuer fixed effects, month fixed effects, and double-clustered
standard errors:
Marginpt = β0 + β1Multi-Dummyp + γFEIssuer + δFEMonth + ǫpt,
where β1 is the main coefficient of interest, while FEIssuer denotes the issuer fixed effect
and FEMonth the month fixed effect, respectively. Consistent with our experimental find-
ings, the results in Panel B show significantly higher margins for Multis than for Singles
across all model specifications. Moreover, when controlling for issuer and month fixed
effects (even columns), the difference in margins between Singles and Multis increases to
approximately 2.9 pp. on average. Table 2.21 in the Internet Appendix repeats the above
analysis while controlling for product characteristics and the risk-free rate. Given our
pricing model, all coefficients exhibit the expected sign. In particular, we note (i) the
relatively large Multi-Dummy coefficient, and (ii) the insignificant impact of the risk-free
rate in the presence of a month fixed effect. For Multis, given the small variations in mar-
gins derived from the different correlation estimations, we focus in the following on the
most conservative margin estimates based on simple historical correlations (MarginHist).
36
35Note, our margin estimation abstracts from any hedging implementation costs, as we do not observe
bid-ask spreads of BRCs’ embedded barrier options, which are typically traded over-the-counter. Assum-
ing hedging costs equal to ten percent of the option value (Muravyev and Pearson, 2016), our calculations
suggest that the average hedging costs for Multis are less than 40 basis points higher than for Singles.
Moreover, when focusing on the difference in margins between Singles and Multis, any potential exposure
to foreign currency risk (notional) cancels out.
36All our results hold across correlation estimation approaches.
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Table 2.6: Issuer margins – Singles vs. Multis
Table 2.6, Panel A, reports estimates of issuer margins for Singles and Multis, where margins for
Multis are based on three different correlation estimation approaches. Panel B reports coefficient
estimates from OLS regressions with issuer margins as dependent variable and a Multi-Dummy
(equal to one for Multis) as main regressor of interest. In specifications (1) to (2), Multi margins
are based on simple correlation estimations (MarginHist). In specifications (3) to (4), and (5)
to (6), Multi margins are based on correlation estimations applying the Ledoit and Wolf (2004)
(MarginLW ) and the Chen et al. (2010) (MarginOAS) shrinkage method, respectively (see Section
2.4.1.1 for details). In (1), (3), and (5), raw effects of the Multi-Dummy are reported. In (2), (4),
and (6), issuer and month fixed effects are added to the model specifications. The subsample of
Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products. The total sample consists of 4,460 products
issued between January 2008 and December 2017. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the issuer and the month level. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Margins
Single MultiHist MultiLW MultiOAS
Mean 2.01 4.06 4.36 4.15
Median 1.37 3.25 3.52 3.37
Std 4.51 6.67 6.83 6.71
Observations 2,528 1,932 1,932 1,932
Panel B: Regressions on product type
MarginHist MarginLW MarginOAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multi-Dummy 2.041*** 2.749*** 2.337*** 3.067*** 2.135*** 2.851***
(0.551) (0.604) (0.573) (0.626) (0.561) (0.613)
Constant 2.019*** 1.715*** 2.019*** 1.706*** 2.019*** 1.711***
(0.163) (0.266) (0.163) (0.275) (0.163) (0.270)
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457























2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
 
Single Multi
Figure 2.6: Issuer margins of Singles and Multis over time
Figure 2.6 shows average issuer margins for Singles (blue) and Multis (red) between





where Marginpt is the issuer margin for product p at issuance date t, IPpt denotes
the corresponding issue price, and FVpt its fair value as implied by our pricing model
(using simple correlation estimations for Multis). Shaded areas indicate one standard-
error confidence intervals. The subsample of Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932)
products.
2.5.1.1 Margin Drivers for Multis
For a better understanding of the discrepancy in issuer margins between Singles and
Multis, we explore the relation between margins and product characteristics in more
detail. As shown in Section 2.4.2, from an investor’s perspective, the main product
specifications, i.e., annual coupons and barrier levels, unconditionally favor Multis over
Singles. Hence, those specifications cannot possibly explain the discrepancy in issuer
margins. Consequently, the documented margin discrepancies must either stem from
other product characteristics, such as implied volatilities of the underlying assets and
their dividend yields, or must be driven by Multis’ embedded correlation risk induced by
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their worst-of payoff structure.
To investigate how the interplay between Multis’ worst-of design and the correlation
of underlying assets affects issuer margins, we regress the margins of Multis with three
underlying assets on product characteristics, including estimated underlying correlations.
We fix the number of underlying assets at three to control for any further confounding
effects of varying payoff contingencies. Importantly, Multis with three underlying assets
constitute the “median Multi type” (see Table 2.5), representing approximately 88% of
all Multis in our final sample. The results of these regressions are presented in Table 2.14
in the Appendix.
While controlling for coupon, barrier level, maturity, as well as underlyings’ implied
volatility and dividend yield, plus the prevailing risk-free rate, we find a significant neg-
ative relation between a Multi’s margin and both its average and minimum correlation
(across all three underlyings), respectively. Intuitively, a lower correlation among under-
lying assets, ceteris paribus, results in a higher margin, as the implied probability of a
barrier event increases. Additionally, conditional on a barrier event, a lower correlation
also increases the downside exposure borne by investors. The results in Table 2.14 imply
that the lower the correlation among a Multi’s underlying assets, the higher the associated
margin for its issuer. Thus, also across Multis, product characteristics, e.g., headline rates
and barrier levels, do not sufficiently compensate for higher correlation risk.
2.5.2 Ex-post Performance
So far, we have analyzed ex-ante, i.e., expected margins from the issuers’ perspective.37
Here, we report results on the ex-post, i.e., realized performance of both Singles and Multis
from the investors’ point of view. To get an optimistic estimate of BRCs’ investment
performance, we adjust realized returns only for the risk-free rate. This is likely to
imply a favorable perspective on their ex-post returns, considering that the average retail
investor is risk-averse (see our experimental evidence, or, e.g., Célérier and Vallée, 2017).










− rt(T − t)
]
,
37Note, under the premise that issuers hedge their exposure, these margins are actually locked in at
the time of issuance.
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where Returnpt is the log return of product p issued at t, PayoffpT denotes its realized
payoff at maturity T , IPpt the product’s issue price, and rt the continuous risk-free rate
at issuance.38 Results are presented in Table 2.7.
Panel A in Table 2.7 reports summary statistics of ex-post performances for Singles
and Multis, respectively. On average, Singles pay a yearly premium of 0.78% in excess of
the risk-free rate. Strikingly, Multis’ average annual return is negative, i.e., −1.62% when
controlling for the risk-free rate. Across our sample, ex-post performances display con-
siderable variation over time. Notably, during the crisis, investors in Multis, on average,
lost close to one quarter of their initial investment.
Panel B in Table 2.7 again shows results from product-type regressions, this time with
realized returns as the dependent variable:
Returnpt = β0 + β1Multi-Dummyp + γFEIssuer + δFEMonth + γpt.
In line with our regression analysis of estimated issuer margins in Section 2.5.1, we find
a significant difference in ex-post returns between Singles and Multis, while controlling
for both issuer and month fixed effects. The Multi-Dummy coefficient estimate in speci-
fication (2) indicates that Multis, on average, pay 2.6 pp. lower investment returns than
Singles (p-value = 0.012).
Strikingly, on average, absolute differences between Singles and Multis are fairly similar
for both ex-ante (estimated) margins (2.9 pp.) as well as ex-post (realized) returns (2.6
pp.). In other words, Multis’ extra margin estimated at issuance closely matches the
average extra return realized by their issuers. The deviations in levels likely stem from
the risk-neutral discount rate that underlies the above calculation of realized returns.
However, the resulting values square reasonably well with carefully beta-adjusted returns
of Singles issued in the US (Vokata, forthcoming). Importantly, the similarity in margin
differences corroborates the sufficient accuracy of our pricing model for comparing the
profitability of Singles vs. Multis.
38To get annualized returns, the time difference between issuance date t and maturity T is measured
in years here.
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Table 2.7: Ex-post performance of Singles and Multis
Table 2.7 reports summary statistics of average realized returns (per year of issuance) for Singles
and Multis, respectively (Panel A), and coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with realized
returns as dependent variable and a Multi-Dummy (equal to one for Multis) as main regressor
of interest (Panel B). The subsample of Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products.
The total sample consists of 4,460 products issued between January 2008 and December 2017.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the issuer and the month level.
* , ** , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Panel A: Ex-post product returns
Single Multi
Mean (%) N Mean (%) N
Issued in 2008 -7.80 68 -25.12 27
2009 11.75 114 14.71 38
2010 7.54 142 7.44 101
2011 -2.12 246 2.98 143
2012 0.91 283 -6.64 158
2013 0.64 295 -10.12 147
2014 -5.92 373 -16.22 267
2015 -0.57 335 -2.86 240
2016 6.82 317 6.86 328
2017 1.14 355 2.30 483
Full sample 0.78 2,528 -1.62 1,932
Panel B: Regressions on product type
(1) (2)










2.5.3 Supply Competition: Margins and Product Complexity
over Time
As documented by means of product issuance (see Figure 2.1) and volumes (see Figure
2.9 in the Appendix), the sharp reduction in interest rates during the Great Recession
was followed by a distinct shift from Singles to Multis. In light of the experimentally and
empirically identified margin difference, the question about possible relations between
product prevalence and profitability arises. On the one hand, the parallel rise of both
product types during our earlier sample period aligns with both the overall growth in
YEPs and our experimentally established impact of interest rate levels on investment
propensity; on the other hand, however, the increasing popularity of Multis over the later
sample period does not.
Section 2.2.2 provides evidence of the distinctive competitive forces at play in the
Swiss YEP issuer market. Carlin (2009) argues that in retail financial markets with im-
perfectly informed investors, issuers have an incentive to strategically increase product
complexity and thereby diminish product comparability. Imperfect comparability shields
issuer margins from perfect price competition. In the context of YEPs, Singles are not
only less complex than Multis but can also be readily compared based on one-dimensional
volatility forecasts. In contrast, Multis require an estimate of every underlying’s volatility
as well as of their collective correlation structure. Moreover, due to their worst-of pay-
off function, a Multi’s risk-return profile can change substantially by replacing just one
underlying asset.
In addition to the prevailing low degree of market concentration, the adoption and
steady growth of a multi-issuer platform in 2014 have arguably intensified price competi-
tion for standard products. Specifically, for products with common features, the platform
allows investors to easily compare price quotes of up to eight issuers, who (not uncom-
monly) overbid each other’s coupons by only a few basis points (see Section 2.2.2 and
references therein for details).
To investigate potential complexity effects more systematically, we first regress prod-
uct margins on a Multi-Dummy and the respective year of issuance. Table 2.8 reports
the results. Across all model specifications, i.e., controlling for correlation estimations
and issuer fixed effects, we find a significant negative time trend. Margins decrease by
approximately 20 basis points per year.
Second, we look at the composition of the growing number of Multis issued over time.
Panel (A) of Figure 2.7 indicates that – unsurprisingly – the proportion of non-unique
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Table 2.8: Time trend in issuer margins
Table 2.8 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with issuer margins as dependent
variable and a Multi-Dummy (equal to one for Multis), the issuance year (Year), and the Risk-
free rate (%) as main regressors of interest. In specifications (1) to (2), Multi margins are based
on simple correlation estimations (MarginHist). In specifications (3) to (4) and (5) to (6), Multi
margins are based on correlation estimations applying the Ledoit and Wolf (2004) (MarginLW )
and the Chen et al. (2010) (MarginOAS) shrinkage method, respectively (see Section 2.4.1.1 for
details). In (1), (3), and (5) raw effects of the Multi-Dummy and issuance year are reported.
In (2), (4), and (6) issuer fixed effects are added to the model specifications. The subsample of
Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products. The total sample consists of 4,460 products
issued between January 2008 and December 2017. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and are clustered at the issuer and the month level. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
MarginHist MarginLW MarginOAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multi-Dummy 2.220*** 2.682*** 2.518*** 2.997*** 2.316*** 2.784***
(0.519) (0.535) (0.539) (0.557) (0.528) (0.545)
Year -0.229*** -0.175*** -0.232*** -0.174*** -0.233*** -0.177***
(0.063) (0.041) (0.067) (0.043) (0.065) (0.042)
Risk-free rate (%) 0.034 -0.138 0.039 -0.141 0.040 -0.137
(0.294) (0.247) (0.305) (0.255) (0.298) (0.248)
Constant 3.275*** 2.847*** 3.292*** 2.836*** 3.295*** 2.854***
(0.308) (0.386) (0.320) (0.402) (0.313) (0.390)
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457
R2 0.042 0.065 0.050 0.074 0.045 0.068
underlying combinations within a given quarter grows during our sample period. Further-
more, Panel (B) shows that this increasing occurrence of “Multi twins” is counteracted
by a continuous (approximately threefold) expansion of the respective underlying uni-
verse. The latter trend implies that issuers are inclined to consistently expand the range
of available products.
Third, we make use of the steady flow of Multi twins depicted in Panel (A) of Figure 2.7
to test the above conjectured price competition at the individual product level. Crucially,
every set of Multi twins comprises, on average, 2.9 different issuers per quarter. Table
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(a) Panel A: Concentration of Multis

















(b) Panel B: Underlyings in use
Figure 2.7: Concentration of Multis over time
Panel A illustrates the percentage of non-unique underlying combinations across all
Multis issued during a given quarter between 2008 and 2017. An underlying combi-
nation is considered to be non-unique if the same combination of underlying assets
is issued multiple times during the same quarter. For every quarter, Panel B shows
the number of different underlyings across all issued Multis. The dashed black lines
show the respective linear fits (Panel A: β = 0.019, p-value< 0.01; Panel B: β = 30.07,
p-value< 0.01).
2.9 reports the coefficient estimates of a logistic regression that predicts the likelihood of
a (strict) coupon increase based on the number of previously (within the same quarter)
issued products with identical underlyings. Across all specifications, i.e., controlling for
issuance volume, product characteristics, as well as issuer and quarter fixed effects, and
contrary to a decreasing time trend in coupon levels (see above), we find strong evidence
that the existence of product twins forces issuers to increase their offered headline rate.
In sum, we interpret these findings as evidence in support of a competition-driven in-
crease in product complexity. Building on well-documented information asymmetries for
related products (Egan, 2019), and in conjunction with our own experimental evidence, it
appears highly probable that (at least some) retail investors only have incomplete knowl-
edge about BRCs’ fair values. Hence, in the face of competition, issuers rationally preserve
profits by increasing the complexity of their investment products. Specifically, due to in-
vestors’ inability to accurately compare sufficiently different products, by switching from
issuing Singles to offering more complex and diverse Multis, issuers partially shield their
rents against increasing price pressure. This interpretation is further supported by rerun-
ning specification (1) in Table 2.8 but separately interacting the year with a Single and
a Multi-Dummy, respectively. While the former coefficient is highly significant (-0.203,
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Table 2.9: Competition for higher margins
Table 2.9 displays the coefficients of logistic regressions where the dependent variable Coupon
raise is a dummy equal to one if, in a given quarter, the given product has a higher coupon than
the preceding product with the same underlying combination. For all Multis, the first specifica-
tion regresses Coupon raise on Combination count, which counts the number of preceding Multis
with the same underlying combination issued in the same quarter. The second, third, and four
specification control for log Volume (mil. CHF) and the main product characteristics, as well as
issuer and quarter fixed effects, respectively. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are clustered at the issuer level. * , ** , and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coupon raise Coupon raise Coupon raise Coupon raise
Combination count 0.017*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.024***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Volume) -0.190*** -0.043 -0.179***
(0.060) (0.036) (0.026)
Maturity (days) -0.000** -0.000*** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Barrier level (%) 0.030*** 0.033*** 0.036***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Coupon p.a. (%) 0.054*** 0.058*** 0.073***
(0.011) (0.005) (0.006)
Constant -1.464*** -0.747 -3.398*** -1.572***
(0.105) (0.982) (0.607) (0.463)
Issuer FE Yes
Quarter FE Yes
Observations 28,497 17,893 17,893 17,893
p-value < 0.001), the latter only remains marginal significant (-0.270, p-value = 0.065),
pointing to more sustained competition in the market segment for Singles.
2.5.4 Underlying Combinations and Dependency Bias
In the context of BRCs, the pivotal attribute of any given combination of underlying stocks
is their respective correlation. The significance of the embedded dependencies is due to
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Multis’ worst-of payoff structure: the lower the correlation, the higher the likelihood
of diverging stock performances and, thus, the higher the risk of a barrier event and
investment losses. The first-order importance of underlying selection on actual down-side
risk calls for a discussion of potentially interacting behavioral phenomena and preferences.
2.5.4.1 Underlying Selection
Our experimental evidence suggests that the presence of multiple underlyings decreases
bidding aggressiveness considerably (although not sufficiently to prevent higher margins).
A straight-forward approach to manage Multis’ amplified down-side risk is by choosing
underlyings that are highly correlated.39 One way of doing so consists of selecting stocks
from the same or just a few related industries.
Table 2.15 in the Appendix reports the 30 most frequent underlying assets of Singles
and Multis, respectively. Notably, well-known large-cap stocks are frequently used as
underlying assets.40 Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 in the Appendix illustrate that (i) Multis’
underlying stocks are predominantly from certain industry divisions, (ii) within these
divisions, combinations within one or across two industry groups are common, and (iii)
underlyings’ industry concentration is increasing over time. According to the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC), there exists a total of 416 industry groups (first three digits
of SIC code).
In our final sample, the three main industry groups make up 43.3% of all Multis’
underlying stocks, i.e., “Computer Programming & Data Processing” (group 737): 21.1%,
“Gold and Silver Ores” (group 104): 11.7%, and “Computer & Office Equipment” (group
357): 10.5%. Moreover, in the second half of our sample period, for 52.9% of all Multis
with three underlying assets, issuers pick stocks within two or even only one industry
group. Across all repeated underlying combinations depicted in Figure 2.7, the following
three stock combinations are issued most frequently: Newmont Mining, Barrick Gold,
and Goldcorp (all group 104, issued 199 times); Coca-Cola, McDonald’s, and Starbucks
(group 208 and 581 (2x), issued 179 times); Apple, Alphabet, and Microsoft (group 357
and 737 (2x), issued 152 times).
We also find suggestive evidence that underlying selection is influenced by the (finan-
cial) news cycle. For instance, 67% of all repeated underlying combinations are issued in
39In the limit, i.e., in the case of perfect correlation, any Multi essentially converges to a Single.
40We do not detect any apparent difference in the selection of underlying stocks between Singles and
Multis.
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just one (respective) quarter.41 For instance, less than seven months following Twitter’s
IPO in November 2013, the first Multi on Facebook, Netflix, and Twitter was issued, fol-
lowed by another 27 such products until December 2017 (end of our sample period). Most
recently, on January 20, 2021, Credit Suisse issued a Multi BRC (ISIN CH0575748063)
offering a 12% annual coupon on Pfizer, Moderna, and AstraZeneca, i.e., the three leading
American and European producers of approved COVID-19 vaccines.
2.5.4.2 Bias in Perceiving Dependencies
When studying the prevalence of seemingly correlated stock combinations, it is key to un-
derstand their actual correlation structure and how it determines product returns (mar-
gins). Given the importance of underlying dependencies for Multis’ overall risk-return
profile, this requires an analysis of investors’ perception and awareness of actual correla-
tion levels. But how do (retail) investors perceive dependencies between stock prices?
Recent evidence from neuroscience suggests that humans, if confronted with an uncer-
tain environment, generally struggle to identify and adapt to outliers, i.e., the realization
of extreme events (d’Acremont and Bossaerts, 2016). Moreover, Ungeheuer and Weber
(2020) demonstrate that both experimental participants and stock market investors ac-
count for the frequency but not the magnitude of return comovement, thereby running
the risk of misestimating actual correlations. Building on these findings, we investigate
(i) the role of (perceived) dependencies for observed underlying frequencies and (ii) the
potential effect of investors’ correlation misperception on cross-sectional issuer margins.42
Panel A in Figure 2.8 shows the distribution of yearly pairwise correlations of all S&P
500 member stocks over our sample period. For comparison, we plot the correlation dis-
tribution for the underlying stock combinations of all Multis in our sample (whereof 62%
are S&P 500 members as of year-end 2017).43 The mean correlation within the S&P 500
universe equals 0.353 and is therefore significantly lower than the 0.449 mean correlation
of underlying stocks (p-value < 0.01). Similarly, Panel B in Figure 2.8 shows the corre-
sponding comovement frequency distributions. Following Ungeheuer and Weber (2020),
41See Table 2.22 and Table 2.23 in the Internet Appendix for summary statistics.
42While we deliberately abstracted from modeling tail risks when pricing BRCs’ short option compo-
nent, thereby accepting conservative estimates of issuer margins, we can now non-parametrically study
the consequences of leptokurtic return distributions on the popularity of underlying stock combinations
(and associated margins).
43Consistent with Multis’ worst-of payoff structure, we consider all underlying combinations embed-
ded in a given product. E.g., for a Multi with three underlying assets, we include all three pairwise
combinations of underlying stocks.
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(a) Panel A: Correlation distribution

















(b) Panel B: Comovement distribution
Figure 2.8: Correlation and comovement – S&P 500 vs. Multi underlyings
Panel A shows the distributions of annual correlations for both S&P 500 member
stocks and between the underlying stocks within each Multi in our final sample. Panel
B shows the corresponding distributions of comovement frequencies, which, for any pair
of stocks, equals the proportion of days (over one year) with the same sign (direction)
of returns. For S&P 500 member stocks, computations are based on calendar years,
whereas, for Multi underlyings, computations are based on the twelve months prior to
issuance. Both correlations and comovement frequencies are based on daily log returns.
The sample period ranges from January 2008 to December 2017. S&P 500 members
are selected in accordance with the index composition as of year-end 2017.
the comovement frequency between a given pair of stocks simply equals the proportion of
trading days over the past year for which both stocks exhibited the same sign of returns
(either both negative or both positive). Hence, the comovement frequency is a simple
counting measure based on direction rather than magnitude. Similar to linear correla-
tions, the average comovement within the S&P 500 (0.630) is significantly lower than the
average comovement of underlying stocks (0.670, p-value < 0.01).
From Figure 2.8, it becomes evident that investors indeed seem to exhibit a strong
preference for highly dependent underlyings. This corroborates our interpretation of the
descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence in Section 2.5.4.1. But what about our hy-
pothesis that investors perceive dependency based on comovement frequency rather than
actual linear correlation? Obviously, given their distinct shape and domain, the differences
in distributions between Panel A and Panel B in Figure 2.8 cannot be compared directly.
To this end, we assign both correlation and comovement ranks to each underlying com-
bination relative to the S&P 500 universe. Specifically, we first compute the percentiles
for the distribution of yearly S&P 500 member correlation (comovement) pairs. For in-
stance, the first comovement percentile equals 0.481, and the 99th comovement percentile
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amounts to 0.772. Second, we map the correlation (comovement) estimate of each under-
lying combination into the corresponding S&P 500 percentile, which then determines its
rank within the S&P 500 benchmark.
Across all combinations of underlying stocks, the average correlation rank is 62.3,
whereas the average comovement rank is 64.0. While, on average, Multis’ underlying
correlations are clearly above those of randomly picked S&P 500 stocks, their comovement
ranking appears even higher (p-value = 0.049 for relative ranking difference, Wilcoxon
signed-rank test). Splitting our sample into an “early” (2008-12) and “late” (2013-17)
period, i.e., controlling for the financial crisis, subperiod-specific rankings reveal that the
relative comovement of underlying stocks increased substantially more (+9) than their
relative correlation (+5).44 Overall, these findings suggest that investors’ preferences for
certain underlying combinations could – at least partially – be driven by a tendency to
overestimate actual dependency levels.
In a last step, we investigate the cross-sectional pricing implications of the above de-
pendency measures. To prevent confounding effects of varying payoff contingencies, we
again focus on the representative Multi-type with three underlying stocks (see Table 2.5).
As before, we control for all other product specifications, the main characteristics of un-
derlying assets, as well as time trends and issuer effects. Moreover, we also account for
issuance volumes across Multis.45 Table 2.10 reports the results. Unsurprisingly, in isola-
tion, both correlation and comovement-based (not shown) dependency measures exhibit
a significant negative relation with issuer margins. Taken together, the significant effect
of products’ (average) underlying correlation vanishes. This indicates that an increase in
perceived dependence reduces the margins paid by investors.
Most interestingly, according to the final two model specifications in Table 2.10, the
greater the ranking difference between a product’s (average) underlying comovement and
correlation, the higher its margin. In other words, in the cross section, underlying combi-
nations whose pairwise dependencies are likely to be overestimated by investors offer sig-
nificantly higher margins to issuers. Moreover, when controlling for potential dependency
overestimation (ceteris paribus more likely for low dependencies), the negative effect of
average comovement on margins intensifies substantially. Thus, our findings suggest that,
while issuers do not sufficiently adjust Multis’ coupons to compensate for their embedded
44As expected, general dependency levels between stock prices were significantly higher during the
crisis.
45We obtain qualitatively identical results for our unrestricted sample of Multis with three underlying
stocks, i.e., without the constraint of existing data on issuance volume.
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Table 2.10: Issuer margins and dependency measures
Table 2.10 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with issuer margins of Multis with
three underlying assets as dependent variable. For each product, Avg correlation denotes the
average correlation (based on historical daily log returns) across all three correlation pairs. Sim-
ilarly, Avg comovement denotes the average comovement frequency across all three correlation
pairs. Both measures are reported in percent (i.e., scaled by 100) and are based on the twelve
months preceding issuance. For each product, Rank difference denotes its comovement rank mi-
nus its correlation rank, where both ranks are computed relatively to S&P 500 member stocks.
Controls include a constant, product characteristics, i.e., coupon p.a. (%), maturity (days), bar-
rier level (%), underlyings’ average implied volatility (%) and dividend yield (%), issued volume,
as well as the prevailing risk-free rate (%) at issuance, see Table 2.16 for details. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the issuer and the month level. * , ** , and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Margin Margin Margin Margin Margin Margin
Avg correlation -0.075*** -0.082*** -0.021 -0.024 0.039* 0.032
(0.005) (0.006) (0.012) (0.017) (0.019) (0.031)
Avg comovement -0.166*** -0.171*** -0.323*** -0.313***
(0.045) (0.059) (0.060) (0.092)
Rank difference 0.034*** 0.030**
(0.008) (0.012)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 948 939 948 939 948 939
R2 0.801 0.836 0.811 0.844 0.815 0.847
correlation structure, this discrepancy (margin) is (i) decreasing in the perceived depen-
dency level of underlying stocks, but (ii) increasing in the dependency overestimation by
investors.
2.6 Conclusion
Studying the market for yield enhancement products (YEPs) in Switzerland between 2008
and 2017, we document a substantial increase in market size, followed by a distinct rise
in product complexity. This pattern is paralleled by firstly falling and then plateauing
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low interest rates. Via the means of laboratory control, we show that, while decreasing
interest rates increase individuals’ overall willingness to bear risk, it is their misestimation
of correlation effects that creates demand for more complex products. By analyzing 4,460
issued YEPs, we find that (i) estimated issuer margins are increasing in product com-
plexity, (ii) average investment returns are negative, (iii) increasing product complexity
appears driven by issuer competition and to cater to investors’ bias in the perception of
stock price dependencies.
In the face of high economic uncertainty as well as surging private and public debt
levels, interest rates are expected to remain low in most advanced economies for the
foreseeable future, a phenomenon aptly termed “low for long.” While the debate about the
risk-taking consequences of such unconventional monetary policies is continuing (see, e.g.,
Rajan (2013) for an optimistic and Stein (2013) for a more conservative outlook), seminal
finance theories, e.g., on portfolio choice (Campbell and Sigalov, 2020), are currently being
revised to account for reaching for yield behavior. Moreover, as shown by Bordalo et al.
(2016) and Lian et al. (2019), this environment also offers new opportunities for financial
innovation.
As recent as November 2019, structured investment products received approval of the
Swiss pension supervisory authority (OPSC).46 Considering the growing yield-generating
pressure experienced by pension funds globally, educating the broader investor commu-
nity about the complete risk-return profile of emerging or newly accredited investment
alternatives is all the more of high policy relevance. To assist ongoing regulation, a bet-
ter understanding of both demand and supply driven mechanisms is crucial for shedding
light on the effect of low interest regimes on investment decisions, and, thus, on financial
stability. This paper takes a step in this direction.




At issuance t = 0, the value of a Single (BRC with one underlying asset) can be calculated
via the following closed-form solution:




where N is the nominal value of the Single, c the coupon p.a., r the risk-free rate p.a. at
issuance, T the product maturity (in years), S0 the value of the underlying asset at
issuance, and pdi the value of a European down-and-in put option on the underlying asset
(at issuance). Here, both c and r are expressed using continuous compounding.
Under the assumptions of Black and Scholes (1973), the risk-neutral dynamics of the
underlying asset with continuous (dividend) yield µ are:
dSt = (r − µ)Stdt+ σStdWt,
where St denotes the underlying asset price at time t, σ the volatility of the underlying
asset, and {Wt, t ≥ 0} a Brownian motion.
At t = 0, the value of the embedded European down-and-in put option then equals
(see, e.g., Jeanblanc, Yor, and Chesney, 2009):
pdi =− S0N(−x1)e−µT +Ke−rTN(−x1 + σ
√




















where H denotes the put option’s barrier and:
λ =
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Figure 2.9: BRCs estimated issuance volume
Figure 2.9 shows the evolution of estimated BRC issuance volume between January
2008 and December 2017. We classify BRCs as “Singles” (one underlying asset) or
“Multis” (more than one underlying asset), respectively. In total, we have volume data
for 28,960 BRCs: 11,067 Singles and 17,893 Multis. Estimates of issuance volumes are
calculated by multiplying annual mean volumes by the respective number of issued



























2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
GS Vontobel Claridenleu UBS
Bär ZKB EFG CS
Leonteq Raiffeisen Others































2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
(b) Panel B: Herfindahl index
Figure 2.10: Competition in the market for YEP
Panel A in Figure 2.10 illustrates the respective market share (turnover) of the largest
YEP issuers in Switzerland between 2008 and 2017. Panel B plots the evolution of
the corresponding Herfindahl index across all YEP issuers. Source: Market Report
Express provided by SIX Structured Products (SIX Securities & Exchanges).
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Figure 2.11: Margins and risk preferences
Figure 2.11 shows the relation between participants’ risk preferences and their average
implied margin for Singles (blue) and Multis (red). Risk preferences are measured as
participants’ switching point in the Holt and Laury (2002) elicitation task. The blue
line shows the linear fit for Singles (β = −1.66, p-value = 0.02) and the red line for
Multis (β = −2.61, p-value < 0.01), respectively.
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Figure 2.12: Margins and overconfidence
Figure 2.12 shows the relation between participants’ overconfidence and their average
implied margin for Singles (blue) and Multis (red). Overconfidence is measured as
proportion of incorrect intervals in the Alpert and Raiffa (1982) interval production
task: participants are confronted with ten knowledge questions, for each of which
they have to provide 90% confidence intervals. A value of one indicates that a given
participant’s intervals did not contain the true answer to any of the ten questions. The
blue line shows the linear fit for Singles (β = 9.58, p-value = 0.24) and the red line for
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Figure 2.13: BRCs issuance over time – final sample
Figure 2.13 shows the evolution of BRC issued between January 2008 and December
2017 in our final sample. We classify BRCs as “Singles” (one underlying asset) or
“Multis” (more than one underlying asset), respectively. In total, the final sample
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Figure 2.14: Issuer margins
Figure 2.14 shows the distribution of estimated margins (in %) earned by BRC issuers.
Displayed margins are winsorized at one and hundred percent. In total, the final
sample consists of 4,460 BRCs issued between January 2008 and December 2017.
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Figure 2.15: Distribution of underlyings stocks across SIC divisions
Figure 2.15 shows the distribution of underlying stocks across all BRCs in our final
sample, classified by Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) division: A = Agricul-
ture, B = Mining, C = Construction, D = Manufacturing, E = Transportation &
Communication, F = Wholesale Trade, G = Retail Trade, H = Finance & Insurance,
I = Services, J = Public Administration. In total, the final sample consists of 4,460
issued BRCs: 2,528 Singles and 1,932 Multis.
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Figure 2.16: Industry concentration of underlying combinations
Figure 2.16 shows the percentage of Multis with three underlyings whose underlying
stocks are either all from the same industry group or from two industry groups. In
total, there exist 416 Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) industry groups. The
sample period is split into the first and second five years, respectively. The final sample
consists of 1,691 issued Multis with three underlying stocks.
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Table 2.11: Treatment Overview
Table 2.11 shows an overview of the different experimental treatments. Treatments differ along
the interest rate and the volatility dimension. In each treatment, the respective parameter
changes in isolation, e.g., the volatility level (moderate vs. high) of the underlying asset(s), or












l Moderate (13.7%) Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
High (27.4%) Treatment 4 Treatment 5 Treatment 6
Table 2.12: Product parameters overview
Table 2.12 provides an overview of the products and their parameters used in the different
treatments of the experiment. Overall, participants have to evaluate twelve products, half of
which are Singles, over six rounds. In any given round, Singles and Multis only differ in the
number of underlying stocks. Columns Coupon S and Coupon M show the values of the coupon
payment for each product type. Column Vola indicates the volatility level in each round, and
column rf-rate shows the corresponding risk-free rate. The columns HitProb S and HitProb
M present the actual probabilities of a barrier event for the Single and Multi in each round,
respectively.
Round Coupon S Coupon M Vola rf-rate HitProb S HitProb M
1 17.00% 17.00% 13.7% 3.00% 16.94% 30.97%
2 17.00% 17.00% 13.7% 0.00% 16.94% 30.97%
3 17.00% 17.00% 13.7% -2.00% 16.94% 30.97%
4 17.00% 17.00% 27.4% 3.00% 55.91% 80.62%
5 17.00% 17.00% 27.4% 0.00% 55.91% 80.62%
6 17.00% 17.00% 27.4% -2.00% 55.91% 80.62%
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Table 2.13: Summary statistics experiment
Table 2.13 shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, first quartile, median,
third quartile) for participants’ estimates during the main experimental task. WTPSingle
and WTPMulti indicate participants’ willingness-to-pay for Singles and Multis, respectively.
ProbSingle and ProbMulti denote participants’ estimated probabilities of a barrier event for Sin-
gles and Multis, respectively. MisestmationSingle and MisestimationMulti indicate the differ-
ence between the true probability and the respective estimate for Singles and Multis, respectively.
The total number of observations is 606.
Mean Std Q1 Median Q3
WTPSingle 96.49 18.84 85.00 100.00 110.00
WTPMulti 89.52 19.80 73.50 90.75 105.00
ProbSingle 38.67 22.88 20.00 36.00 50.00
ProbMulti 49.61 24.85 30.00 50.00 70.00
MisestimationSingle -2.25 29.68 -23.06 -3.06 15.91
MisestimationMulti 6.18 34.44 -19.03 5.97 30.62
Observations 606
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Table 2.14: Issuer margins of Multis with three underlying assets
Table 2.14 reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with issuer margins of Multis
with three underlying assets as dependent variable. For each product, Avg correlation denotes
the average correlation (based on historical daily log returns) across all three correlation pairs.
Similarly, Min. correlation denotes the smallest correlation across all three correlation pairs.
Controls include a constant, product characteristics, i.e., coupon p.a. (%), maturity (days),
barrier level (%), underlyings’ average implied volatility (%) and dividend yield (%), as well
as the prevailing risk-free rate (%) at issuance, see Table 2.16 for details. Standard errors are
reported in parentheses and are clustered at the issuer and the month level. * , ** , and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Margin Margin Margin Margin Margin Margin
Avg correlation -0.032*** -0.084*** -0.089***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Min. correlation -0.028*** -0.074*** -0.077***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issuer FE Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes
Observations 1,691 1,691 1,679 1,691 1,691 1,679
R2 0.010 0.839 0.862 0.009 0.838 0.859
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Table 2.15: Underlying equities
Table 2.15 reports the 30 most frequently used underlying assets for both Singles and Multis in
the final sample, as well as the number of linked products and their respective percentage share
in the initial data set. The sample consists of 4,460 BRCs and 172 corresponding underlying
assets.
Single Multi
Underlying Products % share Underlying Products % share
Microsoft 113 4.47 Microsoft 429 7.61
Caterpillar 108 4.27 Alphabet 365 6.48
General Electric 103 4.07 Coca Cola 272 4.83
Tesla 101 4.00 General Electric 248 4.40
Pfizer 88 3.48 Newmont Mining 221 3.92
Facebook 81 3.20 Goldcorp 211 3.74
Intel 75 2.97 Facebook 205 3.64
Alphabet 63 2.49 McDonalds 200 3.55
Exxon Mobil 55 2.18 Intel 176 3.12
Twitter 53 2.10 Pfizer 174 3.09
Newmont Mining 52 2.06 Starbucks 169 3.00
Cisco 50 1.98 Caterpillar 165 2.93
Alibaba 49 1.94 Netflix 143 2.54
HP 44 1.74 Cisco 88 1.56
Goldcorp 42 1.66 Nike 87 1.54
Starbucks 42 1.66 IBM 78 1.38
IBM 41 1.62 Gilead Sciences 74 1.31
Coca Cola 35 1.38 Johnson & Johnson 63 1.12
McDonalds 34 1.35 Exxon Mobil 61 1.08
Netflix 34 1.35 Mondelez 61 1.08
Gilead Sciences 29 1.15 Celgene 52 0.92
United States Steel 28 1.11 Biogen 50 0.89
Johnson & Johnson 26 1.03 Tesla 50 0.89
Halliburton 26 1.03 Disney Walt 48 0.85
Nike 24 0.95 Twitter 47 0.83
Petroleo Brasileiro 22 0.87 Procter & Gamble 46 0.82
JP Morgan 21 0.83 Visa 45 0.80
Celgene 21 0.83 Nvidia 35 0.62
GoPro 21 0.83 Alibaba 34 0.60
Penney JC 20 0.79 Walt Mart Stores 32 0.57
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Table 2.16: Variable definitions
Variable name Description Source
Year Calendar year of product issuance date Data set
Issuer Product issuer Data set
Nominal value, N Value invested in product at issuance (excluding fees) Data set
Coupon p.a., c Annual coupon of product (in %) Data set
Maturity, T Life time of product (in days) Data set
Barrier level, H Barrier level of product’s embedded put option Data set
Strike price, S0 Strike price of embedded option, equal to the value of
underlying asset at issuance
Data set
Risk-free rate, r OIS rate linearly interpolated from two nearest matu-
rities
Bloomberg
Dividend yield, µ Dividend yield of underlying asset over past 12 months CRSP
Implied volatility, σ Implied volatility bi-linearly interpolated from four




Volume Issuance volume (in CHF) winsorized at 5% and 95% Bloomberg
Correlation Linear correlation between log returns of two underly-
ing assets over past 12 months (see Section 2.4.1.1 for
different estimation approaches)
CRSP
Comovement Relative frequency that two underlyings assets have
same sign of daily returns over past 12 months
CRSP
Margin Estimated issuer margin (see Section 2.5.1) Pricing model
Product return Realized investment return (see Section 2.5.2) Own calculations
Misestimation Difference between true probability of barrier event
and participant’s estimate thereof
Experiment
Invest Decision Participants’ conditional willingness to invest Experiment
WTP Participant’s willingness-to-pay for a product Experiment
Multi-Dummy Equal to one (zero) for Multis (Singles) Experiment
Interest-Dummy Equal to one (zero) in positive (non-positive) interest
rate treatments
Experiment
Vola-Dummy Equal to one (zero) in high (moderate) volatility treat-
ments
Experiment
Female/Male Participant’s gender Experiment
Age Participant’s age Experiment
Risk preferences Participant’s risk preferences measured as their switch-
ing point in Holt and Laury (2002)
Experiment
Overconfidence Participant’s normalized judgmental overconfidence




This Internet Appendix provides additional analyses and results that were omitted from
our paper “Low Interest Rates, Bounded Rationality, and Product Complexity: Demand
and Supply Effects for Retail Financial Markets.” The discussion thereof can be found in
the main text of the paper. In addition, the instructions of the experiment are attached
at the end.
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Table 2.17: Participant characteristics
Table 2.17 provides an overview of participant characteristics in the experiment. Age is reported
in years. Male denotes a dummy variable that equals one if a participant reveals to be male.
Familiar with SP is a dummy variable that equals one if a participant indicates to be familiar
with structured products. Risk preferences indicates participants’ risk preferences measured as
their switching point in the Holt and Laury (2002) elicitation task. Confidence measure indicates
participants’ normalized overconfidence measured as the proportion of incorrect intervals in the
Alpert and Raiffa (1982) interval production task. The average participant is 23 years old,
slightly risk-averse, and significantly overconfident. Slightly more than half of all participants
are female and approximately one third considers themselves to be familiar with structured
products. The total number of participants is 125.
Mean Std Min Max
Age 23.77 4.24 20 62
Male 45.6% - - -
Familiar with SP 32.8% - - -
Risk preferences 5.51 2.30 0.00 10.00
Confidence measure 0.67 0.20 0.10 1.00
Observations 125
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Table 2.18: Summary statistics of all barrier reverse convertibles in data set
Table 2.18 reports summary statistics of product characteristics for all barrier reverse convert-
ibles in our initial data set. Coupon p.a. (%) is the product’s annual coupon rate (extracted
from its payoff description). Barrier level (%) is the barrier level of the product’s embedded
put option in percentage of underlying values at fixing. Maturity (days) is the product’s time
to maturity at issuance. # of underlyings indicates the number of payoff-relevant underlying
asset(s). Volume (mil. CHF) is the issued volume. Bloomberg provides data on issued volumes
for 28,960 products of our initial data set.
Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Coupon p.a. (%) 8.70 3.67 0.20 6.15 8.00 10.26 57.34
Barrier level (%) 67.19 9.35 30.00 60.00 69.00 75.00 93.00
Maturity (days) 392 177 60 357 359 386 1,821
# of underlyings 2.25 1.07 1 1 3 3 14
Volume (mil. CHF) 17.03 10.55 2.00 10.00 10.00 30.00 40.00
Observations 47,080
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Table 2.19: Overview of barrier reverse convertibles in final sample
Table 2.19 presents the number of issued Singles and Multis in our final data
set grouped by issuer (Panel A) and year (Panel B). The subsample of Singles
(Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products. The total sample consists of 4,460
products issued between January 2008 and December 2017.
Panel A: By issuer
Single Multi
Vontobel 1,282 493








J.P. Morgan 18 20
Panel B: By year
Single Multi











Table 2.20: Closed-form vs. Monte Carlo pricing of Singles
Table 2.20 reports summary statistics of Single price estimates from the closed-form solution
in the Black and Scholes (1973) model and a standard Monte Carlo method, respectively. The
results of the Monte Carlo procedure are based on 365 time steps (within one year) and 50,000
price path simulations per underlying asset. Marginclosed denotes the margins implied by the
closed-form solution. Marginsim denotes the margins implied by the Monte Carlo method. The
small differences between the two are caused by a slightly lower barrier event probability, i.e., a
lower activation risk of the embedded barrier put option, implied by the latter’s discretization
error.
Mean Std p2.5 Q1 Median Q3 p97.5
Marginclosed 2.10 4.51 -1.767 1.047 1.449 3.158 8.921
Marginsim 2.01 4.49 -1.844 0.972 1.377 3.081 8.769
Observations 2,528
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Table 2.21: Issuer margins – Singles vs. Multis II
Table 2.21, reports coefficient estimates from OLS regressions with issuer margins as dependent
variable and a Multi-Dummy (equal to one for Multis) as main regressor of interest. In spec-
ifications (1) to (2), Multi margins are based on simple correlation estimations (MarginHist).
In specifications (3) to (4), and (5) to (6), Multi margins are based on correlation estimations
applying the Ledoit and Wolf (2004) (MarginLW ) and the Chen et al. (2010) (MarginOAS)
shrinkage method, respectively (see Section 2.4.1.1 for details). In (1), (3), and (5), the effects
of a Multi-Dummy, product characteristics (including valuation inputs), and the Risk-free rate
(%) are reported. In (2), (4), and (6), issuer and month fixed effects are added to the model
specifications. The subsample of Singles (Multis) consists of 2,528 (1,932) products. The total
sample consists of 4,460 products issued between January 2008 and December 2017. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at the issuer and the month level. * , ** ,
and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
MarginHist MarginLW MarginOAS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Multi-Dummy 6.505*** 6.687*** 6.849*** 7.054*** 6.602*** 6.801***
(0.270) (0.344) (0.277) (0.357) (0.267) (0.349)
Coupon p.a. (%) -0.918*** -0.932*** -0.920*** -0.935*** -0.916*** -0.931***
(0.045) (0.049) (0.046) (0.050) (0.045) (0.049)
Barrier level (%) 0.410*** 0.402*** 0.417*** 0.409*** 0.412*** 0.403***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Maturity (in days) 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Divid. yield (%) 0.283*** 0.292*** 0.268*** 0.276*** 0.267*** 0.275***
(0.044) (0.041) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.057)
Implied vola. (%) 0.580*** 0.583*** 0.589*** 0.592*** 0.582*** 0.585***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026)
Risk-free rate (%) 1.241*** -0.962 1.263*** -1.129 1.246*** -1.113
(0.200) (1.624) (0.197) (1.632) (0.194) (1.596)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Issuer FE Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457 4,460 4,457
R2 0.659 0.682 0.653 0.676 0.652 0.674
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Table 2.22: Product characteristics – same underlyings and issuance quarter
Table 2.22 reports the summary statistics of the average characteristics of non-unique products
(i.e., identical underlying combinations) issued in the same quarter of any given year. Coupon
p.a. (%) is the products’ mean annual coupon rate. Barrier level (%) is the mean barrier level of
the products’ embedded put option in percentage of underlying values at fixing. Maturity (days)
is the products’ mean time to maturity at issuance. In total, there are 3,870 sets of non-unique
products issued in different quarters.
Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Coupon p.a. (%) 9.47 1.94 7.62 8.56 9.39 10.29 11.63
Barrier level (%) 63.75 4.80 58.78 61.76 64.00 65.95 68.17
Maturity (days) 396.24 92.55 315.84 356.38 387.88 428.90 501.60
Observations 3,870
Table 2.23: Product characteristics – same underlyings
Table 2.23 reports the summary statistics of the average characteristics of non-unique products
(i.e., identical underlying combinations). Coupon p.a. (%) is the products’ mean annual coupon
rate. Barrier level (%) is the mean barrier level of the products’ embedded put option in
percentage of underlying values at fixing. Maturity (days) is the products’ mean time to maturity
at issuance. In total, there are 2,949 sets of non-unique products issued across our sample period.
Mean Std Min Q1 Median Q3 Max
Coupon p.a. (%) 9.55 1.99 7.50 8.55 9.42 10.43 12.09
Barrier level (%) 63.60 4.79 58.01 61.48 63.89 65.92 68.44




The complete set of instructions (including comprehension questions) for our laboratory








Welcome to the Finance-Lab! 
Please read the following instructions carefully. Fully understanding the instructions will increase your chances of 
achieving a higher number of bonus points for the final exam of the lecture “Environmental and Financial 
Sustainability”. At the end of these instructions, you will find 3 control questions. We will also go through a short 
training session before starting the experiment. However, please take the time to understand the instructions fully. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come over to help. 
 
Task 
In this experiment, you will have the opportunity to buy different financial products. Your goal is to maximize your 
total wealth. The experiment consists of 12 independent rounds. Each round is divided into two stages. 
 
At the beginning of each round, you will be provided with an initial amount of 140 ECU (experimental currency 
units). During every round, you will have the opportunity to use your cash to buy one financial product or to invest 
your money at the risk-free rate. The price of the product is not yet fixed. It will be determined by chance. You will 
never have to spend more for a product than you are willing to. You may even be able to buy it for less. Here is 
how it works: 
 
Stage 1 
At the first stage of each round, all participants receive the same public information about all products available 
for purchase. This information will help you to determine the value of each product. To do this more easily, you 
will first be asked to estimate each product’s value components. Then, for a given list of different prices, you have 
to decide whether you want to buy the product or not. This procedure is carried out for all products. In summary, 
it should help you to make better decisions. 
 
After all participants have made their decisions, the computer randomly selects one product. Thereafter, the 
computer randomly sets the price for the selected product. If this random price is less than or equal to your 
willingness to pay for the selected product, you will purchase the product at that randomly determined price. In this 
case, the randomly determined price gets deducted from your initial cash amount and the remainder is automatically 
invested at the risk-free rate. In contrast, if the random price is higher than your willingness to pay for the selected 
product, your entire initial cash amount is invested at the risk-free rate. However, if you prefer to invest your initial 
cash amount at the risk-free rate, independently of the randomly determined price, you will always have the chance 
to do so. Notice, the risk-free rate can change between rounds. 
 
For example, if you are willing to buy the selected product for up to 110 ECU and the randomly determined price 
turns out to be 105 ECU, you only have to pay 105 ECU in return for the product. The remaining 35 ECU (=140-
105) will automatically be invested at the current risk-free rate. If, however, the randomly determined price turns 
out to be higher than 110 ECU, you will not acquire the product and your total initial cash amount is automatically 






Example screen of stage 1:  
 
Stage 2 
At the second stage of each round, your total wealth of that round is displayed. Additionally, if you have previously 
purchased a product at stage 1, the screen shows this product’s final payoff. In this case, your total wealth 
corresponds to the sum of your remaining cash account and the product’s payoff. Your goal should be to maximize 
your total wealth in every period. Now, we finally turn to the available products themselves. 
 
Financial products 
It is important to understand that the payoffs of the financial products depend on the development of underlying 
assets. Every asset starts at a nominal value of 100 ECU. Between stage 1 and stage 2, each asset then changes its 
value 50 times. In particular, for a total of 50 time steps, the computer randomly determines whether the asset value 
either increases or decreases. At every time step, an increase or a decrease in asset value is equally likely, that 
means both can happen with a probability of 50%. For example, if the asset’s value changes correspond to ±3%, 









There exist two different kinds of products: 
 
Single: 
A Single is a product whose final payoff depends on the development of 1 underlying asset with respect to a lower 
barrier. Additionally, the product always offers a fixed coupon x (x% of 100 ECU) independently of the 
development of the underlying asset. In total, the buyer’s payoff depends on the following two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: If the underlying asset never hits the lower barrier, the buyer receives 100 ECU plus the guaranteed 
fixed coupon x. 
Scenario 2: If the underlying asset hits the lower barrier at least once, the buyer receives the lower amount of either 
100 ECU or the final value of the asset, plus, in each case, the guaranteed fixed coupon x. 
 
Multi:  
A Multi is a product whose final payoff depends on the development of 2 independent underlying assets with 
respect to a lower barrier. Additionally, the product always offers a fixed coupon x (x% of 100 ECU) independently 
of the development of the 2 underlying assets. In total, the buyer’s payoff depends on the following two scenarios: 
Scenario 1: If none of the 2 underlying assets hits the lower barrier, the buyer receives 100 ECU plus the guaranteed 
fixed coupon x. 
Scenario 2: If at least 1 of the 2 underlying assets hits the lower barrier at least once, the buyer receives the lower 
amount of either 100 ECU or the worst performing underlying asset, plus, in each case, the guaranteed 
fixed coupon x. 
 
The expected payoff for both product types can always be decomposed into the following 4 components: 
Expected payoff = Prob( Barrier hit ) * expected payoff( Barrier hit ) + Prob( Barrier not hit ) * payoff( Barrier not hit ) 
 









Bonus points: You are guaranteed to earn 0.5 bonus points for participating in this experiment. Besides, you can 
gain additional bonus points based on your investment decision. You can infer from the distributed table, how many 
ECUs in a given round correspond to how many bonus points. At the end of the experiment, only one of the 12 
independent rounds will be randomly selected. Your total wealth from this round will then be converted into bonus 
points and credited to you at the final exam. 
 
Please answer the following 3 comprehension questions: 
1) Your initial cash amount is 140 ECU. The computer has randomly selected the Single and randomly set 
its price equal to 100 ECU. The risk-free interest rate is 20%. Assume you are willing to pay 95 ECU for 
the Single. What is your total wealth at the end of this period in ECU?________________ 
 
2) Assume the following development of the asset underlying a Single:  
 
Which scenario has realized?                                                   Scenario 1            Scenario 2 
 
3) Assume the following development of the assets underlying a Multi:  
  
Which scenario has realized?                                                   Scenario 1            Scenario 2 
 
******************************************************************************************* 
You will now go through a short training session to get familiar with the task. This training session will not impact 





































Mutual Funds and Qualitative Disclosure
Joint with Timo Schäfer†
In this paper, we use the content of U.S. mutual funds’ prospectuses to examine
the informational value of funds’ qualitative disclosures. We document signifi-
cant heterogeneity in the cross-section of funds’ qualitative disclosures, primarily
attributed to characteristics at the investment company level. Using textual anal-
ysis, we decompose funds’ qualitative disclosures into informative and standard
content. Our results show that funds’ risk-taking behavior and risk-adjusted-
performance increase with the informativeness of their disclosures. Content-
based updates of disclosures are informative about funds’ future risk-taking and
their future performance. Finally, we document evidence that investors react to
some extent to the informativeness of fund disclosures.
3.1 Introduction
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. requires investment com-
panies of mutual funds to disclose qualitative information about several fund character-
istics in their annually updated prospectuses. Besides providing quantitative information
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on a fund’s risk, performance, and expenses, investment companies disclose textual infor-
mation on each fund’s principal risks, its investment strategy, and its primary investment
objective. However, despite the large mutual funds market in the U.S., i.e., $17.7 trillion
of total net assets invested in mutual funds at the end of 2018,47 the value of qualitative
disclosure in funds’ prospectuses has not been investigated in academic literature. Impor-
tantly, there is no empirical evidence whether mutual funds’ qualitative disclosures are
informative to investors and whether investors react to it.
According to several studies conducted by the Investment Company Institute (ICI), the
information disclosed in a fund’s prospectus is a relatively important source of information
for investors (Investment Company Institute 2006; 2019). In particular, 34% of mutual
fund shareholders rely on information in the prospectus to make an investment decision,
and even 90% of mutual fund-owning U.S. households study the investment objective and
risks associated with investing in a specific fund.
To simplify an investor’s investment decision, the SEC enacted a rule on disclosing
key information in a summary section at the beginning of a fund’s statutory prospectus
(SEC, 2009). The aim of introducing such a summary section is to provide particularly
retail investors with key information in a user-friendly and concise format, assisting them
in making an informed investment decision. It should make it simpler for investors to
find, compare, and interpret information related to a fund’s risks and performance, as
compared to studying the full statutory prospectus.
In this paper, we use methods from textual analysis to examine the qualitative content
provided in summary sections of funds’ statutory prospectuses by focusing on the infor-
mativeness of funds’ disclosures. More precisely, we investigate the summary sections in
the statutory prospectuses of active U.S. open-end equity funds between 2011 and 2018.
Our analyses focus on examining the value of these qualitative disclosures for investors
and especially whether this information is beneficial from an investor’s perspective when
making an investment decision. For this purpose, we use a unique feature of funds dis-
closure – our so-called “laboratory setting”. In this setting, we exploit the fact that most
investment companies manage several funds and issue a prospectus for each of the funds
separately. Accordingly, our laboratory setting provides us with a powerful comparative
universe. It allows us to determine whether investment companies provide the same dis-
closure for each fund under management or whether they tailor the disclosure to each
specific fund. Therefore, we do not conceive informativeness in absolute units but as a
47For a detailed view on the annual statistics, see “2019 Investment Company Fact Book”, available at
https://www.icifactbook.org.
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relative measure within a comparative universe. More precisely, we say a fund’s qualita-
tive disclosure is informative when its content is not addressed by the disclosures of the
other funds managed by the same investment company or by other funds in the same
fund category. This differentiation is the key idea behind our concept of informative-
ness of funds’ disclosure, and hence the focus of this paper. Moreover, in the context of
boilerplate disclosure, our clear advantage is to express informativeness relative to other
disclosures instead of defining a priori text phrases (e.g., Lang and Stice-Lawrence, 2015).
To highlight the importance of our laboratory setting, we start by measuring the
informativeness of funds’ disclosed risk. Risk disclosures are often criticized for being
subjective and ambiguous (Schrand and Elliott, 1998; Jorgensen and Kirschenheiter, 2003;
Kravet and Muslu, 2013), making it difficult for investors to compare them and to verify
their accuracy. We address this challenge by using the power of our laboratory setting. We
investigate the accuracy of funds’ disclosed risk in their prospectuses and at the same time
control for the managing investment company of a fund. Our starting hypothesis is that a
longer risk disclosure of a fund corresponds to a fund’s higher risk-taking (Campbell, Chen,
Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele, 2014). Indeed, we find that a fund’s amount of text on disclosed
risk is positively and significantly related to its idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, and
general risk, supporting our predictions. Importantly, we find that a large proportion of
the cross-sectional variation of funds’ risk disclosure is attributable to investment company
fixed effects. These two findings are interrelated, as the positive relation only holds when
we rely on variation within investment companies. A number of robustness tests confirm
this finding.
Next, we examine the actual written content of funds’ disclosure. For this, we use our
laboratory setting in a more finely tuned analysis to determine how similar the textual
content of funds’ disclosure is. We document that a large part of funds’ disclosure text
similarity is due to time-invariant characteristics at the investment company level and less
due to fund category effects or time effects. This result is valid for all sections in a fund’s
prospectus – risk statements, primary objectives, and strategy narratives. Nevertheless,
more than one-third of the variation in the similarity of funds’ disclosures is due to fund-
specific characteristics, indicating that funds’ disclosures still contain information relevant
to the respective funds.
We use this analysis as a motivation to identify the level of informativeness of funds’
disclosures in more detail. Namely, we decompose the textual information in funds’
prospectuses into an informative and a standard component along the investment com-
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pany dimension and the fund category dimension (Hanley and Hoberg, 2010). We argue
that the more (less) similar a fund’s disclosure is compared to all the other funds’ dis-
closures by the same investment company, the less (more) informative is that specific
disclosure. To understand our approach better, we exemplary provide the risk disclosures
of two funds managed by the same company (see Appendix A.3). Though the two funds,
the Torray Fund and the Torray Resolute Fund, belong to different fund categories and
are subject to different sets of risks, they provide exactly the same risk disclosure. Conse-
quently, investors do not learn anything qualitatively fund-specific about the two funds’
different risk exposures. Therefore, we consider the informativeness of these disclosures
to be limited.48
We then turn to the fund-specific informativeness of qualitative disclosure and analyze
its implications regarding funds’ risk-taking behavior, performance, and flows. First, our
results demonstrate that funds with more informative disclosures are subject to higher
risk-taking. In particular, our findings show that a fund’s idiosyncratic risk increases with
regard to the informativeness of its risk disclosures. Next, we examine the implications of
informative updates in funds’ prospectuses over time. Since funds are supposed to update
their prospectus once a year, we have yearly snapshots of their qualitative disclosures that
we can track over time. This analysis is also motivated by a guidance update provided
by the SEC in 2016 that points to the relevance of timely updates of funds’ qualitative
information in their prospectuses regarding changes in market conditions a fund is exposed
to.49
Similar to disclosure informativeness in the cross-section of funds, we look at yearly
updates of qualitative disclosures in funds’ prospectuses. As we observe an overall increase
in funds’ disclosure length from one year to the next, our analysis aims at examining
whether updated disclosures are informative to investors. For example Appendix B.3
presents for the strategy statement of the Torray Fund an update from 2013 to 2014.
Our regression results indicate a negative relation between updates in funds’ disclosures
and their future risk-taking. This finding suggests that funds with substantial disclosure
updates in their prospectuses decrease more strongly their future risk-taking relative to the
current level. These two findings are good news for investors. On the one hand, funds that
are exposed to higher risks provide investors with more informative (and less standard)
48Note that they still can be relatively informative compared to the other funds in their respective fund
categories.
49See the guidance update by the SEC, March 2016, available at
https://www.sec.gov/investment/imguidance-2016-02.pdf.
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risk disclosures. On the other hand, updates in funds’ disclosures predict changes in funds’
future risk.
Second, turning to the performance of funds, we find that a fund’s risk-adjusted perfor-
mance is positively related to the informativeness of a fund’s risk and strategy statements.
Our results reveal that the effect of the risk statement’s informativeness is additive to the
effect coming from the informativeness of the strategy statement. Thus, our finding is not
driven by the uniqueness of a fund’s strategy description but can be traced back to the
informativeness in a fund’s risk disclosure (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2020). In line with
our risk update analysis, we then investigate the predictive power of updates on funds’
performance. A priori it is not clear whether updates of funds’ qualitative disclosures
are informative to investors about future fund performance or not (Brown and Tucker,
2011; Cohen et al., 2020). When we look at funds’ disclosure updates from one year to
the next, we find that particularly funds’ adjustments in their strategy statements are
economically and statistically significant in predicting future risk-adjusted performance.
A content-based change of 4% (mean value in our sample) results in a fund’s performance
increase by approximately 14 basis points in the next year. Thus, our results suggest
that updates in funds’ qualitative disclosure, i.e., strategy disclosure, provide relevant
information in predicting future performance.
Third, we investigate whether investors take the informativeness of funds’ disclosure
into account when investing in funds. Our findings suggest that investors can – at least
to some extent – differentiate between informative and standard disclosures. We find
some statistical evidence that investors increase (decrease) their investment in funds with
more informative (standard) disclosures in prospectuses. Moreover, we find a positive
and statistically significant effect of funds’ provision of a summary prospectus on fund
flows. This relation indicates that funds that voluntarily disclose the summary section
as an additional filing, i.e., a summary prospectus, experience higher inflows than funds
that do not provide a summary prospectus (Brown, Goetzmann, Liang, and Schwarz,
2008; Kozup, Howlett, and Pagano, 2008). Nevertheless, we want to emphasize that it is
rather challenging for investors to identify the degree of informativeness of mutual fund
prospectuses and to identify informative updates.
Our paper builds on several strands of the literature. First, we add to the recent lit-
erature on qualitative (risk) disclosures and their informational value. Previous research,
however, rather examines qualitative disclosures in a corporate setting (Dye, 2001; Healy
and Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Dyer, Lang, and Stice-Lawrence (2017) document
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that companies’ 10-K filings have become not only longer but also more complex over
time. Campbell et al. (2014) and Chiu, Guan, and Kim (2018) analyze risk factor disclo-
sures (RFD) in 10-K filings and conclude that the information that companies disclose in
their risk factor section is meaningful. By contrast, Kravet and Muslu (2013) find that
RFDs in 10-K filings do not cover firm-level risks, and the content of them is to be more
likely boilerplate. These contradictory findings are partially resolved by Bao and Datta
(2014). Using a topic modeling approach for RFDs in 10-K filings, they show that only
two-thirds of the identified risk types are informative to investors, and not necessarily all
of them increase investors’ risk perceptions. Similarly, Hope, Hu, and Lu (2016) show
by introducing a computing algorithm to quantify the specificity of firms’ qualitative risk
disclosures that market reactions are positively associated with the quality of those dis-
closures. In addition to the literature on 10-Ks, Hanley and Hoberg (2010) use methods
from textual analysis to examine the information contained in IPO prospectuses, showing
that a higher informativeness results in more accurate offer prices. Florysiak and Schandl-
bauer (2019) conduct a related analysis in the context of ICOs. We extend this literature
by examining the informativeness of mutual fund disclosures, which plays a role in the
investment decisions of many (retail) investors.
Second, this paper contributes to the large literature on the managerial behavior of
fund managers and the following reaction of investors. Several studies (e.g., Jensen, 1968;
Carhart, 1997; Wermers, 2003; Berk and Green, 2004; Fama and French, 2010) contribute
to the debate whether managers of active funds add value to their investors. Tufano and
Sevick (1997) and Fu and Wedge (2011) look closer at the governance of mutual funds and
find that the independence of the board positively affects the fee structure. Jain and Wu
(2000) and Gallaher, Kaniel, and Starks (2015) show that funds do not experience superior
performance after advertising a fund but attract significantly higher fund flows compared
to a group of control funds. In line with this finding, Cooper et al. (2005) show that
investors react to fund name changes while the corresponding funds do not improve their
performance. Therefore, investors react to salient, attention-grabbing information while
this information does not necessarily correspond to a higher fund performance (Barber,
Odean, and Zheng, 2005). Brown et al. (2008) empirically examine the value of infor-
mation about operational risk and conflict of interest variables disclosed by hedge funds.
Their results suggest that financial institutions and sophisticated investors may receive
little added value from mandatory disclosures, while retail investors might benefit from
them. Furthermore, the literature shows that funds change their risk-taking behavior over
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time (e.g., Brown and Goetzmann, 1997; Huang, Sialm, and Zhang, 2011). For instance,
Huang et al. (2011) show that funds that shift their risks perform worse than funds with
unchanged exposed risks. Our paper examines a different source of information that funds
provide to investors: textual disclosure in their prospectuses and its relation to a fund’s
performance and risk-taking.
Third, our paper adds to the textual analysis literature in general,50 and to the recent
research stream on the qualitative communication of mutual funds in particular (Daugh-
drill, 2015; Hillert, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Ruenzi, 2016; Hwang and Kim, 2017; Kostovetsky
and Warner, 2020).51 Hillert et al. (2016) provide evidence that investors react to the writ-
ing style of shareholder letters, which is another written communication channel of fund
managers with their investors besides prospectuses. Hwang and Kim (2017) show that
harder-to-read shareholder reports from closed-end investment companies have a negative
effect on firm value. Probably closest to our paper is Kostovetsky and Warner (2020).
They use the text in funds’ strategy statements in their prospectuses to approximate a
fund’s innovativeness and find that more unique funds attract higher fund flows. Despite
the large literature on mutual fund risk, flows, and performance, no previous research has
– to the best of our knowledge – systematically studied the informativeness of mandatory
qualitative disclosure in the mutual fund industry. This paper is the first that investi-
gates qualitative disclosure in prospectuses by using methods from textual analysis.52 We
provide evidence for the informativeness of these disclosures in the cross-section of funds
and over time.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides background
information about the summary section in U.S. mutual funds’ prospectuses and describes
the data. Section 3.3 provides general descriptive evidence of funds’ qualitative disclosures
and introduces our textual informativeness measures. We first explain our laboratory
setting, then analyze determinants of funds’ disclosed amount of text on risk to motivate
our setting, and later introduce our fund-specific informativeness measures. Then, Section
3.4 examines the relation of our informativeness measure with funds managerial behavior
and investors’ reactions. Finally, Section 3.5 concludes.
50See Tetlock (2014) and Loughran and McDonald (2016) for an overview.
51Abis (2017) and Baghai, Becker, and Pitschner (2019) extract the information from funds’ prospec-
tuses to obtain a proxy for funds’ style classification and use of credit ratings, respectively.
52Tucker and Xia (2020) examine the content of summary prospectuses with respect to their readability
and show that these prospectuses are hard to read.
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3.2 Institutional Framework and Data
This section first provides background information on the mandatory provision of a sum-
mary section in U.S. mutual funds’ prospectuses. Second, we describe how we obtain our
prospectus data and preprocess it. Third, we provide summary statistics on the main
financial and textual characteristics of our sample of active U.S. equity funds.
3.2.1 Institutional Background
The SEC requires all investment companies to provide a statutory prospectus. This
applies to all funds registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 and that
offer their shares under the Securities Act of 1933. In the statutory prospectus, funds
inform investors about their past and future activities. The goal is to protect investors by
disclosing relevant information about the offered securities.53 However, these statutory
prospectuses are often criticized as long and complicated, using a complex and legalistic
language. This results in difficulties for investors to use them efficiently and compare
different funds. Accordingly, in April 2009, the SEC adopted a new disclosure framework
that requires mutual funds to provide from January 2010 onward a summary section in
their statutory prospectuses for securities that they offer for sale (SEC, 2009).
This summary section at the beginning of the statutory prospectus is intended to
provide key information to investors facing a large universe of available funds. The in-
formation should be easy to understand and relevant for making an informed investment
decision. The summary section shows a standardized order and contains streamlined
details on the following dimensions: (1) investment objectives; (2) costs and fees; (3)
principal investment strategies, risks, and performance; (4) investment advisers and port-
folio managers; (5) brief purchase, sale and tax information; as well as (6) information on
financial intermediary compensation. Already prior to 2009, open-end mutual funds in
the U.S. were required to provide a risk-return summary (SEC, 1998). However, this infor-
mation was disclosed at the fund family level and, therefore, less informative to investors,
as it often describes more than one fund and is not fund-specific.
With the adoption of the new disclosure rule in 2009, investment companies have to
inform about each fund’s specific investment strategy, risks, and objective. These three
sections are at the focus of this paper. Additionally, investment companies can decide
53The statutory prospectus is defined in the Securities Act of 1933, see
http://legcounsel.house.gov/Comps/Securities%20Act%20Of%201933.pdf.
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whether to publish a separate summary prospectus, which contains the same information
as the summary section in the statutory prospectus, but is filed separately.54 Thus, if an
investment company manages several funds, the investment company has to publish for
each fund a separate summary section. Appendix A.3 and B.3 present examples of funds’
qualitative disclosures from their summary section in their respective prospectuses.55
Moreover, for our analysis, it is important that mutual funds are required by the SEC
to update their summary sections – to react to changes over time – at least once per year.
This does not automatically mean that they have to provide new information in each
new publication, as it is, for example, the case with mutual fund shareholder letters. In
these letters, fund managers discuss the fund’s performance and economic outlook (Hillert
et al., 2016). However, the SEC also comments that investment companies are supposed
to review their risk disclosures when the market conditions of a fund change.
3.2.2 Data
We obtain data on mutual funds’ prospectuses from the SEC “Mutual Fund Prospectus
Risk/Return Summary Data Sets” (MFSD).56 This dataset provides quarterly updates of
textual and numeric information that is extracted from the risk/return summary sections
of mutual funds’ prospectuses. Since the values of some text variables are truncated (the
maximal length of values is fixed to 2048 bytes), we download prospectus data separately,
i.e., filings 49757 (initial registration) and 485BPOS58 (post-effective amendment), that is
specified in the MFSD dataset.59
Prospectus data is provided in the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)
format. The relevant sections in a prospectus can be identified due to the XBRL tree
54While providing a summary section in the statutory prospectus is mandatory, the additional delivery
of a summary prospectus is not. However, about 85% of all mutual funds offered a summary prospectus
to investors by the end of 2018.
55Note, many funds are also offered in multiple share classes. Since all share classes are invested in
the same underlying portfolio, this separation of individual summary sections does not apply to multiple
share classes. All share classes of a fund are pursuing the same strategy and are exposed to the same
risks. They primarily differ in their fees, for example, their management fees and 12b-1 fees.




59For some funds, we observe several 485BPOS filings per year. In these cases, in line with Baghai et al.
(2019), we only keep the prospectus with the longest risk statement for each fund and year. Regarding
the length, we refer to the number of words after removing the html code from the filings, while Baghai
et al. (2019) refer to the number of sentences.
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and key structure. We extract the most recent data on a fund’s risk statement, strategy
statement, and investment objective for each fund and year. We clean text data by
removing html code, stem words, and by converting numeric values into <numeric>.
The final sample comprises all active U.S. open-end mutual funds regulated under the
supervision of the SEC from 2011 to 2018 that we match with the Morningstar database,
covering a total of 1,892 funds. For our empirical analysis regarding the informativeness of
funds’ qualitative disclosure, we merge mutual funds’ prospectus data from the Electronic
Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system from the SEC60 with the
Morningstar survivorship bias-free mutual fund database. The Morningstar database
includes information on fund returns, various risk measures, as well as several other mutual
fund characteristics, like total assets under management and fees.
We merge the prospectus data from the SEC with the database in Morningstar by using
a fund’s ticker symbol at the share class level. Since Morningstar provides data by fund’s
share class, we aggregate the quantitative characteristics of a fund’s share classes into
a single fund characteristic by taking the value-weighted average (see, e.g., Kacperczyk,
Sialm, and Zheng (2008); Nohel, Wang, and Zheng (2010); Gallaher et al. (2015); Choi,
Kahraman, and Mukherjee (2016)). For the mapping we use the investment companies’
file of the SEC to identify 40,266 ticker symbols of share classes under their regulation (see
Table 3.12 in the Appendix for details on the matching process).61 After excluding funds
with missing ticker symbols in Morningstar and linking them to to the SEC, it reduces the
sample to 8,542 unique mutual funds from 2011 to 2018. We conduct several plausibility
tests to ensure that the data in Morningstar corresponds to the funds identified in the SEC
reports.62 Next, we drop all balanced funds, money market funds, fixed income funds,
index funds, and exchange traded funds. So in our final sample, we focus on active U.S.
open-end equity funds for reasons of comparability. Finally, we also exclude observations
where a fund’s total net assets in a given year are less than USD 1 million. Our final
sample of interest then comprises 1,892 active U.S. equity open-end mutual funds from
2011 to 2018.
Table 3.1 reports the summary statistics on turnover, risk, and returns of funds in our
sample of active U.S. equity funds. We also include a fund’s age (in months), its expense
60(https://www.sec.gov/edgar/)
61The basic identification information on investment companies year by year is available at
https://www.sec.gov/open/datasets-investment company.html.
62For instance, we test whether there is a unique link between a fund’s Series ID in EDGAR and
assigned Fund ID in Morningstar. Since both identifiers are unique at the fund level, we exclude cases
where Series IDs are assigned to multiple Fund IDs in Morningstar in a year.
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ratio, and its size to analyze whether more established funds, more expensive funds, and
larger funds differ in their disclosure behavior. Based on data on total net assets and
returns, we then compute yearly fund net flows, which we define as the growth rate of the
total assets under management adjusted for reinvested returns:
Flowf,t =
TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 +RFf,t)
TNAf,t−1(1 +RFf,t)
, (3.1)
where TNAf,t is fund f ’s total net assets at time t and RFf,t is the fund’s return over the
prior year.63 To account for outliers, we winsorize at both the bottom and the top parts
of the distribution at the 1% level.
The average active U.S. equity fund in our sample has total net assets of USD 2,213
million, is about 17.5 years old, and charges an annual expense ratio of 0.64%. An
investor’s average yearly return of funds in our sample is 4.64%, while the average fund’s
risk, estimated as the standard deviation of the fund’s monthly returns over the prior 36
months, amounts to 2.16. The remainder of the table shows summary statistics on risk
variables and the length of the summary section of the prospectuses.64
Next, we turn to the textual data. We extract all risk statements, strategy statements,
and investment objectives from the summary sections of funds’ prospectuses between 2011
and 2018 to investigate the information content of funds’ prospectuses both in the cross-
section and over time. Figure 3.1 illustrates time trends and differences between the three
sections of our focus. It presents the median statistics of the length of each of the sections
between 2011 and 2018 for the risk statement (Panel A), the strategy statement (Panel
B), and the investment objective (Panel C), respectively. Panel D displays aggregated
numbers.
Panel A of Figure 3.1 provides evidence that the length of the average risk disclosure
section has grown significantly between 2011 and 2018. While the median section contains
about 402 words in 2011, the number has almost grown by 50% until the end of 2018.
We document a similar growth for funds’ strategy statements in Panel B, whereas funds’
investment objectives do not show considerable variation over time and represent by far
the shortest of the three sections.
63This measure follows the methodology of Huang et al. (2011) and ensures that fund flows cannot be be-
low -100%. Most studies define fund’s net flows as Flow = (TNAf,t−TNAf,t−1(1+RFf,t))/(TNAf,t−1).
This approach guarantees that fund outflows will not be below -100%. The Pearson correlation coefficient
between the two measures is 0.998.
64All variables are defined in detail in Table 3.15.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics active U.S. equity funds
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, 1% (p1) and 99% percentile (p99)
percentile, and the number of observations for all financial characteristics of active U.S. equity funds in
our sample at the fund-year level. Our sample includes all active U.S. equity mutual funds in the SEC
database that are linked to a fund in the Morningstar database, i.e., 1,892 funds between 2011 and 2018.
The variable Fund Flow Period are fund flows over the 12 months in the respective calendar year and is
winsorized at the bottom and the top percentile. Fund Size is a fund’s total net assets (TNA) in million
USD. Company Size is the sum of all funds’ TNAs an investment company manages. Age is a fund’s age
in months and is calculated based on the IPO date of the oldest share class. Expense Ratio is a fund’s
annual expense ratio in percent. Turnover Ratio is a fund’s average ratio of purchases or sales to TNA.
Raw Return is the fund’s return calculated as the change in yearly net asset value minus the fund’s cost.
Fund Risk is the standard deviation of a fund’s monthly returns over the prior 36 months. Systematic
Risk is a fund’s market beta from estimating a 4-factor Carhart (1997) model using a fund’s returns from
the prior 36 months. Idiosyncratic Risk is the standard deviation of the residuals from this regression.
# of Words is the number of words in the summary section. All fund characteristics are defined in more
detail in Table 3.15 in the Appendix.
Variable name Mean Std p1 Median p99 N
Fund Flow Period (in %) 1.82 31.88 -67.50 -2.45 109.58 8,979
Fund Size (in mn.) 2,213.29 7,960.45 3.01 427.45 33,925.49 8,979
log(Fund Size (in mn.)) 19.76 2.00 14.90 19.87 24.25 8,979
log(Company Size) 23.68 2.32 17.00 23.94 28.47 8,979
Age (in Months) 209.84 154.07 22.50 186.50 941.50 8,979
log(Age (in Months)) 5.11 0.73 3.10 5.23 6.85 8,979
Expense Ratio (in %) 0.64 0.83 0.06 0.42 2.95 8,979
Turnover Ratio (in %) 64.32 72.30 2.00 48.00 308.24 8,979
Raw Return (in %) 4.64 8.60 -12.39 2.65 33.62 8,979
Fund Risk (in %) 2.16 1.60 0.30 1.61 6.83 8,979
Systematic Risk 0.51 0.34 0.09 0.39 1.20 8,979
Idiosyncratic Risk (in %) 0.57 0.53 0.06 0.40 2.29 8,979
# of Words 565.73 399.24 132.00 457.00 1987.00 8,979



















































(b) Panel B: Strategy statement













































(d) Panel D: All sections
Figure 3.1: Distribution of number of words in funds’ qualitative disclosures
Figure 3.1 shows the median of number of words in qualitative disclosures of prospec-
tuses of active U.S. equity funds over time. The number of words is calculated after
removing the html code from the filings. Panel A, B, and C show the evolution for
funds’ risk statement, strategy statement, and investment objective of funds’ summary
sections in their yearly prospectuses, respectively. Panel D shows the aggregated length
of all three sections from Panels A–C. Dashed lines indicate 25% and 75% percentiles.
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3.3 Descriptive Evidence of Funds’ Risk Disclosures
In this section, we provide descriptive evidence on the information in funds’ qualitative
disclosures. Section 3.3.1 introduces the laboratory setting that we use throughout the
analysis. Then, we use this setting in Section 3.3.2 to examine variation in the disclosure
length in the cross-section of our sample of active U.S. equity funds. Sections 3.3.3, 3.3.4,
and 3.3.5 introduce our detailed measures to approximate the informative and standard
content of funds’ qualitative disclosures in the cross-section and over time.
3.3.1 Laboratory Setting
In this study, we use a unique laboratory setting to allow us to pinpoint the degree of
informativeness in funds’ qualitative disclosures. Our setting comprises investment com-
panies that (usually) manage several funds. Importantly, they have to provide investors
with summarized information for each fund separately, see Section 3.2. This specific
characteristic enables us to compare qualitative disclosures from a completely new per-
spective. More specifically, we can compare the disclosures of funds managed by the same
investment company to determine the level of fund-specific information. To illustrate this
setting, we briefly describe two cases. In one case, an investment company could use a
generic template for the qualitative disclosures of the funds that it manages. For instance,
an investment company discloses the same risk statements for all its funds, though the
funds of that company differ in their investment strategies (see as an example the risk
statements of the Torray Fund and the Torray Resolute Fund in Appendix A.3). Such
risk disclosures would be relatively uninformative to investors, as the investment company
does not provide much fund-specific information. In the other case, the investment com-
pany could tailor funds’ disclosures to fund-specific characteristics. Then, investors can
actually derive valuable information about a fund’s risks when reading the information.
Therefore, to exploit our laboratory setting, we collect information on the investment
company for each fund. The SEC assigns identifying Central Index Key (CIK) numbers
to investment companies, which is provided in EDGAR. The CIK refers to the unique
investment company identifier. However, several CIKs might refer to the same underlying
investment company, which would bias our results when comparing funds’ disclosures
within the same CIK. For instance, Vanguard’s funds have different CIKs, but all belong to
the Vanguard Group, e.g., Vanguard Explorer Funds and Vanguard World Fund. Hence,
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Figure 3.2: Density distribution of funds per investment company
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of funds per investment company in our sample.
For companies that have different numbers of funds across years, we use the maximum
value. In total there are 442 investment companies. For illustrative reasons, we exclude
two investment companies from Figure 3.2 with 144 and 299 funds, respectively. The
vertical line marks the median number of funds per investment company (5).
manually map funds to their investment companies. Figure 3.2 illustrates the distribution
of the number of funds per investment company.
In general, an investment company manages several funds. A few small investment
companies manage only a single fund, while the largest investment companies are respon-
sible for managing more than 100 funds. The median number of funds per investment
company is 5. Therefore, to measure the informativeness of a fund’s disclosure, we com-
pare the content on average with 4 other fund disclosures of the same investment company.
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3.3.2 Determinants of Funds’ Disclosures
The amount of text on risk disclosure is highly heterogeneous in the cross-section of
funds as measured by the number of words. More precisely, we document that the length
of funds’ risk disclosures varies from 200 words to more than 7,000 words (see also Panel
A of Figure 3.4 in the Appendix C.3). The number of words is a relatively simple but
meaningful text-based measure of risk disclosure. The textual content in prospectuses’
risk sections is usually divided into several risk factors, e.g., a fund reports its exposure
to blue-chip risk or foreign investment risk. Therefore, we assume that the length of a
fund’s risk statement and the number of disclosed risk factors are positively correlated,
meaning that longer risk statements contain more risk factors. Nevertheless, it is not
clear what determines this heterogeneity in risk disclosures in the cross-section of funds.
Accordingly, we ask whether the exposed risk of a fund’s portfolio, assuming that riskier
funds provide longer risk disclosures, explains this heterogeneity. We hypothesize that
funds with relatively similar investment strategies are subject to the same set of risks and
therefore provide similar amounts of risk disclosure. To shed light on this hypothesis and
to motivate our first analysis, we look at a group of very similar funds: S&P 500 Index
funds (Hortaçsu and Syverson, 2004). Panel B of Figure 3.4 in the Appendix C.3 displays
the distribution of risk disclosure of S&P 500 Index funds in our overall sample for the
year 2018. It clearly shows distinct differences in the length of funds’ risk disclosures in
spite of the funds’ identical strategies.
In line with this finding, a report by the SEC points to considerable variation of risk
disclosures of funds belonging to the same Morningstar category.65 Accordingly, we can
use our laboratory setting to examine how much of the variation in the length of funds’ risk
disclosure is determined at the investment company level while controlling for several fund
characteristics. In general, we would expect that funds with riskier portfolios also write
more extensively about their risks (Campbell et al., 2014). Therefore, we hypothesize
that funds exposed to larger risks in their portfolios also report more extensively about
it in their risk disclosures.
We answer this research question by relating the amount of disclosed risks, i.e.,
log(Number of Words), as a dependent variable to a fund’s exposed risk via its port-
folio holdings. We take the logarithm of the number of words since the distribution of
risk disclosure is highly skewed (see Panel A in Figure 3.4 in the Appendix C.3). We
65See, for instance, the “Request for Comment on Fund Retail Investor Experience and Disclosure”,
available at https://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2018/33-10503.pdf.
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use three different risk measures as dependent variables to represent various dimensions
of a fund’s risk, i.e., general risk, systematic risk, and idiosyncratic risk. Following the
approach suggested by the literature on mutual funds, we measure the general risk of a
fund (Fund Risk) by calculating the standard deviation of the returns over the prior 36
months as a risk measure (e.g., Huang et al., 2011). Our sample comprises all active U.S.
equity funds to derive implications from funds’ qualitative disclosure on their managerial
behavior. Note, however, that the descriptive evidence we are presenting in Section 3.3.2
generalizes to the whole universe of U.S. mutual funds.
To examine the determinants of a fund’s disclosed risk, we run OLS regressions at the
fund-year level. We regress the length of a risk statement on the general risk variable.
Furthermore, we control for several fund characteristics as well as investment company
characteristics like fund flows and returns over the respective calendar year, fund size,
expense ratio, turnover ratio, age, and a dummy that indicates whether a fund files a
summary prospectus in that year (1) or not (0). Then, we estimate the following panel
regression model:
log (# of Words)f,t =β0 + β1Fund Riskf,t + β2Fund Flow Periodf,t + β3Return Periodf,t
+ β4 log(Fund Sizef,t) + β5Expense Ratiof,t + β6Turnover Ratiof,t
+ β7 log(Agef,t) + β8SP Dummyf,t + νcat + νt + νcik + ǫf,t, (3.2)
where log(# of Words)f,t is the log of number of words in the disclosed risk statement
and Fund Riskf,t is a fund’s general risk of fund f in year t. νcat, νt, and νcik are fund
category, year, and investment company’s fixed effects respectively. We cluster standard
errors by fund and year. The coefficient of interest β1 captures the marginal effect of the
fund’s respective risk on the amount of risk disclosure. It allows us to analyze whether
the disclosed risk is positively aligned with the fund’s exposed risk dimension.
The inclusion of fixed effects of fund categories allows us to estimate β1 by exploiting
variation in the disclosed risk of funds within a specific fund category. The amount of
disclosure might vary substantially across different fund categories, e.g., between small-
cap funds and large-cap value funds, which can be distinguished regarding their risk-
taking behavior. Time fixed effects allow us to control for the time trend in the length
of these statements that we observe in Figure 3.1. Finally, we add investment company
fixed effects, considering that different investment companies – irrespective of a fund’s
exposed risk – provide varying amounts of (risk-related) information. The inclusion of an
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investment company fixed effect enables us to investigate the role of a fund’s investment
company in more detail concerning the decision of the amount of disclosed information.
Table 3.2 shows the results obtained by estimating Equation 3.2 for the fund’s general
risk (Fund Riskf,t) with category, year, and investment company fixed effects.
Table 3.2: Determinants of length of risk statements - all funds
Table 3.2 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions with the length of a fund’s risk section in its prospectus
(log(# of Words)) as the dependent variable on various fund characteristics on all funds. Summary
Prospectus is a dummy indicating whether the fund publishes a summary prospectus (1) or not (0). The
control variables are defined in detail in Table 3.15. In the first specification (1), we regress a fund’s
disclosed risk on fund risk controlling for the fund category fixed effects (Category FE) and year fixed
effects (Year FE). In specification (2), we add investment company fixed effects (CIK FE) to the regression.
In specification (3), we alternatively control for the interaction of investment company fixed effects and
year fixed effects (Year×CIK FE). The sample consists of 29,728 fund year observations between 2011
and 2018. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year
level. * , **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable log(# of Words)Risk
(1) (2) (3)
Fund Risk −0.040∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
Fund Flow Period -0.00003 −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Return Period -0.003 0.001 0.0002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Fund Size) −0.024∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Expense Ratio -0.012 -0.016 -0.018
(0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
Turnover Ratio 0.0001∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)
log(Age) −0.127∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Summary Prospectus -0.018 0.046∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.047) (0.022) (0.030)
Category FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N
CIK FE N Y N
Year×CIK FE N N Y
Observations 29,728 29,728 29,728
R2 0.354 0.797 0.833
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For the results of the first regression, we document a negative relation between dis-
closed and exposed risk. Specification (1) in Table 3.2 shows that a fund’s general risk
is negatively related to the amount of disclosed risk when exploiting within a year and
within a category variation. A one-unit higher risk measure results, on average, in about
a −5.4% decrease in the length of a fund’s risk statement, which is statistically significant
at the 1% level. This result clearly contrasts our hypothesis that riskier funds inform more
extensively about their risk exposure. In specification (2), we additionally control for un-
observed characteristics at the managing company level using investment company fixed
effects. In line with our expectations, we now document a positive and significant relation
between a fund’s general risk and the amount of disclosed risk. The change in the sign
of the coefficient from specification (1) to (2) implies that riskier funds within the same
investment company write more extensively about their risks in their risk statements.
Moreover, when comparing specifications (1) and (2), there is a large increase in the R-
squared from 0.118 to 0.756, which points to the relevance of unobserved characteristics
at the investment company level to explain variation in the amount of risk disclosure.
The inclusion of investment company fixed effects significantly increases the R-squared.
This fact illustrates that the length of the disclosed risk statements is considerably de-
termined at the investment company level and not exclusively at the fund category level.
Accordingly, at this stage, our results suggest that a comparison of funds’ disclosed risks
across categories and investment companies is rather difficult since we only document a
positive relation between a fund’s general and disclosed risk when we control for these two
dimensions. Finally, specification (3) includes the interacted year×investment company
fixed effects, which control for unobserved time-varying characteristics at the investment
company level (instead of time-invariant characteristics in specification (2)). Specification
(3) confirms our results from specification (2) and shows a positive and significant relation
between disclosed risks and general risk. To ensure that investment companies with only
one fund do not drive our results, we also exclude those funds in a robustness test. All
findings hold qualitatively and are statistically significant. Moreover, our findings docu-
mented in this Section can be generalized to the complete sample of U.S. mutual funds;
see Table 3.13 in the Appendix.
Besides a fund’s general risk, we also examine several other fund characteristics as
controls. First, for all specifications in Table 3.2, we find that the coefficient of the
age variable is negative and highly significant, which indicates that older funds write
relatively shorter risk statements than younger funds. Second, our results reveal that funds
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with higher turnover, i.e., funds that rebalance their portfolio holdings more extensively,
provide longer risk statements. Third, whenever we include investment company fixed
effects, we find that larger funds and those that have lower fund inflows provide longer
risk statements.
As alternative proxies for funds’ risk-taking that might influence the variation in funds’
risk disclosures, we distinguish between funds’ idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk. In
particular, we hypothesize that a fund’s idiosyncratic risk is positively related to the fund’s
risk disclosure length. If a fund exhibits a higher idiosyncratic risk, we would expect that
the fund would need more words to explain the fund-specific risks. Similarly, we expect a
positive relation when looking at a fund’s amount of text on disclosed risks and a fund’s
systematic risk.
We estimate a 4-factor Carhart (1997) model to compute a fund’s market beta as
a proxy for its systematic risk since it measures the relation between the fund’s excess
returns over Treasury bills and excess market returns. We compute the market beta
in the 4-factor model based on the fund returns measured in the prior 36 months. To
quantify a fund’s idiosyncratic risk, we calculate the standard deviation of the residuals






f,t, where T = 36 months and ǫf,t is
the residual of fund f in month t in the 4-factor model regression. Table 3.3 presents
the results from estimating Equation 3.2 with idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk as
independent variables, respectively.
In specifications (1) and (4), we use fund category fixed and year fixed effects and
find a significantly negative relation between the disclosed risk amount and the exposed
risk – either for the idiosyncratic risk or the systematic risk, respectively. Once again,
when we control for investment company fixed effects as in specifications (2)–(3) and (5)–
(6), the sign of the risk coefficient changes from negative to positive and becomes highly
significant. Therefore, the results in Table 3.3 show that the amount of disclosed risks
is positively related to a fund’s idiosyncratic risk controlling for unobserved investment
company characteristics. The higher the idiosyncratic risk of an active U.S. equity fund
in our sample, the more information is disclosed in the fund’s risk statement. This finding
is robust to either time-invariant (specification (2)) or to time-varying (specification (3))
investment company characteristics. The same holds true for the systematic risk of funds.
Overall, our findings indicate that a fund’s risk statement, approximated by the length of
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3.3.3 Cross-sectional Informativeness in Fund Prospectuses
The preceding Section has provided evidence that a large part of the amount of disclosed
risks can be traced back to unobserved characteristics at the level of the investment
company and at the level of the fund category. To formalize this finding and analyze
the comparability and specificity of funds’ disclosures, we next examine the similarity of
the actual written content in funds’ prospectuses and the corresponding cross-sectional
determinants. A common concept to calculate differences between two text documents is
the cosine similarity. Hence, we compute the cosine similarity between the disclosures of
two funds’ to express the distance between the two text documents (ignoring the order
of words in a document).66 We do this for all three sections separately – risk statement,
strategy statement, and primary objective – and for the complete document. The cosine
similarity takes a value of 0 (1) in case the two disclosures are entirely different (identical).
Formally, we compute the cosine similarity between the disclosures of two different funds
f and f ′ as
simf,f ′ =
~V (df )~V (df ′)
||~V (df )||2||~V (df ′)||2
∈ [0, 1], (3.3)
where ~V (df ) is the word vector of fund f in vector space notation using term frequency
– inverse document frequency (tf-idf) weights and || · ||2 is the L2 norm for normaliza-
tion. Intuitively, the cosine similarity tells us how different two text documents are by
calculating the angle between the two word vectors.67 In contrast to an equal weighting
of words using the vector space operator ~V (·), the tf-idf schema takes into account that
some words appear in a large (small) number of funds’ prospectuses and thus are assigned
a lower (higher) weight.
We conceive a fund’s disclosure as less generic the more different a fund’s risk disclosure
is compared to the risk disclosures of all other funds from the same investment company
66For instance, Hoberg and Phillips (2016) use textual similarity measures for text-based industry
classifications. Moreover, Cohen et al. (2020) compute the textual similarity between companies’ annual
reports.
67For instance, the vector space operator ~V (·) transforms the two sentences d1=“this is a risk”=(“this”,
“is”, “a”, “risk”)′ and d2=“this is no problem”=(“this”, “is”, “no”, “problem”)
′ into word vectors in the
same vector space, i.e., ~V (d1) = (1, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0)
′ and ~V (d2) = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)
′. Then, the first element of
the vector ~V (d1) is the count of the word “this” in document d1, the second element refers to the word
“is”, and the sixth element to the word “problem”. This transformation using the operator ~V (·) allows us
to compare the two documents in the same vector space and quantify their similarity using the definition
of cosine similarity in Equation 3.3.
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or the same fund category. To express this idea of differences across funds’ disclosures, we
apply the concept of cosine similarity. In particular, we compute the median of a fund’s
similarity with all other funds in a given year and regress it via OLS on year, investment
company, and fund category fixed effects. The regression results allow us to evaluate how
much of the variation of a fund’s disclosure similarity can be assigned to each of the fixed
effects. As the similarity of two funds from the same investment company might be upward
biased due to the similarity in a company’s writing style, we use only stemmed (proper)
nouns in funds’ prospectuses and accordingly, do not consider any stylistic words.68
This regression exercise is like a clustering problem, in which we aim to understand
why some funds’ disclosures are similarly different from all other funds. Apart from the
risk disclosure statement, we also consider the primary objective and strategy statement
in the summary sections of a funds’ prospectuses to generalize our findings to other parts
of a fund’s prospectus. Table 3.4 presents the results for each of the three parts separately
and jointly. Panel A in Table 3.4 comprises the results for the complete U.S. fund universe,
while Panel B contains the results for our sample of active U.S. equity funds.
When looking at the whole documents (Panel A of Table 3.4), we find that the most
substantial part of the variation in fund’s disclosures median similarity materializes at
the investment company level (35.51%). In contrast, the contribution of a fund’s category
is only about a third of the size compared to the investment company effect (9.70%).
Nevertheless, the residual contribution is still comparatively high, which suggests that
41.99% of the variation can be traced back to funds’ idiosyncratic effects. The majority
of fund-level variation can be explained by time-invariant fund characteristics (33.17%).
When we consider the three parts of funds’ summary prospectuses separately, we docu-
ment that funds’ risk statements are the least fund-specific (38.01%) parts, while funds’
strategy statements are more informative to investors. The results in Panel B of Table 3.4
for the sample of active U.S. equity funds hold qualitatively, though the contribution of
a fund’s category is much smaller, as we focus on a very particular category of funds. In
line with our findings in Section 3.3.2, our results suggest that a lot of the content-based
variation across funds can be traced back to the investment company of a fund. However,
our results also indicate that a substantial part of the textual content of funds’ disclosures
is fund-specific and is possibly valuable to investors.
68We identify (proper) nouns in funds’ prospectuses via parts-of-speech (POS) tagging.
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Table 3.4: Variance decomposition using fixed effects
Table 3.4 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions with a fund’s median similarity with all other funds in
a given year as the dependent variable on year fixed effects, fund category fixed effects, and investment
company fixed effects. The variation that is not explained by the three fixed effects (Fund-level) can be
divided into fund fixed effects (Fund FE ) and a residual component (Residual) that is not gauged by
fund FEs. We disregard singleton observations in this analysis. In Panel A, we provide the results for all
funds matched with the Morningstar database and with the information on the fund category. In Panel
B, we show the results for our sample of active U.S. equity funds.
Panel A: All funds
Fraction accounted by (%)
All sections Risk statement Strategy statement Primary objective
Year FE 5.08% 7.68% 1.04% 0.31%
Category FE 9.70% 8.74% 9.17% 7.50%
Investment Company FE 35.51% 37.19% 31.57% 37.99%
Fund-level 41.99% 38.01% 51.89% 53.53%
Fund FE 33.17% 28.19% 43.68% 48.96%
Residual 8.82% 9.82% 8.21% 4.56%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Panel B: Active U.S. equity funds
Fraction accounted by (%)
All sections Risk statement Strategy statement Primary objective
Year FE 2.60% 5.07% 0.13% 0.78%
Category FE 0.03% 0.11% 0.09% 0.41%
Investment Company FE 58.03% 54.71% 54.16% 62.98%
Fund-level 38.41% 38.75% 45.43% 34.82%
Fund FE 28.84% 25.48% 36.05% 30.09%
Residual 9.58% 13.27% 9.38% 4.73%
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
3.3.4 Decomposition into Standard and Informative Content
But what part of the information in funds’ prospectuses is fund-specific and what part
is related to the investment company and fund category, respectively? We refer to the
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fund-specific part as the informative one because this part of the variation is explained
neither by the investment company nor by the fund category. Once we have quantified a
fund’s disclosure’s informativeness, we then relate it to a fund’s risk-taking, performance,
and investors’ behavior.
We decompose a prospectus’ content into an informative component and a standard
component (Hanley and Hoberg, 2010). The standard component has the two dimensions
in our setting: the dimension of the investment company and the dimension of the fund
category. For each fund f and year t, we create a normalized average word vector across
all funds managed by the investment company of f and all funds in the same fund category












f ′∈ category of f
dnf ′,t, (3.5)
where dnf,t is the normalized word vector of fund f in year t, i.e., df,t normalized by the
sum of its elements, and F is the total number of funds in the respective investment
company or fund category.69 Then, we run the following first stage regression (without





cat,f,t + ǫf,t, (3.6)
where one word corresponds to one observation in the regression. Using the estimates
from Equation 3.6, we compute a fund’s standard content as:
αstandard,f,t = αcompany,f,t + αcat,f,t. (3.7)
This gives us a quantitative interpretation of how much a fund’s disclosure relies on
the textual information provided by funds from the same investment company and fund
category. The informative, fund-specific, content is the sum of the absolute value of the
residuals from Equation 3.6, i.e., |ǫf,t|. The informative score, therefore, tells us how much
of a fund’s disclosure is not explained at the investment company and fund category level.
69Even though our analysis focuses on active U.S. equity funds only, we compute a fund’s informative
and standard score by relating a fund’s textual content to all funds managed by its investment company.
This is an important condition since otherwise, we would lose a large part of the variation at the investment
company level.
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We estimate informative and standard scores for each section in funds’ prospectuses and
for all sections together.
One might intuitively think that a more informative disclosure automatically implies
a less standard disclosure. However, in line with Hanley and Hoberg (2010), we find that
the Pearson correlation between funds’ informative and standard scores is −0.28 (p-value
< 0.01). This suggests that a higher informative score does not automatically correspond
to a lower standard score. Following Hanley and Hoberg (2010) we make sure that we
do not employ such a mechanistic relation by taking the sum of the absolute values of
the residuals from Equation 3.6. Table 3.5 shows the summary statistics per section and
year for our sample of active U.S. equity funds. Unsurprisingly, our results are even more
distinct when looking at the complete universe of funds.
The results in Panel D of Table 3.5 indicate that the informative coefficient for our
sample decreases continually over time while the standard coefficient increases. This
effect is most pronounced for the risk statement section, see Panel A, and dominates
the effect for the complete prospectus (Panel D). Already Figure 3.1 has shown that the
length in funds’ qualitative risk disclosures is increasing over time. Therefore, these two
observations together suggest that, on average, adding information to risk statements
does not automatically increase the informativeness of risk disclosures but rather implies
a stronger standardized character of these statements. We do not find a comparable effect
for the strategy and primary objective sections regarding changes in the coefficients over
time. This finding is reasonable as changes in these two sections are less frequent than in
the risk statement section. Funds’ strategy statements (Panel B) and primary objectives
(Panel C) are relatively persistent over time regarding their informative and standard
scores.
3.3.5 Disclosure Updates
Our measure of informative and standard content focuses on cross-sectional differences
in funds’ qualitative disclosures. However, regulators, as well as recent academic research,
have pointed out the importance of timely updates of firms’ disclosures in general (e.g.,
Brown and Tucker, 2011; Cohen et al., 2020). As funds provide yearly snapshots of
their prospectuses, we can gauge the informativeness of a fund’s disclosure over time by
exploiting within fund variation. Updating a textual disclosure means that the investment
company adds or removes statements from one year to the next in the respective section
of a fund’s prospectus.
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Table 3.5: Summary statistics disclosure informativeness
Table 3.5 shows summary statistics, i.e., mean and standard deviation (Std), of the respective summary
sections (Panel A, B, and C) and of the complete summary section (Panel D) in funds’ prospectuses
for both the standard and the informative coefficient obtained from estimating Equation 3.6. Table 3.5
displays the results for active U.S. equity funds, while we estimate Equation 3.6 using the complete set
of funds to capture all variation of funds at the investment company level.
Panel A: Risk statement
Standard Informative
Year Mean Std Mean Std N
2011 0.85 0.23 1.07 0.16 1,382
2012 0.92 0.16 1.05 0.16 1,214
2013 0.92 0.16 1.04 0.16 1,195
2014 0.92 0.16 1.04 0.17 1,152
2015 0.92 0.16 1.03 0.17 1,215
2016 0.93 0.16 1.02 0.16 1,247
2017 0.94 0.15 1.01 0.17 1,318
2018 0.93 0.16 1.01 0.18 1,355
Panel B: Strategy statement
2011 0.92 0.22 1.19 0.15 1,382
2012 0.91 0.23 1.20 0.16 1,214
2013 0.91 0.25 1.20 0.17 1,195
2014 0.91 0.26 1.19 0.17 1,152
2015 0.91 0.25 1.19 0.17 1,215
2016 0.91 0.24 1.19 0.17 1,247
2017 0.91 0.24 1.19 0.17 1,318
2018 0.91 0.24 1.19 0.16 1,355
Panel C: Primary objective
2011 0.99 0.34 1.10 0.26 1,382
2012 1.00 0.34 1.10 0.27 1,214
2013 0.99 0.35 1.11 0.26 1,195
2014 0.98 0.34 1.14 0.26 1,152
2015 0.97 0.32 1.14 0.25 1,215
2016 0.99 0.33 1.14 0.26 1,247
2017 1.00 0.34 1.14 0.26 1,318
2018 0.99 0.33 1.13 0.25 1,355
Panel D: All sections
2011 0.82 0.22 1.04 0.14 1,382
2012 0.87 0.17 1.01 0.13 1,214
2013 0.87 0.17 1.01 0.13 1,195
2014 0.87 0.17 1.00 0.14 1,152
2015 0.87 0.17 1.00 0.14 1,215
2016 0.87 0.16 0.99 0.14 1,247
2017 0.88 0.16 0.98 0.15 1,318
2018 0.88 0.16 0.98 0.15 1,355
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To create our update measure, we compute how similar a fund’s disclosure in year
t is relative to its disclosure in the previous year t − 1. We employ again the cosine
similarity in Equation 3.3 using tf-idf weights to quantify a fund’s update changes. More
specifically, we calculate the Updatef,t variable (in %) between the disclosure of a fund f








The Update score is 0 (100) when a fund’s disclosures in two successive years are identical
(completely orthogonal to each other).
Table 3.6 shows the summary statistics for the update variable, based on Equation
3.8, for all three sections individually (Panel A–C) and aggregated (Panel D) over time.
Regarding updates in all three sections together (Panel D in Table 3.6), we find updates
on average of about 3.66% of the textual disclosure with a slightly decreasing trend over
time. In 2012, fund prospectuses were updated by about 4.11%, while in 2018, they
were updated by around 3.06%. This updating behavior is mainly driven by the risk
statements (5.74% in 2012) and by the strategy statements (4.93% in 2012). The content
in funds’ primary objectives is rather unchanged over time, which we also observe in
Panel C of Figure 3.1 regarding changes in the length of this section. Unsurprisingly,
the disclosed information in the summary section of mutual fund prospectuses is rather
sticky. We often observe that in some years, there are no changes at all for many funds.
Nevertheless, investors can learn valuable information from these updates that funds
provide in summary sections of their yearly prospectuses. We will later provide some
indicative results when using this update variable to understand managerial behavior
better and provide convincing intuition for our findings.
3.4 Effects of Funds’ Disclosure Informativeness
While the previous Section has introduced our measure of informativeness, we now
examine the relation of a fund’s relative degree of informative and standard content with
funds managerial behavior and investors’ reactions. In particular, we explore the effects
on funds’ risk-taking behavior, on funds’ performance, as well as on funds’ flows and
their corresponding implications. Additionally, we examine the value of the updated
information regarding funds’ risk-taking and funds’ performance.
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Table 3.6: Textual similarities of qualitative disclosures
Table 3.6 shows summary statistics (mean, the 1% percentile (p1), first quartile (p25), median, third
quartile (p75), the 99% percentile (p99), and the number of observations (N)) on the the update score
(in %) from year t − 1 to t using Equation 3.3 of funds’ qualitative disclosure in the summary section
of their prospectus for our sample of active U.S. equity funds. The complete prospectus (All sections in
Panel D) includes the union of the qualitative disclosure in a fund’s risk statement (Panel A), strategy
statement (Panel B), and primary objective (Panel C).
Panel A: Risk statement
Year Mean p1 p25 Median p75 p99 N
2012 5.74 0.0 0.0 1.38 7.24 45.75 1,074
2013 5.61 0.0 0.34 2.21 7.57 38.93 1,173
2014 5.00 0.0 0.0 1.28 5.68 37.13 1,140
2015 4.39 0.0 0.0 1.28 5.93 29.73 1,185
2016 5.20 0.0 0.0 1.66 7.22 36.56 1,224
2017 4.79 0.0 0.0 1.88 6.73 31.71 1,283
2018 3.54 0.0 0.0 0.77 3.70 27.34 1,331
Panel B: Strategy statement
2012 4.93 0.0 0.0 0.94 5.35 55.97 1,074
2013 4.68 0.0 0.0 0.75 3.93 56.25 1,173
2014 4.52 0.0 0.0 0.67 3.78 55.56 1,140
2015 3.92 0.0 0.0 0.35 2.88 58.28 1,185
2016 3.97 0.0 0.0 0.16 3.24 51.98 1,224
2017 3.62 0.0 0.0 0.25 2.52 52.38 1,283
2018 3.84 0.0 0.0 0.26 2.99 54.00 1,331
Panel C: Primary objective
2012 1.97 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 53.45 1,074
2013 3.05 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 63.59 1,173
2014 2.14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 60.96 1,140
2015 1.80 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 56.13 1,185
2016 1.55 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 47.36 1,224
2017 1.42 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 56.22 1,283
2018 2.34 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 65.22 1,331
Panel D: All sections
2012 4.11 0.0 0.22 1.59 5.10 35.11 1,074
2013 4.05 0.0 0.38 1.54 4.85 34.63 1,173
2014 3.60 0.0 0.21 1.20 4.26 34.23 1,140
2015 3.42 0.0 0.08 1.20 4.10 39.85 1,185
2016 3.82 0.0 0.10 1.37 4.35 34.91 1,224
2017 3.55 0.0 0.10 1.35 4.06 28.93 1,283
2018 3.06 0.0 0.10 0.97 3.32 30.74 1,331
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3.4.1 Risk Disclosure and Fund’s Risk-taking Behavior
We start by investigating whether investors learn about funds’ risk-taking behavior when
reading funds’ summary section, especially their risk statement. In particular, we are
interested in the risk profile of funds with more informative (standard) risk disclosures
and whether updates in funds’ risk disclosures provide informational value about their
future risk-taking behavior. As proxies for managerial risk-taking behavior, we take a
fund’s general risk, a fund’s idiosyncratic risk, and a fund’s systematic risk as defined in
Section 3.3.2. Additionally, we use a fund’s tracking error for robustness tests, i.e., the
standard deviation of a fund’s returns over the last 12 months from its primary benchmark
as presented in its prospectus.
In a first analysis, we relate a fund’s risk-taking to the informative and standard scores
of its yearly risk disclosures controlling for the same fund variables as in Section 3.3.2
using fund-year observations. We are primarily interested in the cross-sectional effects
of risk disclosure informativeness on funds’ risk. To uncover this effect, we concentrate
on variation across funds within time and within an investment category by using year
fixed effects and fund category fixed effects.70 For our regressions, we again double-cluster
standard errors at the fund and year level. Table 3.7 shows the results of our regressions.
In general, we find a positive relation between a fund’s disclosure informativeness and
its risk. Specifications (1)–(3) of Table 3.7 show a positive (negative) and significant rela-
tion between a fund’s informativeness (standard) score and its general risk, its systematic
risk, and its idiosyncratic risk.71 Therefore, the results suggest that funds with more in-
formative (more standard) risk disclosures exhibit a higher (lower) risk-taking behavior.
Additionally, as a robustness test, we relate in specification (4) a fund’s tracking error
to its informative and standard scores. Confirming our findings in specification (3), we
observe a positive and significant relation between a fund’s tracking error and its infor-
mativeness score. Larger deviations from a fund’s benchmark imply a relative increase in
the fund’s idiosyncratic risk and consequently materialize in a higher tracking error. The
interpretation of these results from an investors’ perspective indicates that funds exposed
to higher risks provide investors with more informative disclosures on the risks taken.
Thus, we find that riskier funds do not only provide longer risk statements (see Section
70Note, in all regressions below, we do not add investment company fixed effects. The reason for that is
that we want to keep variation between investment companies and not only variation within investment
companies for the cross-sectional analysis. Nevertheless, investment company variation is already partly
included due to the way we define our informativeness scores.
71The effect of a fund’s standard score on its idiosyncratic risk is negative but insignificant.
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Table 3.7: Risk disclosure and fund risk in the cross-section
Table 3.7 shows in specifications (1)–(3) the coefficients of an OLS regressions at the fund-year level
to analyze the effect of funds’ informative and standard scores of funds’ risk statements controlling for
several fund characteristics. The dependent variable is the general Fund Risk (standard deviation of fund
returns in the last 36 months), the fund’s Systematic Risk (the market beta from estimating a 4-factor
Carhart (1997) using fund returns in the last 36 months), and the fund’s Idiosyncratic Risk (standard
deviation of the residuals from estimating a 4-factor Carhart (1997) using fund returns in the last 36
months). Specification (4) shows the results of a robustness test with Tracking Error (standard deviation
of fund returns and its primary benchmark in the last 12 months) as dependent variable. All control
variables are defined in detail in Table 3.15 in the Appendix. Period of interest is 2011–2018. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year level. * , **, and ***
represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable Fund Risk Systematic Risk Idiosyncratic Risk Tracking Error
(1) (2) (3) (4)
InformativeRisk 1.026
∗∗∗ 0.240∗∗∗ 0.197∗∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.060) (0.060) (0.080)
StandardRisk −0.414∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗ -0.004 0.024
(0.141) (0.034) (0.038) (0.051)
Fund Flow Period −0.004∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0005)
Raw Return 0.080∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.019∗∗
(0.026) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
log(Fund Size) 0.012 -0.002 0.015 0.024∗
(0.029) (0.006) (0.012) (0.013)
log(Company Size) −0.072∗∗∗ −0.011∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.070∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.005) (0.008) (0.010)
Expense Ratio 0.688∗∗ 0.138∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
(0.274) (0.054) (0.087) (0.097)
Turnover Ratio 0.0003 -0.00003 0.001∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0005)
log(Age) −0.136∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.010) (0.015) (0.019)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,979 8,979 8,979 8,848
R2 0.467 0.415 0.393 0.368
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3.3.2) but also that more informative risk disclosures relate to higher risk-taking.
Second, we look at risk disclosures and funds’ future risk-taking. Prior literature
shows that fund managers change the fund’s risk-taking levels over time (e.g., Huang
et al., 2011). Accordingly, we hypothesize that investors could infer information on a
funds’ future risk exposure from updates in funds’ risk disclosures. We gauge the magni-
tude of funds’ year-to-year updates by using the definition of fund-specific changes from
Section 3.3.5. To uncover this relation, we then regress a fund’s respective risk variable
in year t + 1 on a fund’s UpdateRisk score and on the fund’s UpdateAll score in year t,
see Equation 3.8. UpdateRisk (UpdateAll) compares the textual content of a fund’s risk
statement (all three statements) in two succeeding years, i.e., the amount of informa-
tion the investment company added to or removed from the fund’s risk statement (three
statements). This identification strategy enables us to examine how updates in fund’s
disclosures in their prospectuses predict the fund’s future risk exposure. The set of con-
trols for these regressions is the same as in Table 3.7. However, instead of fund category
fixed effects, we use fund fixed effects, as we are interested in how informative these fund-
specific updates are for each fund individually. Table 3.8 shows the results for predicting
the future risk-taking behavior in our sample of active U.S. equity funds between 2012
and 2018.72 We double-cluster standard errors by fund and year.
Panel A in Table 3.8 reports the results from regressing a fund’s future risk level in year
t+1 on risk disclosure updates and controls in t. The results do not show any significant
effects of the update scores of a fund’s risk statement (or the complete summary section)
on its future general risk, systematic risk, or idiosyncratic risk levels. Hence, looking at
individual fund-specific risk variation, our results do not indicate that larger year-to-year
updates are predictive of higher future risk levels for the same fund.
In a next step, we then look at changes in funds’ risk. Since updates in funds’ risk
disclosures measure changes from year to year, we also regress disclosure updates on
changes in funds’ risk-taking behavior. Specifically, we calculate the change in risk levels







We do this for the raw change as well as for the absolute change |∆riskf,t+1|. Taking
absolute values allows us to study the magnitude of changes independent of the direction
72Since we calculate the difference between two qualitative disclosures over time, we do not have an
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of changes in risk levels. This is also relevant from an investor’s perspective since the
direction of changes is probably more difficult to discover by reading a fund’s disclosure
than measuring the absolute magnitude of a fund-specific update.
Panel B in Table 3.8 shows that updates in funds’ summary sections have a positive
and significant effect on future absolute changes in a fund’s risk-taking behavior in terms
of its general risk (specification (4)). For a fund’s idiosyncratic risk, we find a positive
but insignificant effect (specifications (3) and (6)). Finally, in Panel C of Table 3.8 we
look at directional changes in a fund’s future risk levels. For all risk changes, we find a
negative effect of updates in both a fund’s risk statement separately and the complete
summary section on future risk-taking. This effect is statistically significant for a fund’s
general and systematic risk in specifications (2), (4), and (5). Thus, the negative relation
suggests that funds providing larger disclosure updates in their prospectuses reduce more
strongly their risk-taking in the future.
3.4.2 Qualitative Disclosures and Fund Performance
Our results so far indicate a positive relationship between the informativeness of funds’
risk disclosures and levels of risk-taking, while risk disclosure updates are predictive of
future changes in funds’ risk-taking behavior. However, it remains unclear how a fund’s
disclosure informativeness relates to a fund’s performance. As a fund’s risk-taking in-
creases (decreases) in its informativeness (standard score), we expect in line with the
traditional risk-return trade-off in finance that a fund’s performance is increasing in its
informativeness as well. Hence, we examine the effect of disclosures on raw returns and,
in particular, funds’ risk-adjusted performance. From an investor’s perspective, we an-
swer whether investing in funds with more informative and less standard disclosures is
actually rewarding in terms of fund performance. Finally, we look again at the relation
of fund-specific updates of funds’ disclosure content from one year to the next and its
predictability of funds’ future performance.
We start by relating a fund’s informative scores and standard scores to its contempo-
raneous performance using fund-year observations. For the risk-adjusted return measures,
we compute a fund’s alphas, i.e., the CAPM alpha, the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor
alpha, and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha, for our sample of active U.S. equity funds.
To estimate funds’ alphas, we use funds’ as well as stock market factors’ daily returns
for each calendar year.73 Fund age, fund size, company size, expense ratio, turnover, and
73We thank Kenneth French for providing data on stock market factors, available at
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fund flows are our set of control variables. We include year fixed effects as well as fund
category fixed effects, and again double-clustered standard errors at the fund and year
level. Finally, we use the estimated alphas as dependent variables for our panel regressions
and regress it on the fund’s informative and standard scores and the set of fund charac-
teristics. Table 3.9 shows the results for the different sections in the summary prospectus.
We only show the results for the 4-factor alpha, as our results are robust when using raw
returns, or the CAPM alpha, or the 3-factor alpha (see Table 3.14 in the Appendix).
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data library.html
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Table 3.9: Disclosure informativeness and fund performance in the cross-section
Table 3.9 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of fund performance of funds’ informative and standard
scores of different sections in their summary section of the prospectus and various fund characteristics.
The dependent variable is the annualized Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha (α̂ (4FF)) in %. Alphas are
computed using daily fund returns over 12 months in each calendar year. All control variables are defined
in detail in Table 3.15 in the Appendix. Period of interest is 2011–2018. Standard errors are reported
in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year level. * , **, and *** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable α̂ (4FF)




















log(Fund Size) -0.042 -0.053 -0.042 -0.049 -0.041
(0.093) (0.095) (0.093) (0.092) (0.092)
log (Company Size) -0.015 0.027 -0.018 -0.009 -0.020
(0.080) (0.078) (0.079) (0.079) (0.080)
log(Age) 0.091 0.132 0.101 0.090 0.090
(0.230) (0.239) (0.236) (0.236) (0.232)
Expense Ratio 0.037 0.061 0.037 0.032 0.034
(0.238) (0.238) (0.236) (0.236) (0.237)
Turnover Ratio −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fund Flow Period 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,972 8,972 8,972 8,972 8,972
R2 0.254 0.252 0.252 0.253 0.254
The results in Table 3.9 show a highly significant and positive effect of informativeness
– in the risk statement, strategy statement, and the complete summary section – on a
fund’s performance. The more informative these sections are, the higher the fund’s al-
phas in the same year. Contrarily, we find a statistically non-significant effect of standard
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scores or for the standard score of the investment objective section even a statistically
significant negative effect (at the 5% level). The remaining coefficients of informative and
standard scores are insignificant. These findings indicate that funds with more informa-
tive (standard) disclosures also achieve relatively higher (lower) factor-adjusted returns.74
Therefore, the informativeness of funds’ summary sections can be used as a selection
criterion to identify contemporaneously better performing funds.
One might argue that our overall finding here is due to the unique investment styles
of some funds described in their strategy narrative (Kostovetsky and Warner, 2020). We
test for this by including in specification (5) the informative and standard scores for
both the risk statements and the strategy statements. The correlation between risk and
strategy informativeness in our sample is 0.44 (p-value < 0.01). The results of specification
(5) show that a fund’s risk informativeness has additional value on top of its strategy
informativeness when looking at contemporaneous fund performance. The coefficient of
the informative risk variable is still statistically significant (p-value< 0.05), though smaller
in magnitude.
Next, having explored the informativeness of funds’ qualitative disclosures in their
summary sections and funds’ performance in the cross-section, we study disclosure updates
over time and how informative these updates are to investors. Updates might be important
signals to investors about the future performance of a fund (Brown and Tucker, 2011;
Cohen et al., 2020). Therefore, to analyze the relation between fund performance and
disclosure updates, we predict yearly performance measures for all active U.S. equity
funds between 2012 and 2018. Again, we use fund fixed effects and year fixed effects and
double-clustered standard errors at the fund and year dimensions. Table 3.10 shows the
results for each summary section, respectively.
Specifications (3) and (4) in Table 3.10 report a statistically significant and positive
relation between fund’s future performance and content-based updates of a fund’s strategy
statement as well as updates of the complete summary section. We also find a positive
coefficient for the update of a fund’s risk statement (significant at the 10% level in speci-
fication (1)), while the sign of the coefficient of primary objective updates in specification
(2) is negative and significant at the 5% level. We do not stress the finding of the updated
primary objective too much, as it constitutes only a small fraction of a fund’s prospectus
(see Figure 3.1), and only a very small proportion of funds provides an update of this
section (less than 75% of all funds update this information (see Panel C of Table 3.6)).
74We find a similar but less significant relation for the strategy section in unreported results when
taking funds’ raw returns instead of 4-factor alphas as the dependent variable.
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Table 3.10: Disclosure updates and future fund performance
Table 3.10 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions with fund performance on year-to-year updates in
different sections in their summary section of the prospectuses and various fund characteristics. The
dependent variable is the annualized Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha in the next year (α̂ (4FF)t+1) in %.
Alphas are computed using daily fund returns over 12 months in each calendar year. The Update variable
(in %) is defined between 0 and 100 (see Equation 3.8). All control variables are defined in detail in
Table 3.15 in the Appendix. Specification (1) shows the results for updates in funds’ risk statements,
specification (2) for updates in the objective statements, specification (3) for the strategy statements,
and specification (4) for the complete summary section. Period of interest is 2012–2018. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year level. * , **, and *** represent
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable α̂ (4FF)t+1












Flow Period 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
log(Fund Size) −1.582∗∗ −1.602∗∗ −1.609∗∗ −1.580∗∗
(0.712) (0.708) (0.691) (0.711)
log(Company Size) -0.524 -0.542 -0.519 -0.513
(0.359) (0.359) (0.387) (0.363)
Expense Ratio 1.170∗ 1.159∗ 1.176∗∗ 1.158∗
(0.617) (0.615) (0.591) (0.612)
Turnover Ratio 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
log(Age) 1.006 1.012 0.969 0.989
(0.928) (0.931) (0.971) (0.937)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Fund FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 6,144 6,144 6,144 6,144
R2 0.495 0.495 0.495 0.495
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Our results suggest that updates of funds’ textual disclosures have explanatory power for
funds’ future performance. For example, if a fund’s content changes by 4% (the mean
value in our sample), a fund’s alpha increases by approximately 14 basis points in the
next year.75
Accordingly, investors could use updates in funds’ qualitative statements as a source
of information when making an investment decision. First, investors can interpret funds’
updates of their strategy disclosures as a positive signal for the fund’s future performance.
More extensive adjustments of the investment strategy in funds’ prospectuses relate to
higher future performance. This positive relation could serve as a proxy for fund gover-
nance. In particular, better governed funds might provide more accurate information on
their investment strategy, and this information is updated in a timely manner. For in-
stance, we know from the literature that funds with better, i.e., more independent, board
governance achieve higher returns and charge lower fees (Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Ding
and Wermers, 2012). Second, updates in funds’ strategy statements might signal investors
that a fund indeed makes adjustments to its investment strategy, and this adjustment is
profitable for investors in terms of next years’ risk-adjusted fund performance.
3.4.3 Informativeness and Fund Flows
It remains to investigate investors’ reaction to informative and standard components of
the qualitative content in funds’ prospectuses. More precisely, we examine whether more
informative (more standard) prospectuses of funds experience relatively higher (lower)
fund flows. We predict that the more informative a fund’s disclosure is, the easier and
less costly an investor can process the qualitative information available. Our hypothesis
is in line with the positive relation of fund returns and fund flows well documented by,
e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997) as well as Sirri and Tufano (1998). Since we find
in Section 3.4.2 that there is a positive relation between funds’ performance and their
informativeness, we also would expect that there is such a positive relation between fund
flows and informativeness.
Table 3.11 shows the results for this analysis controlling for different measures of
past fund performance. Specification (1) uses past yearly fund returns as a performance
control. Specification (2) uses the fund’s percentage rank of its raw returns in its category
from the previous year and the squared rank (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Specification (3)
75Note that this relation is obviously not always linear. For instance, we find a negative relation for
funds that update more than 20% of their content from one year to another year.
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Table 3.11: Informativeness and fund flows in the cross-section
Table 3.11 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions with fund flows on funds’ informativeness scores and
standard scores of all three sections from funds’ yearly prospectuses and various fund characteristics.
The dependent variable is yearly fund flows in percent (Fund Flow Period) as defined in Equation 3.1.
Specifications (1)–(3) differ regarding the return controls they include. Specification (1) controls for a
fund’s yearly raw returns. Specification (2) uses a fund’s yearly percent rank regarding yearly raw returns
in its category (Rank) and the square of it as performance controls (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Specification
(3) uses quintiles of the rank as performance controls. All control variables are defined in detail in Table
3.15 in the Appendix. Period of interest is 2011–2018. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and
are double-clustered at the fund and year level. * , **, and *** represent statistical significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.





StandardAll -0.295 -0.541 -0.328
(2.348) (2.379) (2.412)
Summary Prospectus 2.700∗∗ 2.892∗∗ 2.924∗∗
(1.208) (1.227) (1.228)
log(Fund Size) 1.526∗∗∗ 1.508∗∗∗ 1.522∗∗∗
(0.460) (0.464) (0.475)
log(Company Size) −0.743∗∗ −0.763∗∗ −0.777∗∗
(0.352) (0.331) (0.332)
log(Age) −11.422∗∗∗ −11.167∗∗∗ −11.155∗∗∗
(0.707) (0.716) (0.718)
















Risk −3.279∗∗∗ −4.362∗∗∗ −4.276∗∗∗
(0.955) (1.039) (1.070)
Year FE Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y
Observations 8,889 8,889 8,889
R2 0.135 0.151 0.152
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uses quintiles of the rank return variable from specification (2) as alternative performance
control (as in Sirri and Tufano, 1998).
Indeed, in line with Sirri and Tufano (1998), funds with more informative disclosures
are able to attract higher fund flows – controlling for quantitative determinants of fund
flows, year fixed effects, and fund category fixed effects. In all specifications of Table 3.11,
we find that fund flows increase in funds’ informativeness and decrease in funds’ standard
scores. The respective signs of the coefficients are in line with our theoretical expecta-
tions. However, our results do not show an overwhelming statistical significance, which
indicates that investors react only to some extent to the informativeness in funds’ disclo-
sure content. Unsurprisingly, it is rather challenging for investors to identify the degree of
informativeness of mutual fund prospectuses, but investors are, at least to some extent,
able to differentiate between informative and standard content in fund prospectuses.
In addition to the common controls for fund flows, e.g., fund size or age, we also add
a summary prospectus dummy variable to the regressions. As we outlined in Section 3.2,
funds might voluntarily provide an additional summary prospectus, which contains the
same content as the summary section in the statutory prospectus. In line with the aca-
demic literature (e.g., Brown et al., 2008), we find support for the information disclosure
hypothesis. Namely that funds are rewarded for voluntarily disclosing additional infor-
mation. The coefficient of the summary prospectus dummy is positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level across all specifications of Table 3.11. Regarding the magnitude
of the coefficients, we document that if a fund provides investors with a summary prospec-
tus, its yearly fund flows are on average at least 2.7 percentage points higher compared
to not releasing a summary prospectus.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper examines the informational value of qualitative disclosures of U.S. mu-
tual funds prospectuses and their relation to funds’ risk-taking, funds’ performance, and
investors’ reaction. We use methods from textual analysis to investigate in more detail
a sample of active U.S. equity funds between 2011 and 2018 that report their principal
risks, strategy narratives, and investment objectives in the summary section of their yearly
updated full prospectuses.
First, we document significant heterogeneity in the amount of risk disclosure across
funds. A large proportion of the cross-sectional variation can be explained by unobserved
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heterogeneity at the investment company level and a smaller part by a fund’s category.
We find similar results when examining the actual written content of funds’ disclosures.
Accordingly, we introduce an informativeness measure of a fund’s disclosure related to
i) all other funds by the same investment company and ii) all other funds in the same
category. In this setting, we identify a fund’s disclosure as relatively standard if a company
provides the same risk disclosures for all the funds it manages and the funds’ disclosures
do not contain any fund-specific information.
Second, we examine the implications of funds’ levels of informative and standard
disclosures for funds’ risk-taking behavior, funds’ performance, and funds’ flows. Our
results show that funds with more informative risk disclosures take higher risks, and that
updates in funds’ risk disclosures are predictive of changes in funds’ future risk-taking.
Moreover, we show that funds’ risk-adjusted performance increases with their disclosure
informativeness. This effect is not driven by the uniqueness of funds’ strategy statements
but is due to the information in funds’ risk disclosures. Regarding content-based updates
of funds, we document that updates of funds’ qualitative strategy disclosures positively
and significantly predict future fund performance. Finally, looking at investors’ reactions
via fund flows, we find only weak evidence that investors respond to the informative and
standard content in funds’ prospectuses.
Overall, our findings suggest that funds’ qualitative disclosures in their prospectuses
are informative to investors. However, there is considerable heterogeneity in the cross-
section of funds determined mainly at the investment company dimension, and which
impedes for investors a simple comparison of different funds.
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A.3 Example Same Risk Section
Example for a risk statement that is used for two different funds from the same invest-
ment company. The excerpts are from The Torray Fund and The Torray Resolute Fund
for 2013).76
Principal Risks of Investing in the Fund:
General Risk
All investments are subject to inherent risks, and an investment in the Fund is no excep-
tion. Accordingly, you may lose money by investing in the Fund and investors face the
risk that Torray LLC’s (the Manager) business analyses prove faulty.
Market Risk
The value of the Fund’s investments will fluctuate as markets fluctuate and could decline
over short- or long-term periods.
Focused Portfolio Risk
The Fund attempts to invest in a limited number of securities. Accordingly, the Fund
may have more volatility and is considered to have more risk than a fund that invests in
a greater number of securities because changes in the value of a single security may have
a more significant effect, either negative or positive, on the Fund’s net asset value (NAV).
To the extent the Fund invests its assets in fewer securities, the Fund is subject to greater
risk of loss if any of those securities become permanently impaired.
No Guarantee
An investment in the Fund is not a deposit of a bank and is not insured or guaranteed
by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or any other government agency.
76The original filing for the fund’s summary section is available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/862696/000119312513216290/0001193125-13-216290.txt.
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B.3 Example Strategy Statement Change
Example for an updated strategy statement. The excerpts are for the same fund from
2013 and 2014.
2013
Principal Investment Strategy:77 The Fund’s strategy is to invest in high quality
companies that have a record of increasing sales and earnings, and to hold them as long
as their fundamentals remain intact. Capable management and sound finances are critical
considerations in the selection process. Ordinarily, 90% or more of the Fund’s assets will be
invested in common stocks, preferred stocks, and securities convertible into common stocks
with the balance held in fixed-income securities, U.S. Treasury securities or other cash
equivalents. The Fund usually holds between 25 and 40 stocks. Positions in individual
issuers will generally not exceed 8% of assets and positions in industry groupings will
generally not exceed 25% of assets. Investments are made when it is believed that a
company’s long-term outlook is sound and the shares are fairly priced
2014
Principal Investment Strategy:78 The Fund invests in the common stocks of high
quality businesses that are fairly priced and run by sound management. These compa-
nies must have solid finances and a long-term record of rising sales, earnings and free
cash flow. Investments are held as long as the issuers’ fundamentals remain intact. The
Fund invests principally in the common stocks of large capitalization companies. Large
capitalization companies are those with market capitalizations of $8 billion or more. 90%
or more of the Fund’s assets will be invested in common stocks with the balance held
in U.S. Treasury securities or other cash equivalents. Although the number of holdings
may vary, the Fund usually holds between 25 and 40 stocks, with positions in individual
issuers generally limited to between 2% and 4% of the Fund’s assets. Generally, positions
in individual issuers will not exceed 5% of Fund assets. The Fund will not invest in excess
of 25% of its assets in any one industry and generally does not invest greater than 25%
of its assets in any specific group of industries.
77The original filing for the fund’s summary section is available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/862696/000119312513216290/0001193125-13-216290.txt.
78The original filing for the fund’s summary section is available at
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/862696/000119312514198604/0001193125-14-198604.txt.
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C.3 Additional Figures and Tables
Tracking Error     Exemption        Turnover           Expense  Derivative
Passive Inv.         Liquidity          Unspecific       Active Man.        Regional
Foreign Country   Comp. Size       Std. Phrase           Sector          Governmental
    Legal           Federal Insur.         Credit            Unspecific    Depos. Receipts
Market Trad.  Cyber security     Valuation       Foreign Curr.   Fixed Income
Figure 3.3: Topics in funds’ risk statements in 2018
Figure 3.3 shows the computed 25 topics using the Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA)
model from Blei, Ng, and Jordan (2003). Words included in each word cloud are those
ten words with the highest weight in the respective topic. We decided in favor of 25
topics as this number minimizes the perplexity score, i.e., the transformed mean per-
word likelihood, when the fitted model is evaluated with an unseen hold-out sample.
LDA is a statistical method that addresses this problem by identifying an optimal set












































(b) Panel B: S&P 500 Index funds in 2018
Figure 3.4: Distribution of number of words in funds’ risk statements in 2018
Figure 3.4 shows the distribution of the number of words in funds’ qualitative risk statements in
the summary sections of their yearly prospectuses for 2018. The number of words is calculated
after removing the html code from the filings. Panel A displays the distribution of number
of words in risk statements of all funds in 2018. Panel B shows the distribution of words in
2018 of only S&P 500 Index funds. The vertical line marks the median length of funds’ risk
statements.
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Table 3.12: Data merge process
Table 3.12 describes the process of merging and shows the final number of distinct funds and share
classes in our sample. 497(K) and 485BPOS filings are available in the SEC database. Starting point
is the investment companies file of the SEC with 42,057 share classes which correspond to 13,986 funds
from 2010 to 2018. 40,226 of those share classes have a ticker symbol. In the Morningstar database we
have 33,783 ticker symbols corresponding to 10,205 distinct funds, respectively. Merging the SEC data
with the Morningstar data on Ticker and year results in 26,291 unambiguously matched share classes,
respectively 8,542 funds.
Level SEC MS Ticker data Merged data
Share class 42,057 33,783 26,291
(40,226 with ticker)
Fund level 13,986 10,205 8,542
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Table 3.13: Determinants of length of risk statements - all funds
Table 3.13 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions with the length of a fund’s risk section in its prospectus
(log(# of Words)) as the dependent variable on various fund characteristics on all funds. Summary
Prospectus is a dummy indicating whether the fund publishes a summary prospectus (1) or not (0). The
control variables are defined in detail in Table 3.15. In the first specification (1), we regress a fund’s
disclosed risk on fund risk controlling for the fund category fixed effects (Category FE) and year fixed
effects (Year FE). In specification (2), we add investment company fixed effects (CIK FE) to the regression.
In specification (3), we alternatively control for the interaction of investment company fixed effects and
year fixed effects (Year×CIK FE). The sample consists of 29,728 fund year observations between 2011
and 2018. Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year
level. * , **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable log(# of Words)Risk
(1) (2) (3)
Fund Risk −0.040∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.003) (0.003)
Fund Flow Period -0.00003 −0.0001∗ −0.0001∗∗
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Return Period -0.003 0.001 0.0002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Fund Size) −0.024∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Expense Ratio -0.012 -0.016 -0.018
(0.017) (0.011) (0.011)
Turnover Ratio 0.0001∗∗ 0.00001 0.00001
(0.00003) (0.00001) (0.00001)
log(Age) −0.127∗∗∗ −0.107∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.008) (0.008)
Summary Prospectus -0.018 0.046∗∗ 0.077∗∗
(0.047) (0.022) (0.030)
Category FE Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y N
CIK FE N Y N
Year×CIK FE N N Y
Observations 29,728 29,728 29,728
R2 0.354 0.797 0.833
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Table 3.14: Informativeness and fund performance in the cross-section
Table 3.14 shows the coefficients of OLS regressions of fund performance of funds’ informative and stan-
dard scores of the complete summary section of the prospectus and various fund characteristics. The
dependent variable is the (annualized) fund’s raw return, the CAPM alpha, the Fama and French (1993)
3-factor alpha, and the Carhart (1997) 4-factor alpha. Performance is measured on a yearly basis in
percent. Alphas are computed using daily fund returns over the 12 months in each calendar year. All
control variables are defined in detail in Table 2.16 in the Appendix. Period of interest is 2011–2018.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are double-clustered at the fund and year level. * , **,
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Dependent variable Raw Returns α̂ (CAPM) α̂ (3FF) α̂ (4FF)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
InformativeAll 3.232
∗ 2.144∗∗ 2.149∗∗∗ 2.253∗∗∗
(1.934) (0.846) (0.778) (0.757)
StandardAll -0.434 0.825 0.680 0.744
(0.746) (0.713) (0.689) (0.704)
log(Fund Size) −0.116∗ -0.050 -0.053 -0.049
(0.061) (0.096) (0.095) (0.092)
log(Company Size) 0.029 0.001 -0.003 -0.009
(0.075) (0.080) (0.084) (0.079)
log(Age) -0.544 0.270 0.127 0.090
(0.355) (0.187) (0.232) (0.236)
Expense Ratio 1.132 0.059 0.049 0.032
(0.893) (0.243) (0.240) (0.236)
Turnover Ratio −0.006∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Fund Flow Period -0.005 0.101∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.017) (0.014) (0.013)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Category FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 8,972 8,972 8,972 8,972
R2 0.486 0.292 0.253 0.253
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Table 15: Variable definitions
Table 3.15 provides definitions of all variables used in this paper. MS indicates Morningstar, C refers to
own calculations by the authors, and SEC indicates data from the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Variable name Description Source
Fund Flow (%) Computed as (TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 + RFf,t))/(TNAf,t−1(1 +
RFf,t)), where TNAf,t corresponds to fund f ’s total net assets
(TNA) in month t and RFf,t denotes fund f ’s return in month t.
The variable is winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile.
MS, C
Raw Return (%) Percentage return calculated as the change in yearly net asset value
minus management fees and other regular costs.
MS
α̂ (CAPM) (%) Annualized performance alpha from the market model. Market re-
turns are from the Kenneth French library. The alphas are estimated
in sample using daily fund returns for the respective calendar year.
MS, C
α̂ (3FF) (%) Annualized performance alpha from a model including the Fama and
French factor returns for the market (Fama and French, 1993). Mar-
ket returns are from the Kenneth French library. The alphas are
estimated in sample using daily fund returns for the respective cal-
endar year.
MS, C
α̂ (4FF) (%) Annualized performance alpha from a model including the Fama and
French factor returns for the market as well as the Carhart momen-
tum factor (Carhart, 1997). Market returns are from the Kenneth
French library. The alphas are estimated in sample using daily fund
returns for the respective calendar year.
MS, C
Fund Size (in mn.) Fund’s total net assets in million USD, aggregated at the share class
level.
MS
log (Fund Size) Logarithm of fund’s total net assets in million USD, aggregated at
the share class level.
MS, C
log (Company Size) Logarithm of company’s total net assets in million USD, aggregated
at the fund level.
MS, C
Expense Ratio (%) A fund’s annual expense ratio expressed in percent. MS
Age (in months) Fund’s age computed as the difference from the end of the year to
the inception date of the oldest share class.
MS, C
log(Age) Logarithm of fund’s age in months computed as the difference from
end of the year to the inception date of the oldest share class.
MS, C
Turnover Ratio (%) Lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all securities with maturities




Variable name Description Source
Fund Risk Standard deviation of a fund’s monthly returns from the prior 36
months.
MS, C
Systematic Risk A fund’s beta measured as the slope of the regression of the monthly
excess return from estimating a 4-factor Carhart (1997) model using
a funds’ monthly returns from the prior 36 months. For this estimate,
we demand for at least 24 observations.
MS, C
Idiosyncratic Risk A fund’s risk measured as the standard deviation of the residuals from
estimating a 4-factor Carhart (1997) model using a funds’ monthly
returns from the prior 36 months. For this estimate, we demand for
at least 24 observations.
MS, C
Tracking Error Standard deviation of a fund’s return and its primary benchmark (as
indicated in the prospectus) in the last 12 months.
MS
Fund Flow Period Fund flows over the 12 months before the calendar year end. MS, C
Summary Prospec-
tus
Dummy whether the fund issues a summary prospectus (1) or not
(0).
SEC, C
Category Morningstar assigns each fund to 1 of 70 fund categories. MS
CIK Unique identifier of the investment company that issues the fund.
This mapping is manually created by aggregating information on
companies Central Index Key (SEC) from the SEC EDGAR web-
site and internet search.
SEC, C
Number of Words Number of words in the risk statements. SEC, C
log(# of Words) Logarithm of the number of words in the risk statements. SEC, C
Informative Informative score of a fund’s textual disclosures (by sections in funds’
prospectuses), which is the sum of the residuals of the regression
defined in Equation 3.6.
C
Standard Standard score of a fund’s textual disclosures (by sections in funds’
prospectuses), which is the sum of the two coefficients in Equation
3.7.
C
Update Update is calculated as the cosine similarity between textual disclo-




Mutual Fund Names and Style (Mis-)
Information
Joint with Anne-Florence Allard and Kristien Smedts‡
Mutual funds often inform via their name about the investment style that is pur-
sued. We document that a significant proportion of mutual fund names provides
inaccurate information, i.e., the fund’s investment style does not align with the
given name. Funds that deviate from the investment style suggested in their
name performed worse, had lower fund inflows, took more risk, and charged
higher expenses than their competitors. Evidence shows that, in particular, the
tournament character of the fund industry causes fund name deviations. In
addition, the risk-return trade-off deteriorates following a misnaming practice.
Moreover, we document that investors experience difficulties in responding in a
timely manner to this misleading name information.
4.1 Introduction
Do mutual fund names convey reliable information? In this paper, we shed light on this
question by studying mutual fund names’ alignment with mutual funds’ actual investment
styles.
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At year-end 2018, there were more than 119,000 regulated funds worldwide having
more than U.S. $46 trillion in total net assets (Investment Company Institute, 2019).
Investors thus face a broad menu of investment options, and to simplify the selection
process, they often rely on information or heuristics summarising key fund characteristics.
For instance, investors (over-)weight past performance, explicit fees, or base their decision
on qualitative information such as the fund’s name or its ticker symbol (see, e.g., Sirri
and Tufano, 1998; Jain and Wu, 2000; Barber et al., 2005; Cooper et al., 2005; Espenlaub
et al., 2017).79
As a result, fund managers often include salient information in the fund’s name –
such as the asset class, e.g., equity/bonds, or the investment style of the fund, e.g.,
value/growth, or small/mid/large-cap. Providing such information in the name should
facilitate the selection process of investors, for sure when they are less sophisticated. How-
ever, what if fund managers do not truthfully inform—or even intentionally misinform—
about the strategy in the fund’s name?
In this paper, we investigate this phenomenon of inaccurate fund names. Using clus-
ter analysis coupled with a return-based analysis, we are able to show the prevalence
of inaccurate fund names, i.e., a misalignment between the fund’s investment style and
name. Subsequently, we aim to shed light on the reasons and consequences of inaccu-
rate fund names. This analysis is motivated by the tournament hypothesis of Brown
et al. (1996) who consider the mutual fund market as a competitive tournament in which
funds with comparable investment objectives compete against each other. They show that
relative winners within a fund category experience higher fund inflows relative to their
competitors. Moreover, higher inflows result in higher compensation for the fund man-
agers (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Therefore, in an attempt to become relative winners,
mutual fund managers might decide to follow a deviating strategy. This mainly plays at
year end, when the fund’s performance is recorded and the compensation is determined.
Based on this relationship, we expect that relative losers over the course of a year will
increase their efforts to switch to the relative winners’ side by the end of the year. One
strategy to do so is to deviate from the investment style suggested by the fund’s name
79Thaler (2016) provides anecdotal evidence of investors’ behavior regarding a closed-end mutual fund.
A fund having the ticker symbol “CUBA” and investing in the Caribbean traded historically (like most
closed-end funds) at a 10 to 15% discount relative to the net assets value. However, in December 2014,
when President Obama announced to relax conditions for U.S. firms to do business in Cuba, this fund
experienced a significant increase in the price of more than 70% without any change in the net asset value.
Thus, investors overweighted the qualitative information based on the ticker symbol and interpreted it
as a relation to the country Cuba.
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and change the portfolio’s exposure profile. This effect is amplified due to an asymmetric
return-flow relationship, where relative winners gain inflows, but relative losers do not
experience outflows (see Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). Due to this
asymmetric pattern of the flow-performance relationship and due to the tournament set-
ting, mainly within a strategy category, managers of funds with relatively lower returns
over a year thus have incentives to change the investment strategy of the fund by the
end of the year. The fund name’s inaccuracy therefore emerges from a principal-agent
conflict, in which the fund manager aims to maximize his/her compensation.
In a second part, we analyze the consequences of improper naming practices. We
study the fund’s subsequent return and risk to shed light on the success of the strategy
to deviate. We also analyze the investors’ subsequent reaction by investigating fund in-
and outflows.
Over a period spanning from 2010 up to 2018, we document that a significant fraction
of U.S. equity mutual funds provides inaccurate naming information: 33% of U.S. equity
mutual funds have, at least once in their life-cycle, an inaccurate name. Often, however,
misnaming occurs for multiple periods over the life-cycle. In addition, we provide evidence
that this phenomenon of inaccurate naming mainly results from changes in the underlying
portfolio without an appropriate change in the mutual fund’s name (discussed in Section
4.5).
To explore this finding further, we study which fund characteristics can be linked to this
misnaming practice. We show that mutual funds, prior to their misnaming, underperform
in many dimensions compared to accurately named funds. In particular, the degree of
inaccuracy is higher when the fund received lower inflows, charged higher fees, and was
exposed to more idiosyncratic risk. Our results also highlight the tournament hypothesis
and confirm the potential principal-agent conflict (Brown et al., 1996). When funds are
relative losers during the first quarters of a year, they tend to deviate more from the style
suggested by their name, resulting in inaccurate fund naming.
Importantly, we document that the above strategy is on average not successful: fo-
cusing on relative performance, funds that deviate from their name-suggested strategy
do not end-up being relative winners. Thus, a deviation to improve one’s performance
rank does not seem to be effective, on average. Moreover, while the risk-return trade-off
deteriorates following a misnaming practice, investors do not reduce their investments in
such funds. This finding is in line with the asymmetric relationship of returns and flows
(see, e.g., Sirri and Tufano, 1998) and highlights the difficulties that investors experience
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in noticing such inaccurate information in a timely manner.
The importance of mutual fund names in investors’ investment decisions has long been
recognized by the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC). For instance, in 2001, the
SEC stated that “the name of an investment company may communicate a great deal to
an investor” (SEC, 2001). This recognition resulted in Rule 35d-1, introduced in July
2001, to regulate mutual fund names. Hence, to prevent misleading information in the
name, the rule requires funds that mention an asset class in their name to invest at least
80% of the portfolio in that asset class. Following the introduction of this naming rule, a
significant fraction of funds had to make name adjustments, as reported by Cooper et al.
(2005).
Rule 35d-1 is transparent and strict concerning the asset classes, the sector, or the
region in which a fund invests, whether the distribution is exempt from the income tax,
and whether the fund shares are guaranteed or approved by the United States government.
However, the rule is not strictly enforceable when the fund name indicates a particular
focus on asset size, for example, on small or large capitalized companies. Instead, the
authorities require that a fund uses “reasonable definitions of such terms”, leaving room
for interpretation. Some other aspects of the name are even left completely unregulated,
such as a name related to a typical investment strategy (growth or value).80
Aware of these possible loopholes in the regulation, the SEC issued a press release in
March 2020 requesting public comments about the effectiveness of Rule 35d-1. In this
press release, authorities highlight the concerns linked to fund names referring to the size
and investment strategy dimensions (SEC, 2020). Strongly motivated by this concern,
our analysis therefore focuses on fund names referring to the size dimension (small or
large) and the investment strategy dimension (value or growth).
In this paper, we do not assume that a mutual fund name is exclusive in the way that
it indicates investments only in the suggested asset class or only in stocks corresponding
to the specified investment style, i.e., a fund called small might also invest to a certain
degree (much lesser) in large capitalized companies. Mutual fund names are only one
of the information sources that investors can consult, and it should not be the only
one. However, as the SEC states: “fund names are often the first piece of information
investors see, and they can have a significant impact on an investment decision” (SEC,
2020). Hence, the name of a mutual fund introduces essential information to potential
investors, and therefore, should not be misleading.
80All names are still subject to the prohibition on misleading names (SEC, 2001).
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4.1.1 Literature Contribution
Regarding the existing literature, our paper builds upon the literature on inaccurate
information in the mutual fund industry in general. In particular, there is a strand of liter-
ature that investigates mismatches between what mutual funds claim to do and what they
actually do: mismatches between investment styles in funds’ objective statements and ac-
tual investment styles (Bams, Otten, and Ramezanifar, 2017; Brown and Goetzmann,
1997; Kim, White, and Stone, 2005; Mason, Mcgroarty, and Thomas, 2012), between
stated investment objectives in general and actual objectives (Kim, Shukla, and Tomas,
2000), and between the stated benchmark index and actual investment style (DiBar-
tolomeo and Witkowski, 1997; Mateus, Mateus, and Todorovic, 2019; Sensoy, 2009) or
actual holdings (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). We contribute to this literature by pro-
viding evidence on mismatches related to the fund’s name, the very first qualitative in-
formation that investors see when they invest in a mutual fund, and its actual investment
style.
Second, we also contribute to the strand of literature that investigates the role of mu-
tual fund naming in more detail. For example, Kumar, Niessen-Ruenzi, and Spalt (2015)
provide evidence that U.S. investors’ decisions are not free of name-induced stereotypes:
funds with managers having foreign-sounding names have significantly lower annual fund
flows. More closely related to our paper are two studies that report empirical evidence of
misinformation related to changes in mutual fund names (Cooper et al., 2005; Espenlaub
et al., 2017). Cooper et al. (2005) analyze fund name changes from April 1994 to July
2001 and find that funds use name changes strategically. While name-changing funds are
not able to improve return-performance, they do experience significant long-term positive
abnormal fund inflows. This relationship even holds for a cosmetic name change, i.e.,
when the portfolio holdings of the fund are not in line with its new name. Espenlaub
et al. (2017) build further upon Cooper et al. (2005) and study fund name changes be-
tween 2002 and 2011, after the implementation of the SEC Names Rule in 2001. They
distinguish name changes along several dimensions, among which misleadingness which
corresponds to the definition of cosmetic name changes in Cooper et al. (2005).
To summarize, our contribution is fourfold. First, we analyze the problem of inaccurate
fund naming by taking a broader, more continuous perspective, which is, in comparison to
the above literature (Cooper et al., 2005; Espenlaub et al., 2017), not restricted to name
change events. Complementary to Cooper et al. (2005) and Espenlaub et al. (2017), we
provide evidence that the economic problem of inaccurate names is indeed much broader
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than just triggered by name change events. Instead, funds often change their investment
style without changing their name, which also results in a mismatch between the fund’s
name and the actual strategy. Besides, we find that fund managers use name changes
to solve inaccurate names. Second, we provide new insights for regulators by focusing
on name dimensions, both strictly, but also less strictly regulated by the SEC Names
Rule SEC (2001). Interestingly, we find fewer mismatches in the size dimension (SMB),
which is stricter regulated by the SEC. In contrast, we find significant mismatches in
the strategy dimension (HML), which is less strictly regulated. Third, we show that
the misnaming practice can be explained by the fund industry’s tournament character.
Finally, we analyze the consequences of name misinformation and highlight the importance
of name regulation, given investors’ limited reaction to inaccurate naming.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the data
collection process and provides descriptive summary statistics. In Section 4.3, we develop
our accuracy classification methodology and derive the corresponding classifications for
our sample. The second part of the paper elaborates on the reasons and potential con-
sequences of inaccurate mutual fund names. Section 4.4 analyzes the funds’ motivation
to deviate from the investment style suggested by their name and the role played by the
mutual fund tournament. In Section 4.5, we analyze the impact of fund name changes
on funds’ name accuracy and section 4.6 investigates the consequences of inaccurate fund
names. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Data
To analyze potential misleading information in mutual fund names, we construct a
history of mutual fund names. To do so, we consult over 400,000 fund prospectuses
available on the EDGAR database of the SEC and link the fund names to key financial
data obtained from Morningstar.
4.2.1 EDGAR: Mutual Fund Names
The starting point to construct a history of mutual fund names is the open-access
database EDGAR of the SEC. According to the Securities Acts of 1933 and 1940, invest-
ment companies registered with the SEC are required to disclose standardized informa-
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tion on their investment products, e.g., mutual funds.81 According to the Securities Acts,
funds are required to (1) update at least once a year material fund information and (2)
disclose a separate filing whenever there is a significant change in this information. For
completeness, we extract name information from all filings that investment companies of
funds regularly have to provide (see Table 4.10 in the Appendix for a detailed list of filing
types).
Therefore, beginning in 2010, we extract the names of a fund from each fund prospectus
in the EDGAR database.82 We analyze a total of 418,938 prospectuses that were filed
between January 2010 and December 2018. We then aggregate the information from these
different filings and construct a monthly fund name history database of 20,973 funds (see
Table 4.10 in the Appendix for the details).
4.2.2 Morningstar: Financial Data of Mutual Funds
The names history database is merged with the survivorship bias-free mutual fund
database of Morningstar that includes information on fund returns, various risk measures,
as well as several mutual fund characteristics, such as total assets under management,
costs, and security holdings.83
In order to analyze investors’ reactions, we compute the fund quarterly net flows.
Based on data on total net assets and returns, we then compute quarterly fund net flows,
which we define as the growth rate of the total assets under management adjusted for
reinvested returns:
Flowi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t)
TNAi,t−1(1 +Ri,t)
, (4.1)
where TNAi,t is fund i’s total net assets in quarter t and Ri,t is the fund’s return over the
81There is a relatively young research stream on information from mutual fund prospectuses (see Abis,
2017; Baghai et al., 2019; Hillert et al., 2016; Kostovetsky and Warner, 2020; Krakow and Schäfer, 2020).
Abis (2017) applies machine learning techniques to the strategy section of mutual fund prospectuses to
classify funds as either quantitative or discretionary. Baghai et al. (2019) retrieve information on the use
of credit ratings from mutual fund prospectuses. Hillert et al. (2016) analyze the tone in mutual fund
letters, which they also extract from the same database. Krakow and Schäfer (2020) provide evidence
that qualitative updates in fund prospectuses are informative.
82We choose 2010 since from that year onward, prospectus data is provided in the eXtensible Business
Reporting Language (XBRL) format. Therefore, the extraction of relevant sections in a prospectus can
be identified due to the XBRLkey structure.
83As many funds are offered in multiple share classes, which all belong to the same fund and therefore
also have the same fund name, we aggregate the Morningstar share class-level information into fund-level
information. This aggregation is done by taking the market value-weighted average (see, e.g., Kacperczyk
et al. (2008); Gallaher et al. (2015); Choi et al. (2016)). The oldest share class is used as the reference
for all the other variables for which no aggregation is needed.
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prior quarter.84 To account for outliers, we winsorize at the 1% level at the bottom and
the top parts of the distribution.
While data is mostly available on a monthly basis, we aggregate it to a quarterly
frequency. We do this to avoid too much variability in factor loadings when using short
samples. Name changes within a quarter are handled in the following way. If a fund
changes its name in the first half of the quarter, we assign the new name to the corre-
sponding quarter. If the fund changes its name in the second half, we assign the new
name only to the next quarter. Finally, we restrict the sample to equity funds only and
exclude funds with less than 1 million assets under management and funds with only one
quarter of observations.
4.2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our final sample consists of 2,126 U.S. equity open-end mutual funds that are linked
to 2,669 different names in the period 2010 to 2018. Of those funds, 1,339 funds have
a name which either refers to the SMB dimension (having the terms small or large in
the name) or to the HML dimension (having the terms growth or value in the name), or
jointly to both dimensions. Table 4.1 reveals that the number of funds that refer to a
specific style is relatively constant over time. A large fraction of funds refers to the HML
dimension only, while most funds that refer to the SMB dimension also refer to the HML
dimension.
Table 4.2 reports sample summary statistics on various portfolio characteristics. The
average fund has assets under management of USD 2,709 million, is 16 years old, and
charges a quarterly gross expense ratio of 0.12%. The average quarterly fund flow is 2.19%,
the average investor’s return (net of costs) over a quarter is 1.18%, and the idiosyncratic
risk of a fund in a quarter is 0.34%.
4.3 Inaccurate Mutual Fund Names
To answer our research questions, we first analyze the prevalence of inaccurate naming
practices by studying the alignment between mutual fund names and investment styles.
84This measure follows the methodology of Huang et al. (2011). Most studies define fund’s net flows as
Flowi,t = (TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1(1+Ri,t))/(TNAi,t−1). However, our approach, following the methodology
of Huang et al. (2011), guarantees that fund outflows will not be below -100%. The Pearson correlation
coefficient between the two measures is 0.998.
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Table 4.1: Description of mutual fund names
Table 4.1 shows the number of fund names in each year that indicate a fund’s investment style.
Funds are defined as having a style name if one of the following style identifiers appears in
their name: ”large/lg/blue chip”, ”small/sml/sm”, ”growth/grth/gr”, and ”value/val”. The
sample consists of all U.S. open-end equity mutual fund names which are retrieved from the
SEC database and linked to the Morningstar data over the 2010 to 2018 period.
Dimension 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Small 122 131 111 114 116 129 131 144 147
Small & Growth 70 75 60 59 61 63 63 67 70
Small & Value 84 93 76 78 80 85 88 86 86
Large 62 58 46 38 38 42 48 53 60
Large & Growth 79 83 63 56 55 49 48 50 52
Large & Value 77 78 63 57 52 51 54 55 56
Growth 273 281 212 209 204 206 202 217 212
Value 203 215 174 160 151 155 155 167 165
Other 591 612 519 492 472 473 495 553 560
Total 1561 1626 1324 1263 1229 1253 1284 1392 1408
To do so, we rely on a return-based analysis (see, e.g., Cooper et al., 2005).85 The moti-
vation for such a return-based method is threefold. First, funds’ returns provide timely
information about the funds’ investment style as it is available at a daily frequency, while
portfolio holdings data is only updated quarterly. Second, and related, this information is
much more sensitive to changes in investment style than the information about portfolio
holdings (see, e.g., ter Horst, Nijman, and de Roon, 2004). Third, while mutual funds
report on a quarterly basis their holdings themselves, returns are publicly observable and
are therefore exempt from possible reporting biases.
For each fund, for each quarter, we estimate the four-factor model of Carhart (1997)
on daily returns. The factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website.86 Specifically,
85Cooper et al. (2005) use such a method to identify inaccurate name changes, i.e., a fund name which
refers after a name change to an investment style that does not correspond to the portfolio holdings.
86We thank Kenneth French for providing data on these factors. For more details, see https://mba.
tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.
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Table 4.2: Characteristics of the funds in the sample
Table 4.2 shows summary statistics (mean, standard deviation, median, first (p1) and last (p99)
percentile. All fund characteristics are defined in detail in Table 4.14. The variables Fund Flow
and Expense Ratio are winsorized at the bottom and the top percentile. The variable Age is
calculated based on the IPO of the oldest share class. The variable Idiosyncratic Risk is the
standard deviation of the residual of the Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
Variable Mean Std p1 Median p99
Fund Flow (in %) 2.19 14.06 -29.61 0.52 81.17
Fund Size (in mn. $) 2709.93 14,568.09 1.53 372.75 43,069.68
log(Fund Size (in mn. $)) 19.60 2.18 14.24 19.74 24.49
log(Company Size) 21.80 2.11 16.06 22.07 25.87
Age (in Years) 16.21 12.64 0.83 14.25 74.38
log(Age (in Years)) 2.49 0.86 -0.18 2.66 4.31
Return (in %) 1.18 5.06 -18.26 1.15 13.28
Idiosyncratic Risk (in %) 0.34 0.48 0.04 0.21 2.35
Expense Ratio (in %) 0.12 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.50
Turnover Ratio (in %) 68.77 95.33 2.00 46.61 500.35
Cash Proportion (in %) 2.86 8.64 -0.98 1.86 28.18
FI Proportion (in %) 0.55 7.93 0.00 0.00 7.84
Equity Proportion (in %) 95.95 8.84 58.02 97.71 100.26
Holdings 216.80 404.57 17.33 90.00 2274.00
we estimate the following model for each quarter:
Ri,t −Rf,t = αi + βR,i(RM,t −Rf,t) + βS,iSMBt + βH,iHMLt + βM,iMOMt + ǫi,t, (4.2)
where Ri,t is the return of fund i on day t, and Rf,t the risk-free rate. RM,t, SMBt,
HMLt and MOMt denote the market, size, value-growth, and momentum returns on day
t, respectively.
Thus, as a result, we obtain quarterly factor loadings for each fund. Next, to determine
inaccurate fund names, we focus on two of these loadings: βS,i and βH,i. In particular,
we use βS,i to identify a name referring to the size (SMB) dimension, i.e. using the terms
small or large. Similarly, we use βH,i to identify names referring to the investment strategy
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(HML) dimension, i.e. including the terms growth or value.
For each of these two factor loadings, we use cluster analysis to sort funds into two
investment style clusters according to their similarity in βS,i or βH,i. The goal of this
cluster analysis is to obtain a high similarity in β.,i between funds in the same group
and low similarity between funds in different groups (see, e.g., Jain, 2010). Based on the
classification of a fund in a group, we can then determine whether the name information
is in line with the investment style cluster, and thus whether the name is accurate or not.
A few other papers also use cluster analysis in the context of mutual funds. For
example, Brown and Goetzmann (1997) and Mason et al. (2012) use the most popular
algorithm, K-means (Jain, 2010), to classify funds into different style groups. The goal
of the K-means algorithm is to allocate funds to a pre-specified number of groups by
minimizing the squared error between the group’s empirical mean and the funds in this
group (Jain, 2010). Despite being intuitive and widely used, this clustering technique has
one undesirable property: it is a hard assignment, meaning that each fund is assigned to
a single cluster. An extension of the K-means algorithm, called fuzzy C-means (Dunn,
1973; Bezdek, 1981), overcomes this by allowing each fund to be part of every group, but
with different degrees of membership. For example, in the case of two groups, the fuzzy
C-means algorithm identifies the degree of membership of a fund to the first group (say,
0.2) and the second group (say, 0.8). Since the degrees of membership sum up to one, we
can interpret them as the likelihood that a fund belongs to each of the groups.
In this paper, we use the fuzzy C-means algorithm and interpret the degree of member-
ship of a fund to the wrong cluster as the degree of inaccuracy of its name. For example,
if a fund name includes the word small but belongs to the group large with a degree of
membership of 0.7, we conclude that this fund name has a degree of inaccuracy of 0.7.
Similarly, if a fund name includes the word value and belongs to the group growth with a
degree of membership of 0.1, we conclude that this fund name has a degree of inaccuracy
of 0.1.
To determine the name of each group, we look at the names of funds that belong to
each group with a degree of membership of at least 0.5, as these funds are more likely to
belong to this group than to the other one. Suppose the majority of funds in a group has
a name including the word small (vs. large), this group is labeled small.87
87When using a clustering algorithm as fuzzy C-means or K-means, one should know that the different
initial partitions might lead to different cluster results. However, this is not a concern for us: as suggested
in Jain (2010), we run for robustness the clustering algorithm with several initial partitions, and the
inaccurate dummy variable remains the same.
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(a) Panel A: Cluster Small (b) Panel B: Cluster Large
(c) Panel C: Cluster Growth (d) Panel D: Cluster Value
Figure 4.1: Number of funds per cluster per year quarter
Figure 4.1 shows the number of funds per cluster per year quarter. In Panels A and B,
funds whose name contain the word small are in blue and funds with the word large
in their name are in red. Other fund names are in white. In Panels C and D, fund
names referring to growth are in green and funds having the word value in their name
are in yellow. Other names are in white. In total, the sample consists of 2,743 fund
names between 2010 and 2018.
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Finally, based on this degree of inaccuracy, we also create a dummy variable inaccurate.
When a fund’s degree of membership to the wrong group is higher than or equal to 0.5,
we identify this fund’s name as inaccurate. In the example above, the fund featuring the
term small in its name is inaccurate, while the fund featuring the word value in its name
is accurate.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the results of the cluster analysis. First, the classification of each
cluster is straightforward as each cluster is dominated by funds having a specific term in
their name (either small or large for the cluster on the SMB dimension determined using
βS,i, and either growth or value for the cluster on the HML dimension determined using
βH,i). Second, there is some heterogeneity across the dimensions and also across time.
For instance, a larger fraction of HML funds is classified as inaccurate compared to SMB
funds.
More detailed information on the proportion of inaccurate fund names, per year, per
type of fund name, and per dimension on which they are inaccurate is reported in Table
4.3.88 On average, each year, around 25% of funds in our sample is inaccurate in at
least one dimension. This proportion slightly varies over time but always remains above
18%. The phenomenon of inaccurate naming, therefore, tends to be widespread. Looking
at the specific dimensions of inaccuracy, we see that a much bigger proportion of funds
is inaccurate on the HML dimension than on the SMB dimension. This finding is not
surprising given that, according to the SEC Names Rule (35d-1), names referring to
the SMB dimension must be used in a “reasonable manner”, while there is no such clear
restriction for names referring to the HML dimension (SEC, 2001). The findings, therefore,
suggest that a Names Rule is effective. Finally, we find that only a very small proportion
of funds is inaccurate on both dimensions.
Focusing on the results per type of name, Table 4.3 reveals that the funds that most
often feature an inaccurate name are those referring to the two terms small & growth in
their name. More than 30% of these fund names are indeed found to be inaccurate every
year. On the other end of the spectrum, the funds featuring the term large are very rarely
classified as being inaccurate.
88When a fund name contains both a term referring to the SMB dimension (small or large) and a
term referring to the HML dimension (value or growth), it can be found to be inaccurate either on the
SMB dimension, or on the HML dimension, or on both dimensions. Hence, there are in total 8 possible
accurate/inaccurate name cases. Table 4.11 displays the various cases.
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Table 4.3: Inaccurate mutual fund names
Table 4.3 shows the proportion (in %) of fund names which are found to be inaccurate each
year, per type of name, and per dimension on which they are found to be inaccurate. SMB
refers to inaccurate fund names associated with the SMB dimension (cases (2) and (6) in Table
4.11). HML refers to inaccurate fund names associated with the HML dimension (cases (4) and
(7)). SMB & HML refers to inaccurate fund names associated with both dimensions (case (8)).
Note that the number in All is not necessarily the sum of the numbers in SMB, HML, and SMB
& HML. Indeed, a fund name related to two dimensions (small & value for example), can be
inaccurate on the different dimensions during the year. For example, in a given quarter of a
year, the use of small is inaccurate while the use of value is accurate, and on another quarter
of the same year the use of both small and value is inaccurate. So, this fund name is included
in once on row All, as well as once on row SMB and once on row SMB & HML.
Name 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
All funds
All 28.56 22.09 20.75 36.06 31.70 25.51 18.12 23.24 20.75
SMB 0.93 0.89 2.61 5.71 3.96 2.56 1.65 5.36 3.89
HML 27.73 21.40 18.51 29.18 26.68 22.31 16.35 17.52 16.75
SMB & HML 0.00 0.20 0.12 2.08 1.45 0.90 0.13 0.72 0.47
Small 3.28 3.82 9.91 15.79 12.07 5.43 3.82 12.50 9.52
Small & Growth 75.71 56.00 65.00 69.49 60.66 57.14 36.51 31.34 35.71
SMB 0.00 2.67 11.67 16.95 9.84 4.76 3.17 4.48 4.29
HML 75.71 56.00 58.33 59.32 52.46 50.79 33.33 25.37 34.29
SMB & HML 0.00 1.33 1.67 3.39 1.64 3.17 0.00 2.99 1.43
Small & Value 10.71 4.30 7.89 37.18 23.75 16.47 9.09 19.77 9.30
SMB 4.76 2.15 1.32 10.26 10.00 8.24 3.41 10.47 1.16
HML 5.95 2.15 6.58 20.51 11.25 4.71 4.55 9.30 6.98
SMB & HML 0.00 1.08 0.00 7.69 3.75 3.53 1.14 2.33 1.16
Large 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.89 0.00 2.38 0.00 9.43 10.00
Large & Growth 3.80 6.02 7.94 26.79 25.45 24.49 12.50 16.00 17.31
SMB 1.27 0.00 3.17 3.57 0.00 4.08 4.17 10.00 7.69
HML 3.80 6.02 4.76 8.93 14.55 20.41 8.33 6.00 5.77
SMB & HML 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.29 10.91 4.08 0.00 0.00 3.85
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Table 4.3 continued.
Large & Value 22.08 14.10 11.11 36.84 26.92 17.65 16.67 23.64 19.64
SMB 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.26 3.85 0.00 1.85 9.09 8.93
HML 22.08 14.10 11.11 31.58 21.15 17.65 14.81 10.91 12.50
SMB & HML 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.92 0.00 0.00 3.64 0.00
Growth 41.76 31.67 27.83 36.84 46.08 46.60 33.17 29.03 32.08
Value 37.93 31.63 22.99 46.25 31.79 15.48 16.13 29.94 21.21
In addition, we also provide descriptive statistics about the prevalence of this practice
of inaccurate naming per fund, i.e., is a fund inaccurate just once or twice in its life-cycle
or does it occur more frequently. Figure 4.2 sheds light on this issue and shows that a
large fraction of funds indeed provides inaccurate information for just a limited number
of times, but an important fraction of funds do exhibit such misnaming practice for many
periods; with some funds even having an inaccurate name for as long as 8 years (almost
the entire sample period). Such high frequencies hint at a rather deliberative process by
the fund managers involved.
Finally, we also provide descriptive evidence on the distribution of the inaccuracies
over the quarters in a year. In line with the tournament hypothesis that is analyzed in
the next section, Table 4.4 indeed confirms that most inaccuracies occur during the fourth
quarter of a given year. This non-random pattern suggests that the practice is intentional.
4.4 Reasons for Inaccurate Fund Names: the Tour-
nament Hypothesis
In this section, we focus on the reasons for the observed deviations in the name di-
mension as motivated by the tournament hypothesis of Brown et al. (1996) and Chevalier
and Ellison (1997). More precisely, five elements are combined to develop this hypothesis.
First, the mutual fund industry can be seen as a tournament in which funds with similar
investment styles compete with each other.89 The funds at the top of the ranking within
a style group win the tournament, while those at the bottom lose it. Second, the vast
89This tournament characteristic is, for instance, illustrated by the periodic performance ranking of







1 5 9 13 17 21 25 29







Figure 4.2: Frequency of inaccurate fund names
Figure 4.2 shows the number of funds having an inaccurate name for a given number
of quarters. In total, the sample consists of 3,008 inaccurate fund-quarter observations
between 2010 and 2018.
majority of these rankings are produced at the end of a calendar year, based on funds’
performance over the year (Brown et al., 1996). Third, according to the tournament hy-
pothesis, the funds appearing at the top of these end-of-year rankings, i.e., the winners
of the tournament, receive higher fund inflows as compared to the losers (Brown et al.,
1996). Fourth, in contrast to the fund inflows for the winners, there are no significant fund
outflows for the loser. Hence, there is empirical evidence for an asymmetric return-flow
relationship (Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier and Ellison, 1997). While funds with better
performance are rewarded with higher inflows of money, worse-performing funds do not
necessarily suffer from outflows. Fifth, managers’ compensation is determined based on
(new) assets under management. Therefore, their compensation is positively related to
the amount of money flowing into the fund (Brown et al., 1996), giving them strong
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incentives to be among the winners at the end of the year.
Assembling these puzzle pieces results in the following hypothesis. As managers’
compensation is linked to fund’s inflows, which, in turn, is the consequence of better
performance, managers have incentives to be among the end-of-year winners. For this
reason, when their performance over the course of a year is worse than their competitors’,
they have an incentive to deviate from the investment style stated in their name in an
attempt to catch up with competitors by the end of the year, when rankings are final-
ized. If this deviation is successful, their funds will receive higher new investments, and
their compensation will increase. This behavior can be explained with prospect theory
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Due to the convexity of
the utility function in the loss area, individuals are willing to take more risk. However,
given the asymmetric return-flow relationship, if this deviation is not successful and leads
to worse end-of-year performance, managers would, on the other hand, not necessarily
be penalized by investment outflows, and their compensation would not be drastically
affected.
In the context of the name inaccuracy, the tournament hypothesis can be supported by
three different pieces of evidence. First, if the tournament hypothesis holds, funds would
deviate more often at the end of the year Hence, we expect fund name deviations to happen
mainly during the fourth quarter of a year. This hypothesis is motivated by the attempt
to catch up with the winning funds by the end of the year when performance rankings
are calculated. Second, the rank of a fund’s performance in comparison to its competitors
would determine the degree to which a fund deviates from the stated investment style,
i.e., the degree of inaccuracy: the lower the rank, the higher the incentive to ”gamble”
and to deviate from the stated investment style. Third, as the tournament hypothesis
implies that the decision to deviate is deliberate and is part of a strategy, we expect a
difference between funds whose names are only inaccurate for one quarter (which could
be due to inattention) and funds whose names are inaccurate for multiple quarters. A
repetitive character would indeed point at a deliberate strategy used by managers rather
than inattention. In particular, the performance ranking would determine the degree of
inaccuracy of funds whose names are inaccurate for at least two quarters. This would not
be the case for funds featuring an inaccurate name for only one quarter.
Hence, in what follows, we provide evidence for the support of the tournament hy-
pothesis. First, we look at the timing of the inaccuracy to identify potential patterns.
Second, we analyze the determinants of the degree of inaccuracy and investigate whether
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performance ranking is indeed a significant determinant of a fund’s inaccuracy. Finally,
we distinguish funds deviating for only one quarter from funds deviating for at least two
quarters and conduct the previous analysis on each sample separately.
4.4.1 Point in Time of the Inaccuracy
First, we look at the distribution of inaccurate mutual fund names over the year. Table
4.4 reports the percentage of funds deviating in each quarter.90 The results show that
most deviations (53%) occur during the last quarter of a year, while the rest is equally
distributed among the other three quarters. Accordingly, most fund name deviations come
up at the end of the year, when relative performance rankings are created. Thus, this
finding is in line with the tournament hypothesis, which predicts that funds would deviate
from their stated investment strategy in an attempt to increase their performance and
catch up with best-ranked competitors by the end of the year when performance rankings
are issued. Interestingly, this result holds for all dimensions but amplifies in the more
strictly regulated dimensions (SMB or SMB & HML), in which we observe, in general,
fewer deviations (see Table 4.3).
Table 4.4: Quarter of deviation
Table 4.4 reports the deviations (in %) from the investment style suggested by the name (fund
names switching from being accurate to being inaccurate) per quarter and per dimension (SMB,
HML, or both SMB & HML).
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
All 14 17 15 53
SMB 6 12 7 75
HML 16 19 17 48
SMB & HML 0 0 0 100
4.4.2 Determinants of Inaccuracy and Fund’s Performance Rank
Next, we investigate which determinants explain the degree of inaccuracy of mutual
fund names, i.e., the degree to which a fund deviates from the investment styles stated
90To make results across categories comparable, we report relative and not absolute numbers.
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in its fund name. In particular, we are interested in whether the performance rank
determines the degree to which funds deviate.
To this end, we estimate a panel regression in which the dependent variable is the
degree of inaccuracy. We relate this inaccuracy to various fund characteristics observed
in the previous quarter. Among others, we test for the impact of past fund flows, fund age,
costs, and risk. Following Cooper et al. (2005) and Espenlaub et al. (2017), we also include
a long-term flow variable, computed as the average of the fund flows over the previous
three quarters. Including this variable allows us to identify whether the relationship
between flows and inaccuracy is rather of long- or short-term nature. Further, we include
the rank of a fund based on its return with respect to its competitors, defined as the
funds having the same name; i.e. a fund named small competes with all the other funds
named small. We compute the fund’s rank on the basis of their returns earned over the
past three quarters. Finally, we control for general market conditions by including quarter
fixed effects. The samples of funds in this analysis are the one defined in Table 4.12.91
Hence, we estimate the following panel regression model:
Inaccuracyf,t =γ0 + γ1Rankf,[t−3,t−1] + γ2Fund Flowf,t−1 + γ3Mean Flowf,[t−3,t−1]
+ γ4Riskf,t−1) + γ5Fund Sizef,t−1 + γ6 log(Agef,t−1)
+ γ7Expense Ratiof,t−1 + γ8Turnover Ratiof,t−1 + νt + ǫf,t−1, (4.3)
where Inaccuracyf,t−1 is the degree of inaccuracy at time t of fund f . Rankf,[t−3,t−1] is the
respective rank variable. Further, we control for the fund flow and the return, the fund
risk, size, the age, the expense ratio, and the turnover. νt is a year-quarter fixed effect,
and we cluster standard errors at the fund level. The coefficient of interest with respect
to the tournament hypothesis, γ1, captures the marginal effect of the fund’s respective
rank on the degree of inaccuracy and indicates whether its relative performance drives
the degree of a fund’s inaccuracy. The results for our sample of funds that have a name
referring to either the size (SMB), the investment strategy (HML) dimension, or both
dimensions at the same time are reported in Table 4.5.
Indeed, results in Table 4.5 support our hypothesis: the lower the rank of a fund’s
performance with respect to its competitors, the higher the degree to which the fund
deviates from the investment style stated in its name. Thus, this finding suggests that
funds that are relative losers change investment styles that are not aligned with their
91Note that we lose some observations given that the explanatory variables are lagged by one quarter,
or are sometimes computed using information over three quarters.
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Table 4.5: Determinants of Inaccuracy
Table 4.5 reports the result of a panel regression investigating the determinants of the degree
of inaccuracy of a fund (i.e. the degree to which a fund deviates from the investment style
stated in its name). The samples are as defined in Table 4.12. Quarter fixed effects are used.
The dependent variable Inaccuracy is between 0 and 100. The independent variables are all
standardized. The determinants are defined in Table 4.14. Column (1) reports the results for
the whole sample of funds, column (2) reports the results for funds with a name related to
the SMB dimension, column (3) reports the results for funds with a name related to the HML
dimension, and column (4) reports the results for funds with a name related to both the SMB
and HML dimensions. The standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in
parentheses. * , **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SMB HML SMB & HML
Rank[t−3,t−1] -0.6604
∗∗∗ -0.4721∗∗∗ -0.8466∗∗∗ -0.3451∗∗
(0.1871) (0.1646) (0.2171) (0.1687)
Fund Flowt−1 0.2199 0.0500 0.3550
∗ 0.0904
(0.1704) (0.1511) (0.2043) (0.1559)
Mean Flow[t−3,t−1] -1.0262
∗∗∗ -0.6360∗∗∗ -0.6959∗∗∗ -0.2114
(0.2035) (0.1743) (0.2443) (0.1998)
Riskt−1 0.5625
∗∗∗ 0.6204∗∗∗ 0.4041∗ 0.4365∗∗
(0.1889) (0.1644) (0.2101) (0.1812)
Fund Sizet−1 -0.0347 -0.0717 -0.0519 -0.1196
(0.3619) (0.3181) (0.3990) (0.3151)
log(Age)t−1 0.3218 0.1670 0.2442 0.0468
(0.2823) (0.2233) (0.3090) (0.2229)
Expense ratiot−1 1.8346
∗∗∗ 0.4741 2.6273∗∗∗ 0.7229∗∗
(0.3639) (0.3098) (0.3715) (0.2998)
Turnovert−1 0.1304 0.1924 -0.1019 0.0714
(0.2958) (0.2049) (0.3436) (0.2751)
Quarter Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y
Observations 19,662 10,466 15,055 5,937
Adj. R2 0.0753 0.062 0.0693 0.0564
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names to improve their relative performance. This relation holds no matter the dimension
on which the fund name is inaccurate (SMB, HML, or both). In column (2), (3), and
(4) of Table 4.5, we separate the analysis between funds that provide a size indication in
their name (column (2)), those that indicate an investment strategy (column (3)), and
those that refer to both dimensions (column (4)). The main results are always similar to
the regression that includes all funds.
In addition to the performance ranking, other variables are found to be significant
determinants. One of them is fund risk. When a fund has higher idiosyncratic risk, it
deviates more from the stated investment style. This is also true, no matter the dimension
in which a name can be inaccurate.
Moreover, we find a significant effect of fund flows on the degree of inaccuracy. The
fund flows in the previous three quarters are significantly negatively related to the degree
to which a fund deviates from its suggested investment strategy in the name. Interestingly,
we do not find that the most recent fund flows from the previous quarter are significantly
determining the degree of inaccuracy, which suggests that the identified relation is more
of a long-term than a short-term nature.
Finally, we find a statistically significant relationship between a fund’s expense ratio
and the degree of a fund’s name inaccuracy. The more expensive a fund is, the higher
is the degree to which it deviates. We also include fund size, age, and turnover in the
preceding quarter to analyze whether larger, older and more active funds have a higher
probability of providing an inaccurate fund name but do not find any significant impact.
4.4.3 Inattention vs. Deliberate Strategy
While the results in Table 4.5 support our hypothesis and provide evidence that man-
agers’ decisions to deviate from the strategy are linked to a relatively bad rank in perfor-
mance in the previous quarters, we cannot rule out that a deviation can also happen by
inattention. Hence, in the next step, we test whether this decision is based on a manager’s
inattention or whether it is because of a deliberate strategy.
For this reason, and to refine our analysis, we perform the same regression but splitting
our sample into two different subsamples. Figure 4.2 in Section 4.3 shows that a large
fraction of funds provides only for a very short time an inaccurate fund name, while other
funds do so for a long time. Hence, we test whether funds that differ in the duration of
inaccurate information also differ with respect to the motivation. The implicit assumption
behind this analysis is that short-term inaccuracy represents an inattention motive rather
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while a deliberate strategy would drive long-term inaccuracy.
Table 4.6: Determinants of inaccuracy: restricted sample (0/1)
Table 4.6 reports the result of a panel regression to investigate the determinants of the degree of
inaccuracy of a fund (i.e. the degree to which a fund deviates from the investment style stated
in its name). Starting from the sample as defined in Table 4.12, we restrict this analysis to
the subsample of funds whose names are never inaccurate or are inaccurate for a single quarter
only. The determinants are defined in Table 4.14. Quarter fixed effects are used. The variables
are all standardized. Column (1) reports the results for the whole sample of funds, column (2)
reports the results for funds with a name related to the SMB dimension, column (3) reports the
results for funds with a name related to the HML dimension, and column (4) reports the results
for funds with a name related to both the SMB and HML dimensions. The standard errors are
clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. * , **, and *** represent statistical
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SMB HML SMB & HML
Rank[t−3,t−1] -0.1620 -0.1940 -0.2656 -0.1373
(0.1368) (0.1514) (0.1700) (0.1978)
Fund Flowt−1 0.1294 0.1230 0.1649 0.2774
∗
(0.1263) (0.1153) (0.1643) (0.1448)
Mean Flow[t−3,t−1] -0.6095
∗∗∗ -0.5482∗∗∗ -0.3806∗∗ -0.1731
(0.1413) (0.1586) (0.1708) (0.1977)
Riskt−1 0.3448
∗∗∗ 0.2389∗∗ 0.3337∗∗ 0.1622
(0.1271) (0.1144) (0.1578) (0.1478)
Fund Sizet−1 0.1217 -0.1122 0.1711 -0.3400
(0.2419) (0.2910) (0.2677) (0.3295)
log(Age)t−1 -0.1043 -0.0533 -0.1626 -0.0601
(0.1880) (0.2241) (0.2091) (0.2644)
Expense ratiot−1 0.2562 -0.0523 0.7668
∗∗∗ -0.0497
(0.2305) (0.2611) (0.2384) (0.3023)
Turnovert−1 0.3787
∗∗ 0.4568∗∗ 0.1815 0.0454
(0.1489) (0.1980) (0.2028) (0.3721)
Quarter Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y
Observations 11,453 7271 7511 3343
Adj. R2 0.0488 0.0533 0.0373 0.0303
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Table 4.7: Determinants of inaccuracy: restricted sample (0/>1).
Table 4.7 reports the result of a panel regression to investigate the determinants of funds the
degree of inaccuracy of a fund (i.e. the degree to which a fund deviates from the investment
style stated in its name). Starting from the sample as defined in Table 4.12, we restrict this
analysis to the subsample of funds whose names are never inaccurate or are inaccurate for more
than a single quarter. The determinants are defined in Table 4.14. Quarter fixed effects are
used. The variables are all standardized. Column (1) reports the results for the whole sample
of funds, column (2) reports the results for funds with a name related to the SMB dimension,
column (3) reports the results for funds with a name related to the HML dimension, and column
(4) reports the results for funds with a name related to both the SMB and HML dimensions.
The standard errors are clustered at the fund level and are reported in parentheses. * , **, and
*** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All SMB HML SMB & HML
Rank[t−3,t−1] -0.7607
∗∗∗ -0.4131∗∗ -1.0088∗∗∗ -0.3969∗∗
(0.2200) (0.1921) (0.2534) (0.1913)
Fund Flowt−1 0.1564 -0.0005 0.3298 0.0334
(0.1886) (0.1664) (0.2292) (0.1849)
Mean Flow[t−3,t−1] -0.9502
∗∗∗ -0.5320∗∗∗ -0.5688∗∗ -0.1403
(0.2390) (0.1986) (0.2857) (0.2357)
Riskt−1 0.8146
∗∗∗ 0.8506∗∗∗ 0.4897∗∗ 0.4323∗∗
(0.2369) (0.2261) (0.2463) (0.2085)
Fund Sizet−1 -0.2229 -0.2128 -0.2659 -0.1047
(0.4392) (0.3801) (0.4791) (0.3620)
log(Age)t−1 0.5863
∗ 0.3052 0.4695 0.0256
(0.3348) (0.2662) (0.3619) (0.2513)
Expense Ratiot−1 2.0122
∗∗∗ 0.4876 2.7936∗∗∗ 0.9189∗∗∗
(0.4241) (0.3648) (0.4319) (0.3349)
Turnovert−1 0.1781 0.2565 -0.1283 0.1982
(0.3530) (0.2201) (0.4033) (0.2685)
Quarter Fixed Effect Y Y Y Y
Observations 15,637 8181 12,033 4641
Adj. R2 0.0712 0.0475 0.0698 0.0562
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First, we analyze funds whose names are only inaccurate for a single quarter (inatten-
tion treatment) versus funds whose names are never inaccurate (control group). Second,
we study funds whose names are inaccurate for more than one quarter (deliberate strategy
treatment) versus funds whose names are never inaccurate (control group). We use the
repetitive nature of a name inaccuracy as an indication that the decision to deviate is
part of the fund’s strategy to achieve a higher rank. The tournament hypothesis implies
that the rank is significant only for the regression, where the treatment group consists of
funds whose names are inaccurate for more than one quarter.
Table 4.6 reports the result of the regression estimated on a sample of funds that
either never have an inaccurate name or have an inaccurate name for only one quarter,
while Table 4.7 estimates the regression on a sample including the funds that have an
inaccurate name for more than one quarter.
The results of Table 4.6 and 4.7 support the tournament hypothesis as Table 4.6 does
not report any effect of the rank on the degree of inaccuracy while Table 4.7 reports
such an impact. The performance rank over the past quarters does not drive the degree
of inaccuracy of funds that are only short-term inaccurate in their names. In contrast,
we find for long-term inaccurate mutual fund names that the lower the rank of a fund’s
performance with respect to its competitors, the higher the fund’s degree deviates from
the investment style stated in its name. The results hold across all dimensions.
Therefore, we conclude that the results of our analyses confirm that managers use
deviations from the investment styles stated in the name (leading to an inaccurate name)
as a strategy when their performance over the course of the year is worse than their
competitors, to try to achieve a higher performance rank by the end of the year when
rankings are issued.
4.5 Fund Name Changes and Inaccuracy
In general, fund managers are allowed to change the fund names whenever they want
as long as the new name is in line with Rule 35d-1 (SEC, 2001). In doing so, fund
managers can ensure that the new fund name is continuously accurate with regard to the
asset class, the sector, or the region in which a fund invests. Former literature documents
that fund name changes are widespread and used as a strategic instrument (Cooper et al.,
2005; Espenlaub et al., 2017). Namely, fund managers use name changes to attract fund
inflows, i.e., changing the name from a cold fund name (style) to a hot fund name (style).
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This, however, sometimes also without considering the accuracy of the new fund name.
Hence, fund name changes can affect the degree of inaccuracy of a name in two possible
ways. On the one hand, they can increase the inaccuracy of a name. This is the case
when a fund manager changes the fund name without changing the underlying portfolio.
This is what Cooper et al. (2005) and Espenlaub et al. (2017) observe: a new fund name
can indicate an investment in hot styles without being accompanied by a corresponding
change in the portfolio. On the other hand, name changes can decrease the inaccuracy of
a fund name. This happens when a fund name and the corresponding fund portfolio are
not aligned before the fund name change. In this case, a fund manager changes the fund
name to ensure that the name remains in line with a new portfolio.
Accordingly, we investigate in the following the role of fund name changes for the
accuracy of the name and thus analyze all fund name changes in our sample between
2010 and 2018. In total, there are 665 fund name changes. See Figure 4.3 for an overview
of fund name changes over time.
Figure 4.3 shows the number of fund name changes in each year quarter. It illustrates
that fund name changes are spread over the whole period in our sample. On average,
there are 18 fund name changes per quarter with a considerable variation over time.
Next, we formally test for the effect of name changes on the degree of inaccuracy of a
fund by repeating the panel regression (4.3), including a name change dummy. We define
the variable Name Changet, when the name of a fund in quarter t is different from its
name in quarter t − 1. Table 4.8 reports the effect of a name change on the degree of
inaccuracy of a fund. The results in specifications (1) to (4) of Table 4.8 show across all
subsamples that a name change in the quarter before does not significantly affect a fund’s
inaccuracy. More precisely, we find a positive but non-significant effect.
Many of those fund name changes are, however, not meaningful in our context. More
precisely, the new name and the old name do not differ in terms of the mentioned invest-
ment styles (small, large, value, or growth). Therefore, in the next step, we differentiate
between non-meaningful and meaningful fund name changes – changes in the name that
refer to a change in the indicated style, e.g., from or to growth/value/small/large. There
are 49 meaningful name changes in our sample (see Figure 4.4 in the Appendix for an
overview over time).
Hence, the specifications (5) to (8) in Table 4.8 show the results when we control for
the meaningful name changes. Contrary to the findings before, we document that when



























Figure 4.3: Frequency of fund name changes
Figure 4.3 shows the number of fund name changes for each quarter between 2010 and
2018. In total there are 665 fund name changes in our sample.
inaccuracy is significant at the 1% level in the SMB dimension. These results indicate
that meaningful fund name changes are used as an instrument to bring fund names and
the corresponding underlying portfolio again align with each other. Thus, fund name












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6 Consequences of Inaccurate Names
Finally, we analyze the possible consequences of deviating from the investment style
stated in the name. In particular, we are interested in central fund characteristics before
and after a name becomes inaccurate. Our goal is to investigate whether implementing a
deviation strategy to achieve a higher performance ranking is effective and to understand
the investors’ reaction to an inaccurate name.
Given that deviating from the stated investment style is not random, we follow Cooper
et al. (2005) and rely on propensity score matching. This approach allows us to match
funds similar in every characteristic but the naming accuracy. To obtain the propensity
score, we estimate a logit regression using the same explanatory variables as in Table 4.5.
Moreover, to ensure that we match funds that are as similar as possible and to control for
unobservable characteristics across time, we restrict ourselves to matches of funds within
a year-quarter-style category, where style is either related to the SMB dimension, to the
HML dimension, or to both dimensions at the same time. Once a match is found, we
compute abnormal fund characteristics as the difference between the characteristics of the
treated fund (whose name switches from accurate to inaccurate) and of the control fund
(whose name keeps being accurate).
The results are reported in Table 4.9. They are reported for each dimension on which a
fund name can be inaccurate (only SMB, only HML, or both). Moreover, given the results
of the previous section highlighting that funds having an inaccurate name for one quarter
are not the same as funds having an inaccurate name for more than one quarter, we report
three different results: (1) using the full sample of inaccurate fund names (N >= 1), (2)
using a sample of funds whose names are only inaccurate for one quarter (N = 1), (3) and
using a sample of funds whose names are inaccurate for more than a quarter (N > 1).
Our first characteristic of interest is fund flows, as those indicate whether and how
investors react to such name inaccuracy. An increase in fund flows could be interpreted
as an increased interest in the fund from investors. The increased fund flow also means
that managers receive higher compensation (managers’ compensation is increasing with
the fund’s size). On the other hand, a decrease in fund flows could indicate that investors
take note of funds’ deviating behavior and decide to invest in alternative products.
Overall, Panel A in Table 4.9 shows that funds do not experience statistically signif-
icant abnormal outflows. This result, therefore, suggests that investors do not respond
to inaccurate information. Moreover, while the ultimate goal of the deviation strategy
implemented by fund managers is to attract new investments into the funds in order to
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increase their compensation, the results show that this is not effective, on average.
Second, we examine potential consequences in a funds’ return rank. If the deviation
from the stated investment strategy leads to a higher rank, this indicates that the strategy
to use deviations to increase the fund rank is successful. However, we do not find evidence
that such deviating behaviour consistently pays off in terms of improving the fund’s
performance rank. The strategy sometimes even negatively impacts the rank. In this
case, not deviating from the name-suggested style would have delivered better relative
performance.
Panel B in Table 4.9 also reports a significant difference in abnormal ranks depending
on whether funds deviate on the SMB dimension or on the HML dimension. While fewer
funds are deviating on the SMB dimension, these results suggest that those funds which
deviate do this in a rather extreme manner. Given that the SMB dimension is more
strictly regulated than the HML dimension, these results suggest that the stricter name
regulation is not effective in reducing the severity of such deviations, even if it is effective
in reducing the occurrence of inaccurate names (as shown in Table 4.3).
It is also interesting to note that the SMB funds do not suffer from significant outflows
of money despite their worse performance ranking. This finding can be explained by the
asymmetric relationship between flows and returns (Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier and
Ellison, 1997).
Third, we investigate the consequence in terms of risk. A higher risk would highlight
that the funds “gamble” by deviating to try to achieve a better ranking. Moreover, if risk
increases and the rank is not improved, investors do not benefit from a fund’s decision to
deviate from its stated investment style. Bearing higher risk but not benefiting in terms
of returns is clearly undesirable for investors.
The results of abnormal risk reported in Table 4.9 show that risk significantly in-
creases. This result, taken together with the abnormal rank results, shows that a fund’s
risk/return trade-off is worse after a deviation. Again, we observe a significant difference
between funds that deviate on the SMB dimension and those who deviate on the HML
dimension: the trade-off is even worse for those deviating on the more strictly regulated
SMB dimension.
In general, the results reported in Table 4.9 highlight that funds perform very poorly
after deviating from the investment style stated in their name. This suggests that these
funds gambled but lose. Hence, our findings are in line with the tournament hypothesis.
Moreover, as highlighted by the absence of abnormal flows, investors are not able to
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Table 4.9: Abnormal Characteristics
Table 4.9 reports abnormal characteristics of funds following a name inaccuracy. In order to
compute these abnormal characteristics, a propensity score matching technique is used to find
a fund with an accurate name which is the most closely related to a fund with an inaccurate
name. The propensity score are obtained with a logit regression using as dependent variable a
dummy that is equal to 1 when the fund name becomes inaccurate and 0 when the fund name
remains accurate. The explanatory variables are the same as in Table 4.5. The control fund is
also required to be in the same year-quarter-style category as the treated fund, where style is
either related to the SMB dimension, to the HML dimension, or to both dimensions at the same
time. The abnormal characteristic is the difference between the characteristic of the treated fund
and the characteristic of the control fund. Panel A reports the abnormal characteristics and
whether they are significantly different from zero. Panel B reports the difference in abnormal
characteristics, depending on the dimension present in the fund name (SMB, HML, or both).
The results are also split for different samples: N >= 1 is a sample of funds whose names are
inaccurate for at least one quarter, N = 1 is the sample of funds whose names are inaccurate
for exactly one quarter, and N > 1 is the sample of funds whose names are inaccurate for more




Panel A: Abnormal characteristics
All
(1a) N>= 1 -0.6399 -0.0264∗∗ 0.3562∗∗∗
(1b) N= 1 -2.3534∗ -0.0136 0.7608∗∗∗
(1c) N> 1 -0.4290 -0.0280∗∗ 0.3064∗∗∗
SMB
(2a) N>= 1 -0.4196 -0.0732∗∗ 0.7686∗∗∗
(2b) N= 1 -3.2930 -0.0455 0.9826∗∗∗
(2c) N> 1 0.6066 -0.0832∗∗ 0.6922***
HML
(3a) N>= 1 -0.5971 -0.0172 0.2635∗∗∗
(3b) N= 1 -1.7431 0.0040 0.6457∗∗∗
(3c) N> 1 -0.4975 -0.0191 0.2303∗∗∗
SMB & HML
(4a) N>= 1 -2.8948∗ -0.0527 0.9052∗∗∗
(4b) N= 1 -3.1405 -0.0034 0.5897
(4c) N> 1 -2.8411 -0.0635 0.9742∗∗∗
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Table 4.9 continued.
Panel B: Within-sample comparison
SMB vs. HML
T-stat (2a)-(3a) 0.1611 -1.8008∗ 4.9297∗∗∗
T-stat (2b)-(3b) -0.5460 -0.6897 1.6493
T-stat (2c)-(3c) 0.9981 -1.8327 ∗ 3.7180∗∗∗
SMB & HML vs. SMB
T-stat (4a)-(2a) -1.3949 0.2814 0.5111
T-stat (4b)-(2b) 0.0386 0.3219 -1.0006
T-stat (4c)-(2c) -1.7638∗ 0.2317 0.8898
SMB & HML vs. HML
T-stat (4a)-(3a) -1.4500 -0.5214 2.5652∗∗
T-stat (4b)-(3b) -0.4174 -0.0608 -0.1460
T-stat (4c)-(3c) -1.2999 -0.5608 2.5261∗∗
notice this deviation, at least not in a timely manner. This adds an additional layer of
concern: investors are worse off but do not react. Thus, our results highlight the need for
stricter regulations, not only when a fund changes its name or is created but also over its
whole life cycle.
4.7 Conclusion
A significant fraction of mutual funds refers to an investment style in their name. This
paper explores whether these funds stick to these highlighted investment styles or deviate
from it, resulting in inaccurate fund names. In particular, we want to understand which
funds provide inaccurate name information, why they feature an inaccurate name and the
consequences of such inaccuracy.
To answer these research questions, we construct a fund name history dataset based
on fund prospectuses in the EDGAR database of the SEC. Extracting information from
more than 400,000 prospectuses between January 2010 and December 2018 allows us to
build a detailed name history dataset for U.S. equity mutual funds. To identify inaccurate
fund names, we then use a cluster analysis technique.
In the first part of the paper, we document that a significant fraction of mutual funds
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is associated with an inaccurate fund name. We find that 33% of U.S. equity mutual funds
have an inaccurate name at least once in their life-cycle. Second, we focus on two specific
dimensions on which a name can be inaccurate: the size dimension (name including the
terms small or large), and the investment strategy dimension (name including the terms
growth or value). The size dimension displays relatively few inaccurate fund names, while
inaccurate fund names are abundant in the investment strategy dimension. This result
is not surprising given that the SEC regulates more strictly the names related to the size
dimension (see Rule 35d-1) than those related to the investment strategy dimension.
Regarding the characteristics of funds with inaccurate fund names, we find that funds
that deviate from the investment style stated in their names experience lower fund inflows,
are riskier, and charge higher expense ratios. More importantly, we find that funds that
are relative losers in performance compared to their competitors deviate more from the
stated investment styles in the names. This finding can be rationalized by prospect
theory and supports our tournament hypothesis, which states that funds deliberately use
deviations from the style in the name as a strategy to climb the performance ranking.
This hypothesis is further supported by the fact that we do not observe such an effect
for funds, which only have an inaccurate name for one quarter (which could be more the
result of inattention than strategy).
Finally, to shed light on the consequences of inaccurate fund names, we estimate
potential abnormal characteristics of inaccurate funds with respect to funds that do not
deviate from the investment style included in their name. We rely on propensity score
matching to overcome potential endogeneity problems. By looking at funds’ performance
ranking and idiosyncratic risk, respectively, we find that funds do not improve their
ranking while being exposed to higher idiosyncratic risk after deviating from the stated
investment style. This consequence is even more pronounced for funds whose name is
more strictly regulated by the SEC. However, investors fail to actively respond to these
disadvantageous characteristics of funds having an inaccurate name as we do not document
any significant abnormal fund outflows.
Overall, our results highlight the role of transparency and a precise regulation in the
fund names.
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Figure 4.4: Frequency of non-cosmetic fund name changes
Figure 4.4 shows the number of fund name changes for each quarter between 2010 and
2018. In total there are 49 fund name changes in our sample.
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Table 4.10: Prospectus data
Table 4.10 shows the number of prospectuses for each form type that mutual funds have to fill
and whether the information is already at the fund level or the fund family level. 497, 497K,
485APOS, and 485BPOS filings are available in the EDGAR SEC database. In total, we retrieve
fund names from 418,938 prospectuses, covering 20,973 funds (SeriesId’s). Prospectus data is
provided in the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) format. The fund name in
a prospectus can be identified due to the XBRL tree and key structure. We extract for all
prospectuses the most recent name on a fund for each fund and month-year. Merging the data
with the Morningstar database via the share class ticker symbol and restricting the sample to
equity funds only results in 2,166 funds between 2010 and 2018.







Table 4.11: Possible cases of inaccurate names
Table 4.11 shows the eight possible cases that we have in our sample and the associated number
of fund-quarter observations. A fund name either refers to the SMB dimension (small or large),
to the HML dimension (value or growth), or to both dimensions. When a fund name refers to
both dimensions, it can be inaccurate (or accurate) on only one of these two dimensions, or on
both.
Name SMB dimension HML dimension N
(1) SMB Accurate 5513
(2) SMB Inaccurate 135
(3) HML Accurate 10,752
(4) HML Inaccurate 1961
(5) SMB & HML Accurate Accurate 7729
(6) SMB & HML Inaccurate Accurate 116
(7) SMB & HML Accurate Inaccurate 748
(8) SMB & HML Inaccurate Inaccurate 48
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Table 4.12: Control and treatment groups
Table 4.12 shows the number of fund-quarter observations during which a name switches from
being accurate to being inaccurate (columns Treated) or remains accurate (columns Control).
The numbers are reported per type of name and per dimension on which a name is inaccurate.
We obtain three different treatment and control groups, one for each dimension on which a fund
name can be inaccurate. SMB refers fund-quarter observations associated to cases (1), (2), (5),
and (6) in Table 4.11. The fund names in the treatment group switch from being part of the
accurate name group (1)+(5) to being part of the inaccurate name group (2)+(6), while fund
names in the control group remain in group (1)+(5). HML refers to fund-quarter observations
represented by cases (3), (4), (5), and (7). The fund names in the treatment group switch from
being part of the accurate name group (3)+(5) to being part of the inaccurate name group
(4)+(7), while the fund names in the control group remain in group (3)+(5). SMB & HML
refers to fund-quarter observations of cases (5) and (8). The fund names in the treatment group
switch from being part of the accurate name group (5) to being part of the inaccurate name
group (8), while the fund names in the control group remain in group (5). Note that, when
a name includes both dimensions and remains accurate on both, the associated fund-quarter
observation is included in the SMB control group, in the HML control group, and in the SMB
& HML control group.
SMB HML SMB & HML
Control Treated Control Treated Control Treated
Small 3876 100
Small & Growth 1299 28 1299 224 1299 4
Small & Value 2496 42 2496 56 2496 16
Large 1524 14
Large & Growth 1696 17 1696 43 1696 18




Table 4.13: Characteristics of treatment vs control
Table 4.13 reports the summary statistics of funds in the treatment group, defined as funds
which have an inaccurate name in quarter t while having an accurate name in quarter t − 1.
These funds are compared with funds in the control group, which are those having an accurate
name in both quarters t and t−1. The last two columns present the difference and the statistics
of a two-sided t-test for significant differences. The sample includes all equity U.S. mutual funds
in the Morningstar database that are linked to a name in the SEC database and have a name
referring to the SMB dimension (small or large), to the HML dimension (value or growth), or to
both. This results in 22,323 accurate and 1,612 inaccurate fund-quarter observations between
2010 and 2018, removing any missing observations in the characteristics. * , ** , and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Control Treatment
Variable Mean Median Std Mean Median Std Diff t-stat
Fund Flow (in %) 2.07 0.52 14.06 1.33 0.02 13.87 0.75 2.05*
log(Fund Size (in mn. $) 19.48 19.62 2.01 19.17 19.22 2.01 0.31 6.02***
log(Company Size) 21.91 22.12 2.02 21.43 21.75 2.01 0.48 9.20***
Age (in Years) 14.93 13.83 10.39 15.41 14.08 10.75 -0.48 -1.80*
Return (in %) 1.15 1.12 5.10 1.38 1.40 5.08 -0.23 -1.76
Risk (in %) 0.32 0.21 0.43 0.83 0.36 1.00 -0.51 -40.43***
Expense Ratio (in %) 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.10 -0.02 -8.01***
Turnover Ratio (in %) 71.33 52.00 88.11 74.22 52.03 90.71 -2.88 -1.26
Cash (in %) 2.53 1.74 6.65 3.12 1.95 6.67 -0.59 -3.41***
FI (in %) 0.28 0.00 4.89 0.28 0.00 4.3 -0.01 -0.06
Equity (in %) 96.78 97.91 5.33 96.00 97.57 6.91 0.78 5.51***
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Table 4.14: Variable definitions
Table 4.14 provides definitions of all variables used in this paper. MS indicates Morningstar, C
refers to own calculation and SEC indicates data from the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Variable name Description Source
Name Name history of the fund as extracted from all prospectus
fillings in EDGAR
SEC
Series ID Fund identifier as extracted from the prospectuses in
EDGAR
SEC
Fund Flow (in %) Computed as
(TNAf,t − TNAf,t−1(1 +RFf,t))/(TNAf,t−1(1 +RFf,t)),
where TNAf,t corresponds to fund f ’s total net assets
(TNA) in quarter t and RTf,t denotes fund f ’s return in





Average flow over the 3 quarters before the observation
quarter t.
MS,C
Return (in %) Quarterly log-return computed as the sum of monthly log-
returns. Monthly returns are computed as the percentage
return calculated as the change in monthly net asset value
minus management fees and other regular costs.
MS, C
Rank (in %) Rank of the fund return in comparison to funds having the
same terms in their names. Fund return is the quarterly
log-return.
MS, C
Rank[t−3,t−1] (in %) Rank of the fund return in comparison to funds having the
same terms in their names. Fund return is computed as
the log-return over the 3 quarters (9 months) before the
observation quarter t
MS, C
Risk (in %) Standard deviation of the residuals from a model including
the three Fama and French factor returns as well as the
Carhart momentum factor. Factor returns are from Ken-
neth French’s library. It is expressed in %.
MS, C
Fund Size Logarithm of fund’s quarterly total net assets in million
USD, aggregated at the fund level.
MS, C
Company Size Logarithm of company’s quarterly total net assets in million
USD, aggregated at the investment company level.
MS, C
Age (in Years) Fund’s age computed as the difference from quarter t to the
inception date of the oldest share class.
MS, C
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Variable definitions, Table 4.14 continued
Variable name Description Source
log(Age (in Years)) Logarithm of fund’s age in months computed as the





Fund’s quarterly expense ratio expressed in percent. MS
Turnover (in %) Fund’s quarterly turnover ratio expressed in percent. MS
Inaccurate Classification of fund’s name as accurate (0) or inaccu-
rate (1) based on the Fuzzy C-means clustering method
in quarter t.
C
Inaccuracy (in %) Degree of inaccuracy of the fund’s name in percent.
When a fund is inaccurate in two different dimensions,
the maximum inaccuracy across the two dimensions is
used.
C
SMB Size factor in the Carhart four factor regression. C
HML Book-to-market factor in the Carhart four factor re-
gression.
C
Cash Proportion The percentage of the fund’s net assets in cash. MS
FI Proportion The percentage of the fund’s net assets in fixed income. MS
Equity Proportion The percentage of the fund’s net assets in equity. MS
Holdings Quarterly number of holdings that are in the portfolio
of a fund.
MS
Name Change A dummy that indicates for each fund quarter obser-




A dummy that indicates for each fund name change
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Krakow, J., Schäfer, T., 2020. Mutual funds and risk disclosure: Information content of
fund prospectuses. Working Paper .
Kravet, T., Muslu, V., 2013. Textual risk disclosures and investors’ risk perceptions.
Review of Accounting Studies 18, 1088–1122.
Kumar, A., Niessen-Ruenzi, A., Spalt, O. G., 2015. What’s in a name? mutual fund
flows when managers have foreign-sounding names. The Review of Financial Studies
28, 2281–2321.
Kunz, A. H., Messner, C., Wallmeier, M., 2017. Investors’ risk perceptions of structured
financial products with worst-of payout characteristics. Journal of Behavioral and Ex-
perimental Finance 15, 66–73.
Lang, M., Stice-Lawrence, L., 2015. Textual analysis and international financial reporting:
Large sample evidence. Journal of Accounting and Economics 60, 110–135.
Ledoit, O., Wolf, M., 2004. A well-conditioned estimator for large-dimensional covariance
matrices. Journal of Multivariate Analysis 88, 365–411.
Li, F., 2010. The information content of forward-looking statements in corporate filings—a
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